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 SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the effect of bank-specific variables on investment bank 
performance, as estimated by efficiency and financial indicators, in the G7 and 
Switzerland countries, over the 1997-2012 period. Moreover, we investigate the impact 
of expansionary monetary policies on the risk-taking of investment banks between 2007 
and 2014. 
Firstly, we investigate the impact of risk, liquidity and fee-based income on cost 
efficiency prior to and during the crisis. Then, we examine the presence of possible 
threshold effects of bank-specific variables on performance (cost efficiency). Moreover, 
we investigate whether there is difference between the impact of liquidity on the 
performance of stand-alone investment banks and on investment banks that belong to a 
larger banking entity. Secondly, we assess the impact of corporate governance on the 
performance (profitability and profit efficiency) of the US investment banks. We focus 
on five different categories of governance measures: i) board structure, ii) executive 
compensation, iii) ownership, iv) CEO power and v) operational complexity. We put 
emphasis on the impact of board size and board ownership on performance by examining 
for threshold effects of these variables. 
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Thirdly, we examine the impact of M&A advisory fees on bank performance, as estimated 
by technical inefficiency, using a methodology that includes as an undesirable output the 
bank-individual level of risk. Then we test the level of convergence in terms of M&A 
advisory fees and technical inefficiency of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland 
prior to (1997-2007) during (2007-2010) and after the financial crisis (2010-2012). 
Fourthly, we study the effect of unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) on the risk-
taking of investment banks in the US over the 2007-2014 period. We employ a number 
of alternative proxies that capture both directly UMPs: i) central bank’s assets over gross 
domestic product ratio ii) monetary aggregates iii) Taylor gap; and indirectly through the 
usage of low-interest rates: i) federal fund rate and ii) shadow short rate. 
Finally, we provide conclusions together with limitations of this research and a plan for 
a future work. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
This thesis examines the effect of bank-specific characteristics on investment bank 
performance, as proxied by efficiency and accounting-based indicators, in the G7 and 
Switzerland countries over the 1997-2012 period. Moreover, we examine the impact 
of unconventional monetary policies on investment bank risk during the 2007-2014 
period, when major economies have implemented numerous expansionary monetary 
policies aiming to boost the economic growth and wither the crisis. This section is an 
introductory one and will briefly show why it is important to examine the determinants 
of the performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland and also why we 
focus on both the micro-level and macro-level, i.e., monetary characteristics, which 
can have a significant impact on the performance of these financial institutions.1 
A well-functioning and developed financial market in an economy can contribute 
positively to the general economic growth and development. There are several ways 
that financial markets can promote growth enhancement: i) The accumulation and 
transmission of invaluable information to investors that in turn can have a beneficial 
effect on firm financing and performance (Allen and Gale, 1999), ii) The increase of 
motives to research companies as it is easier to earn profits from this type of 
information than by having operations in large markets (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993), 
iii) The enhancement of corporate governance mechanism by easing acquisitions 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990), iv) The facilitation of trading and managing the risk 
                                                          
1In some detail, two empirical chapters of this thesis focus exclusively on the US investment banks due to 
data availability issues. 
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(Levine, 1991). Based on these and given the fact that most of the functions described 
above are conducted by investment banks, a well-developed financial market can 
facilitate investment banking activities that in turn can influence the economic growth. 
Moreover, as investment banks among other financial institutions carry out such 
important activities it is natural to expect that when these financial institutions 
underperform the impact on the real economy can be severely negative as the recent 
financial crisis has verified. This is evident particularly in the case of Lehman Brothers 
that filed for bankruptcy in 2008, while a number of firms connected and non-
connected to this bank underperformed as well. A study by Chakrabarty and Zhang 
(2012) shows that the underperformance of investment banking sector can impact 
negatively the performance of both business related and unrelated companies and 
consequently this can have a detrimental effect on the entire economy. In particular, 
Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012) show that firms that had business relationships with 
Lehman Brothers faced severe consequences as they were exposed ‘directly’ to credit 
losses in line with the ‘counterparty risk’ hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis a 
failure of a company can cause negative effects on the performance of the firms in the 
same industry through the channel of credit contagion (Davis and Lo, 2001; Jorion 
and Zhang, 2009). This, in turn, can have detrimental effects on the industry as a 
whole and can also lead to contagion effects across industries that are connected. 
Investment banks offer their financial services to a number of companies from 
different industries. Therefore, consecutive failures of investment banks could, in turn, 
lead to the underperformance of a number of companies from different industries that 
would consequently affect negatively the economy as a whole. In support of this 
argument, Fernando et al. (2012) show that companies that had as their main 
underwriter Lehman Brothers experienced an important reduction in their returns and, 
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therefore, suffered great output losses. In addition, Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012) 
show that the poor performance of Lehman Brothers can affect ‘indirectly’ companies 
that do not have business linkages with the failed investment bank and one would 
expect that  are not exposed to thus are less exposed to adverse consequences as they 
do not have a direct business relationship. However, Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012)  
found that these companies are also exposed to negative effects of the financial crisis 
through the large dispersion in views among investors that created abnormal trading 
behaviour, consistent with the ‘information transmission’ hypothesis. The idea that 
lies behind this concept is that the information of a surprise default of a company is 
shared across firms and, therefore, this information can lead a number of unrelated 
companies to the failed firm to behave abnormally with regards to their trading 
performance (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2010). Another issue that highlights the 
importance of the investment banking industry is that in the most sophisticated 
economies including among others, G7 and Switzerland countries, investment 
banking activities capture a particularly important amount of revenues of the total 
banking industry profits. These economies have been significantly integrated with 
global financial markets over the last two decades. There is empirical evidence to 
support that economies that are more financially integrated suffered extensively over 
the period of the latest financial crisis (Claessens et al., 2010; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 
2011). Hence, it is natural to expect that in countries, such as the G7 and Switzerland, 
where financial markets have been expanded hugely both in the home country and 
cross-border level, the performance of investment banking sector has played and 
continues to play an important role in the general economic growth. Driving forces of 
the expansion of investment banking activities in the developed countries could be 
summarized in what it follows as described by Morrison and Wilhelm Jr (2007) and  
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Liaw (2006): i) The increase of the real per capita income and prosperity has raised 
the need for higher quality of financial services as being offered by the investment 
banks, ii) The rise of the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the 
industrialised countries in which investment banks have played the advisory role, iii) 
The high level of financial deregulation resulted in a rapid growth of the investment 
banking industry in the developed countries before the burst of the financial crisis in 
2007. Recent regulatory mandates have changed the framework that investment banks 
operate as banks are not allowed to perform both commercial and investment banking 
activities. 
The choice of developing and focusing this thesis on the factors that affect the 
performance of the investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland countries 
is thus appropriate. The investment banking industry for these economies is of utmost 
important as a number of new financial products have become a part of investment 
banking due to market expansion, financial globalization and environmental 
conditions, i.e. regulatory and technological framework (Gardener and Molyneux, 
1995). The development of investment banking activities in these countries has been 
encouraged by their well-developed and integrated financial systems that are 
principally characterised as financial market-based rather than bank-based 
systems.2There is evidence suggesting that not only countries such as the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) have market-based systems but also for 
European continental countries such as France and Germany the financial market-
based system is more relevant than in the past (Allen and Gale, 2000; Hölzl, 2006). 
                                                          
2As Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) pg 81 argue the distinction between the bank-based and the market-
based systems is described as: ‘In bank-based financial systems such as Germany and Japan, banks play a 
leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate 
managers, and providing risk management vehicles. In market-based financial systems such as England 
and the US securities markets share centre stage with banks in terms of getting society’s savings to firms, 
exerting corporate control, and easing risk management.’   
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Similarly, as claimed by Bruno et al. (2012) pg.1-2: ‘…financial structures have 
converged towards a model which combines elements of the Anglo-Saxon model, 
where markets and investment banks prevail, with characteristics of the continental 
European systems, where commercial banks are predominant.’ as argued by Bruno et 
al. (2012, p.1-2). Secondly, the latest financial crisis has started from the investment 
banking sector as prominent investment banks filed for bankruptcy, i.e. such as 
Lehman Brothers, others have asked for financial support to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Coverage (FDIC), while others have been acquired or merged with other 
financial institutions. Since financial crisis has been initiated from the investment 
banking sector and given that the economic slowdown is still apparent and continues 
to destabilizes the real economy, the investigation of the determinants of the 
performance of the investment banking industry is of great importance.  
The main focus of this thesis is on the micro-level determinants that affect investment 
bank performance. We put emphasis on risk, liquidity, fee-based income and 
corporate governance variables and their impact on investment bank performance. 
The main reason that drives our interest in these factors is the limited existing 
literature on the determinants of investment bank performance as well as the lack of 
any empirical study that includes the financial crisis period. This thesis gives 
particular attention on factors that can affect significantly the survival and well-
functioning of the investment banking industry that is of great importance especially 
in the wake of the latest financial crisis. Moreover, investment banks are financial 
institutions that differ fundamentally from other more conventional type of banks, 
such as commercial and savings. Hence, a comprehensive investigation of the 
determinants of investment bank performance would give emphasis on the distinctive 
characteristics of these financial institutions, such as their concentration on fee-based 
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operations that is linked with high earnings volatility (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010; Stiroh, 2004) and the fact that they lack of a deposit base that in turn would 
increase their risk exposure in case of a financial crisis (Gatev et al., 2009; Gatev and 
Strahan, 2006). The first contribution of this thesis then is to analyse the impact of 
various factors on the investment banking performance including a period of a great 
economic slowdown.  
 
There is also an angle of finance that has not been covered and adequately studied in 
the extant literature regarding its effect on investment bank performance, named as 
corporate governance. Due to the financial crisis, the corporate governance of 
financial institutions has gained much of research attention (Erkens et al., 2012; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013), 
while there has been a growing view that governance of financial institutions has 
played a detrimental role in terms of their performance (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Therefore, 
an investigation of the corporate governance factors that drive the investment bank 
performance over a period of a huge recession is of utmost importance. Corporate 
governance and its impact on the investment bank performance has been examined 
through a number of different measures that capture both board characteristics, 
executive compensation and ownership variables. We also investigate the impact of 
the operational environment that is related to the business complexity of the 
investment banking industry. The second contribution of this thesis then is that it 
investigates the effect of different types of corporate governance variables on 
investment bank performance. 
Furthermore, monetary policy is critical to central bank’s policy making as the 
introduction of effective strategies would foster economic growth and affect 
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considerably stability of financial institutions. In response to the financial crisis, the 
Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) in the US has initiated a number of unconventional 
monetary policies (UMPs). To this end, it is appropriate to examine if and in which 
way UMPs could impact the soundness of investment banks. Moreover, while there 
is a large volume of existing literature that looks at the impact of unconventional 
monetary policies (UMPs) on the risk-taking of investment banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2010, 2012, 2013; Delis et al., 2011; Buch et al., 2014; Fungacova et al., 2014), there 
is no research paper that focuses on the relationship between UMPs and risk of 
investment banks. However, according to Adrian and Shin (2009), investment banks’ 
involvement in the US large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) over the 2008-2013 period 
as broker-dealers, highlights the importance of these financial institutions when one 
examines the impact of UMPs on the risk-taking of financial institutions and the 
economy as a whole. This is particularly apparent in the US, where the position of 
investment banks has been increased particularly due to the rise of non-traditional 
banking operations such as securitization and underwriting. Moreover, Maddaloni and 
Peydro (2010) claim that over prolonged periods of low-interest rates that UMPs 
might be implemented there is an increase of broker-dealers’ activities signifying that 
monetary policies affect significantly the level of operations of these financial 
institutions. Thus, an investigation of UMPs on the risk-taking of investment banks is 
of particular importance and could provide interesting conclusions to both bankers 
and regulators. We investigate the effect of UMPs on risk taking of the US investment 
banks through various measures, such as central bank assets and other monetary 
aggregates that capture expansionary monetary policies. Therefore, the third 
contribution of this thesis is that explores the impact of UMPs on the risk-taking of 
the US investment banks. 
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Also, from a methodological point of view, this thesis opts, among others, for a 
parametric methodology, the dynamic threshold methodology as recently developed 
by (Kremer et al., 2013). This methodology enables the data employed in this thesis 
to show when the financial crisis took place and that is its main advantage in 
comparison to the other methods used, i.e., a crisis dummy over 2007-2009 or 2008-
2010, that attempt to capture arbitrarily the period of the recent economic recession. 
This econometric technique provides invaluable information with regards to the 
period prior and during the crisis and investigates the presence of possible threshold- 
effects of major bank determinants with respect to bank performance. The usage of 
the dynamic panel threshold methodology is substantial as this thesis covers a wide 
range of time including both tranquil and turbulent periods. The dynamic threshold 
analysis enables us to investigate this change of the economic conditions through 
changes in the number of investment banks that belong to each threshold regime, 
signifying important changes in the fundamental structure of investment banks before 
and after the financial turmoil. The fourth contribution of this thesis then is that it 
examines the determinants of investment bank performance through the application 
of a quite novel and recent methodology that allows making important implications 
in terms of key determinants of investment bank performance.        
 
Finally, it is essential to employ the most appropriate measure of bank performance. 
In this thesis, we use cost efficiency in Chapter 2, profit efficiency and financial 
indicators in Chapter 3 and technical efficiency in Chapter 4. There has been an 
extensive amount of banking literature that investigates bank performance by 
employing the frontier efficiency estimations (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; 
Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010; Cyree and Spurlin, 2012; Servin et al., 2012; Gaganis 
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and Pasiouras, 2013; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014; Goddard et al., 2014; Glass et 
al., 2014). A number of these studies employ cost efficiency (Goddard et al., 2014; 
Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014), others profit (Cyree and Spurlin, 2012; Gaganis and 
Pasiouras, 2013) and some of them use as bank performance measure technical 
efficiency (Servin et al., 2012; Glass et al., 2014). In a nutshell, frontier efficiency 
estimates evaluate the performance of a decision-making unit (DMU), for example 
banks, in relative terms with the best performers (DMUs) of a particular industry. The 
usage of cost efficiency, in Chapter 2, is based on the grounds that risk-related 
variables are linked particularly with the cost performance of banks and hence would 
enable us to capture adequately the relationships between the variables of our interest 
and bank performance measure. With regards to the bank performance measures 
employed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, we opt for frontier efficiency estimation, as 
estimated by profit efficiency, so as to investigate the impact of corporate governance-
related factors on bank performance. We choose to employ profit efficiency and 
profitability ratios, instead of cost-function, as corporate governance is a set of internal 
mechanisms that aim to maximize the value of a bank that is the more accepted 
economic goal of a firm (Berger and Mester, 1999; Denis et al., 2001). In Chapter 4, 
we use the enhanced hyperbolic distance function to estimate technical inefficiency 
as further developed by Cuesta et al. (2009). This efficiency estimation shows if a 
bank uses the minimum quantity of inputs to produce a given quantity of outputs. The 
reason that we opt for this methodology is that it allows the inclusion of an undesirable 
output, as proxied by bank-specific risk, in the translog function. This is of utmost 
value since investment banks are financial institutions that are involved primarily in 
highly risky and complex activities (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).  
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This thesis is structured into six chapters. The following chapter, Chapter 2, 
investigates the impact of risk, liquidity and fee-based income on investment bank 
performance for the G7 and Switzerland countries prior to and during the crisis (1997-
2010). Financial data are sourced from IBCA-Bankscope and used in the form of input 
prices, outputs and netputs to estimate cost efficiency scores employing a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) that has been broadly used in banking literature (Lozano-Vivas 
and Pasiouras, 2010; Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010; Cyree and Spurlin, 2012; Servin 
et al., 2012; Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014; Goddard 
et al., 2014; Glass et al., 2014). In a second stage analysis, we use these efficiency 
scores in fixed panel models, dynamic panel models and dynamic panel threshold 
analysis to evaluate the impact of risk, liquidity and non-interest income on cost 
efficiency scores regarding the economies under study. Dynamic threshold 
methodology enables us to investigate the presence of possible threshold-effects of 
the three main variables of our interest (risk, liquidity and fee-based income) in terms 
of cost efficiency during a period that includes the latest financial crisis. Finally, in a 
further analysis we also split our sample in investment banks that are part of a parent 
company, from which they can withdraw liquidity in case of a financial shock, and 
those that are stand-alone investment banks.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effect 
of corporate governance on the performance of the US investment banks over the 
2000-2012 period. Financial data for investment banks are derived from Thomson 
Financial Banker and IBCA-Bankscope, while corporate governance data are 
obtained from 10-K annual reports of SEC’s filings. These data are then used to 
estimate profit efficiency as well as accounting-based used that are employed as well 
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as robustness tests. Our corporate governance dataset is unique and it is hand-collected 
from DEF 14A proxy statements of annual meetings found in the SECs EDGAR 
filings. In similar lines with Chapter 2, in a second stage analysis we regress profit 
efficiency scores and financial indicators over a plethora corporate governance 
variables. The corporate governance dataset could be categorised in five different 
dimensions; i) board structure ii) CEO power iii) executive compensation iv) 
ownership of CEO and board members and v) operational complexity. We examine 
the impact of the above each category on investment bank performance through the 
usage of dynamic panel models. We also employ dynamic panel threshold 
methodology that enables us to investigate possible threshold-effects of key corporate 
governance variable over a period that includes both turbulent and tranquil times. In 
addition, the advantage of using this methodology in this chapter is to capture possible 
changes of the number of investment banks that fall within each regime that would 
imply transformations in the structure of corporate governance mechanisms of 
investment banks before and after the turmoil. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship between M&A advisory fees and bank 
performance for the G7 and Switzerland for the 1997-2012 period. For this chapter, 
we obtain financial data from IBCA-Bankscope and we then estimate technical 
efficiency by using a parametric methodology, named as the enhanced hyperbolic 
distance function (EHDF). This is a methodology that allows the inclusion of an 
undesirable output in the estimation of efficiency scores. We employ as the 
undesirable output bank-specific risk of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland 
countries that is of particular importance for these type of institutions that are 
inherently riskier than the conventional type of institutions. In addition, M&A 
12 
 
advisory fees comprise the main source of income of investment banks and hence it 
becomes vital to examine their impact on performance as proxied by technical 
efficiency. We also employ dynamic panel vector autoregression (VAR) models to 
investigate further endogeneity issues between M&A fees and technical efficiency 
scores. The high level of financial integration and globalization in the first half of the 
2000 decade resulted in a rapid development of the investment banking industry in 
the G7 and Switzerland (Morana, 2008). In addition, numerous deregulations that 
have taken place over the last two decades also contributed significantly to this growth 
of the investment banking industry. This strong growth of investment banking 
industry came to an abrupt end after the burst of the financial crisis. This economic 
slowdown had a negative effect on the banking integration process, declining in this 
way the convergence level among investment banks. Therefore, in a second stage 
analysis, we examine the level of convergence of investment banks in terms of both 
M&A advisory fees and technical efficiency in the period before (1997-2007), during 
(2007-2010) and after the financial crisis (2010-2012).  
 
The following chapter, Chapter 5, provides an empirical investigation on the effect of 
UMPs on the risk-taking of the US investment banks over the 2007-2014 period. We 
collect financial data from various sources including primarily 10-K annual reports of 
SEC’s filings and Bankscope database. Note, that we use quarterly data in order to 
capture the short-term effect of UMPs on investment bank risk-taking.  Financial data 
are used to estimate the individual level of risk, z-score, for each investment bank and 
regress these scores over various measures of UMPs and other control bank-specific 
and country level variables using both fixed effect and dynamic panel models. The 
measures that we employ to capture directly the effect of UMPs are the followings; i) 
13 
 
central bank assets over gross domestic product ii) monetary aggregates, i.e., M1 and 
M2 and iii) Taylor gap. We also use measures that capture indirectly the effect of 
UMPs, such as the federal fund rate and shadow rate. Over monetary expansionary 
periods the interest rates, i.e., federal fund rates, are close to zero suggesting that the 
implementation of UMPs could cause low-interest rates over prolonged periods.  
 
Lastly, in Chapter 6 we provide a summary of the contributions of this thesis and 
present some final comments and policy implications. We also discuss limitations of 
this research and thoughts for future research. 
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Chapter 2: What drives investment bank performance? The 
role of risk, liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The liberalization and globalization processes resulted in a rapid development of the 
investment banking industry in all the industrialized countries before the burst of the 
financial crisis in 2007. Investment banks primarily engage in the issuance of equity 
or debt securities and in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. In 
addition, investment banks’ activities include trading, securities, and merchant 
banking and investment management services.  The wide operational spectrum of the 
investment banking industry has significantly increased the importance of these 
financial institutions for the global financial system.  
 
The high level of financial integration in the first half of the 2000 decade has led to a 
rapid growth of the investment banking sector, particularly in the G7 and Switzerland, 
(Tomljanovich and Ying 2005; Morana, 2008; Baglioni et al., 2013). Investment bank 
presence both in terms of a number of institutions and operations is centred in these 
countries (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2012; Thomson Reuters, 2012). The development of 
investment banking activities reached its peak in 2006, when the industry’s total 
income in the G7 and Switzerland amounted to 80.67 (US$bn). In particular, 
investment banking earnings constituted 62% of total bank income in the US and 30% 
of the gross output of the UK economy in 2006 (Thomson Reuters, 2007; Burgess, 
2011). However, this strong growth came to an abrupt end due to the financial crisis 
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in 2007. The investment banking sector in the G7 and Switzerland experienced a 
considerable deceleration in activity as revenue dropped more than half from its 
highest point in 2006, reaching a total value of 39.07 (US$bn) in 2008. The industry 
as a whole has been profoundly reformed by the turmoil.3 The crisis revealed that 
investment banking activities are highly complex and interconnected (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010), particularly between the US and 
European investment banks (Eichengreen, 2012). As a consequence, the transmission 
of the US sub-prime mortgage meltdown led to a major recession in the G7 and 
Switzerland.  
 
In response to the 2007 financial crisis, US regulators passed the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010). This Act requires investment banks to have higher capital adequacy ratios as 
a ‘buffer’ against credit crunch. Moreover, it includes the ‘Volcker Rule’ that prohibits 
‘a banking entity to i) engage in proprietary trading; or ii) acquire or retain any 
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a 
private equity fund’ (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The Rule consequently aims to separate 
commercial banking from investment banking that is particularly comprised of 
proprietary trading. Moreover, the impact of the ‘Volcker Rule’ implementation is not 
limited within the US as it also applies to the US subsidiaries of foreign banks.4     
                                                          
3To mention but a few events, JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns with the financial aid of the Federal Reserve 
Bank, Bank of America merged with Merrill Lynch, while another prominent investment bank, Lehman 
Brothers, filed for bankruptcy. 
4The Rule has given rise to concerns due to its extraterritorial effect on the activity of the non-US banking 
institutions (Baxter, 2012). Despite the initial opposition of many countries to the formal application of the 
Rule, countries such as Germany and the UK acknowledge that regulatory amendments should be employed, 
aiming to rationalize banks’ operations in both commercial and investment banking activities. In particular, 
the UK, France and Germany have been seriously considering the introduction of a regulatory reform 
similar to the ‘Volcker Rule’ (Liikanen, 2012; Vickers and Lagarde, 2013; Gambacorta and Van Rixtel, 
2013). The widespread criticism of the Rule is further bolstered by the proposition that only US banks 
should have the right to trade US government bonds. Banks in counties such as Canada, Japan and the UK 
issue substantial levels of foreign sovereign debt and their exemption from the US government debt market 
could harm their financial markets. 
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Despite the importance of the investment banking for the G7 and Switzerland, existing 
research on investment bank performance determinants is limited, while there is no 
study that includes the years of the financial crisis. Radic et al. (2012) is the only study 
to focus exclusively on the performance of investment banks but they cover just the 
pre-crisis period (2001-2007). The authors estimate profit and cost functions with 
investment banking fees as output, concluding that insolvency risk has a positive 
effect on cost inefficiency. Earlier studies, such as those by Allen and Rai (1996) and 
Vander (2002), examine the performance of universal banks that include investment 
banking activities. In particular, Allen and Rai (1996) review the efficiency of 
universal banks compared with conventional banks using both parametric and non-
parametric methods. They find that universal banks operate more efficiently than 
traditional banks. The results of Vander (2002) back this finding of Allen and Rai 
(1996). A later study by Beccalli (2004) focuses on the performance of non-bank 
investment firms that engage solely in investment banking activities. Beccalli (2004) 
performs a comparison study between the UK and Italian investment firms over the 
1995 to 1998 period. The author finds that the UK investment firms are more efficient 
than Italian firms.   
Against this background, an examination of the performance determinants of 
investment banks for a period that includes the financial crisis could be of interest to 
both bankers and regulators. In this chapter, we focus on fees, risk and liquidity as 
drivers of the performance of these institutions. We give emphasis to fees because 
investment banks, as opposed to conventional banks, engage primarily in non-interest 
income operations (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). This concentration on fee-
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based operations could increase the risk of investment banks because of the high 
volatility of earnings stemming from non-interest income operations (Stiroh, 2004 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). On the contrary, conventional banks can exploit 
risk diversification benefits (De-Young and Rice, 2004; Chiorazzo et al., 2008). Thus, 
investigating the impact of default risk on investment bank performance is of vital 
importance in the context of this study. In addition, investment banks carry higher 
liquidity risk than commercial banks, as the latter, in the case of a financial shock, can 
count on deposits (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev et al., 2009). Hence, the level of 
liquid assets availability could form another important contributing factor to the 
performance of investment banks, particularly at a period of high liquidity constraints. 
This chapter contributes to the banking literature in several ways.  Firstly, this is the 
only study on investment bank performance that covers a period (1997-2010) that 
includes the crisis years.  To this end, we employ stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
to estimate cost efficiency as a measure of performance of investment banks in the G7 
and Switzerland.5 The next and main contribution of this study is the application of 
the dynamic panel threshold model by Kremer et al. (2013) in a second stage analysis. 
This methodology allows the investigation of the presence of threshold-effects of the 
variables of our main interest on cost performance, over a period of important 
structural changes for the investment banking industry. In particular, we investigate 
the existence of thresholds in three bank-specific variables: a) we use Z-Score to 
measure default risk, as investment bank activities are related to high-risk b) liquidity 
as a key factor that affects the performance of financial institutions. We account for 
                                                          
5Following previous studies (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Lozano-
Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010), we estimate bank performance, as proxied by cost efficiency scores, using the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). In the efficiency literature, the bank is considered to follow a production 
function that minimizes expenses given its input prices and output mix (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). 
SFA is a parametric methodology that developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and suggests that the stochastic 
frontier constitutes two parts, namely inefficiency and error term. 
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the distinction between investment banks that are part of larger entities and stand-
alone banks, as the former are able to draw liquidity from their group; c) we employ 
investment banking fees, which is the main income source of investment banks. In the 
presence of threshold effects, we expect to see shifts of investment banks across 
different regimes over the crisis period. This would also enable us to investigate which 
investment banks, i.e., of low or high liquidity (fee-income), are mostly affected in 
terms of performance during the financial crisis period. Lastly, we extend the literature 
concerning investment bank performance determinants by including in fixed effects 
and dynamic panel models crisis related variables that capture the asset bubble burst 
and policy responses such as the quantitative easing.6     
Unsurprisingly, we find significant changes in the number of banks that belong to 
each regime before and during the financial crisis. In particular, more investment 
banks appear to be of lower liquidity level and higher default risk after the burst of 
the financial crisis. Z-score exerts a positive effect on cost performance which is 
pronounced for banks of lower level of default risk. Also, our findings suggest that 
increases in liquidity for banks that belong to the low liquidity regime result to the 
huge deterioration of investment banks’ cost performance over the years of the crisis. 
This effect is mainly driven by banks that are not part of a larger banking entity.   
Moreover, we find that the majority of investment banks fall within the high level of 
fee income regime. Thus, the positive effect of an increase in investment banking on 
cost performance is driven principally by banks that belong to the low regime, i.e., 
banks of the low level of fee income. 
                                                          
6The 2007 turmoil led to the implementation of unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative 
easing (Q/E), by the central banks of the G7 and Switzerland (Klyuev, 2009; Fratzscher et al., 2013). 
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 2.3 describes the SFA and the dynamic panel threshold methodology. Section 
2.4 discusses the investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland and presents 
our data and variables. Section 2.5 discusses our results and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
The operations of investment banks go far beyond the lending activities of traditional 
banks as they act as direct intermediaries between investors and capital acquirers in 
the capital markets. Furthermore, they are active participants in the capital markets by 
trading securities. An important function of investment banks that differentiates them 
from traditional banks is their advisory role concerning the wealth of acquirers and 
bidders. Investment banks assess the assets of target companies and advise acquirers 
to take the most value-enhancing decisions with the aim of creating substantial 
synergies (Bao and Edmans, 2011). However, the type, the complex nature and the 
magnitude of investment banking operations carry significant risks that can be 
transferred to their shareholders and customers. To illustrate this, Fernando et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that companies with Lehman Brothers as their lead equity 
underwriter suffered economically, experiencing significant reductions in their returns. 
Hence, it becomes vital to test the following hypotheses regarding the impact of 
default risk, liquidity and investment banking fees on the performance of these 
institutions. 
 
Investment banks are exposed to high risk due to the complexity of their operations. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) argue that higher fee income for investment 
banks are linked to a higher volatility of earnings and higher risk as a consequence. 
However, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) find that for German saving banks an increase in 
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their fee income generated from investment banking activity has a positive impact on 
the efficiency of saving banks. The reason being that these banks benefit from the 
diversification of their activities as they are involved in both interest and non-interest 
income operations (De-Young and Rice, 2004). Similarly, Merciera et al. (2007) show 
that small European banks and US financial holding companies present low revenue 
volatility due to their focus on deposit-taking activities, while the shift from interest 
to non-interest income would result in a trade-off between risk and return. Based on 
previous studies (see Merciera et al., 2007; Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010) investment banks might carry more risk due to their engagement 
in non-interest income activities than savings and commercial banks. To this end, it is 
vital to examine the impact of risk on investment bank performance.  
 
The ‘bad luck hypothesis’ states that a negative relationship exists between risk and 
performance (see Berger and De-Young, 1997). If an unexpected event leads to higher 
risk, banks react by spending more resources to manage this risk. As a consequence, 
this procedure can lead to an increase in bank costs. Consistent with the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that inefficient banks are closer to 
failure. Similarly, investment banks’ performance (measured by cost efficiency) is 
negatively associated with insolvency risk as defined by the Z-Score (Radic et al., 
2012).  
 
Consequently, it would seem that investment banks with lower default risk are more 
efficient than banks with higher default risk. Interestingly, banks with high default 
risk aiming to decrease their probability of default, are forced to divert more resources 
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to short-term screening and monitoring operations and could, in fact, become less 
efficient this way. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Lower default risk asserts a positive impact on the performance of investment 
banks. 
 
Furthermore, investment banks, due to the absence of a deposit base, face  higher 
liquidity risk in comparison with commercial banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev 
et al., 2009). Brunnermeir (2009) demonstrates that investment banks’ reliance on 
short-term debt, such as repurchase agreements, could escalate their liquidity risk. 
Similarly, other studies (Adrian and Shin, 2008, 2009; Krishnamurthy, 2009; 
Brunnermeir and Pederson, 2009) argue that investment banks face more difficulties 
in raising capital during periods of financial distress than deposit-taking banks. In light 
of this, an investigation of the relationship between liquidity and investment bank 
performance would be warranted. 
Moreover, banks with higher levels of liquidity might undertake less risk in a case of 
an unexpected financial shock than banks with lower levels of liquidity. There are 
numerous studies that examine the impact of liquidity on bank performance (Altunbas 
et al., 2000; Brissimis et al., 2008; Altunbas and Marques, 2008). Many studies find 
a direct positive relationship between a bank’s liquidity ratio and its performance 
(Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). 
Nonetheless, there are counterarguments: excess liquidity is accompanied by high 
storage costs (Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008) and lower returns (Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007), suggesting that while liquid assets could decrease liquidity risk they 
could carry high costs that negatively affect bank performance.  
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We assume that banks with higher liquidity perform better than banks with lower 
levels of liquid assets. By this logic (‘bad luck hypothesis’ by Berger and De-Young, 
1997), banks with lower liquidity would underperform banks with more liquid assets 
while trying to raise their liquidity levels. Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Higher liquidity asserts a positive impact on the performance of investment banks. 
 
There is a growing discussion in the literature with regards to the risk diversification 
benefits that stem from the income diversification for banking institutions (Stiroh, 
2004; Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). Commercial and saving banks’ 
major source of income is interest-based, while for investment banks the main source 
of income is generated from non-interest based activities. De-Young and Roland 
(2001) argue that the substitution of traditional operations with fee income activities 
is related to the instability of earnings, while Acharya et al. (2006) show that banks 
with higher inclusion of non-interest income activities in their portfolio perform less 
efficiently than banks with lower involvement in fee-income operations. In the same 
manner, Stiroh (2004) and Lepetit et al. (2008) find a positive association between 
fee-based revenue and bank risk. Yet for saving banks an increase in fee income could 
have a positive impact on performance (Chiorazzo et al., 2008), as these banks engage 
in both interest and non-interest income operations and thereby could diversify their 
risk (De-Young and Rice, 2004). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that for 
banks earning high levels of non-interest income, to raise fee income (such as 
investment banking fees) would induce higher risk. On the contrary, investment banks 
since they solely focus on investment banking activities could benefit less from risk 
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diversification compared to saving banks. It is clearly of interest to study the impact 
of fee-income on investment bank performance. Based on the previous empirical 
studies, we formulate the following hypothesis 
H3: Higher level of fee-based income asserts a negative effect on the performance of 
investment banks. 
      
  2.3 Methodology 
             2.3.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency 
In this study, we measure bank performance in terms of cost efficiency by employing 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The advantage of this parametric methodology is that 
both random error and inefficiency are combined in a composite error term (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). More specifically, we use the following specification for the cost 
frontier: 
     𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                  (1),            
where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡  is the total cost for bank i in year t. Total cost is defined as the sum of 
personnel, interest and non-interest expenses.  𝑃𝑖𝑡  is a vector of input prices,  𝑌𝑖𝑡  is a 
vector of outputs, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is a vector of fixed netputs and 𝑍𝑖𝑡   is a vector of control variables. 
We use country dummy variables to control for home country characteristics 7 and a 
dummy variable for listed banks. The term vi,t stands for the error term, while ui,t  denotes 
bank’s inefficiency.   
The translog cost function, opted in this study, takes the form: 
                                                          
7Structural and macroeconomic conditions might create variances in efficiency from country-to-country 
and time-to-time. To control for these differences we employ both time effects and country effects in the 
estimation of the efficiency as in Bonin et al. (2005). 
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𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡 +
1
2⁄ 𝜇2𝑡
2 +𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝜈𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖 +∑ 𝜉𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ± 𝑣𝑖,𝑡𝜄         (2)
    
Standard linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are applied. The equation (2) is 
estimated via a maximum likelihood procedure parameterized in terms of the variance 
parameters:  
𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2  
                                                      and 𝛽 = 𝜎𝑢2 𝜎𝜀2⁄                                                        (3) 
 
We estimate bank-specific efficiency scores using the distribution of the efficiency term 
conditional to the estimate of the composite error term, as in Jondrow et al. (1982). 
 
2.3.2 Dynamic Panel Threshold Model 
We choose to implement this methodology as it enables us to identify regime changes of 
important determinants of investment bank performance as measured by cost efficiency. 
Specifically, we employ the model of Kremer et al. (2013), which is an extension of 
Hansen (1999) model. It is based on the cross-sectional threshold model of Caner and 
Hansen (2004), where GMM estimators are used allowing for endogeneity issues. 
However, Kremer et al. (2013) opt for a dynamic unbalanced threshold model, which 
could identify possible coefficient changes on the independent variables of our interest. 
We adopt the dynamic threshold model as further developed by Kremer et al. (2013). 
This takes the following form: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑡
= 𝜇
𝑖
+ 𝜆1𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝛪(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (4)        
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where 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable (efficiency scores derived from SFA),  𝜇𝑖  is the 
bank-specific fixed effect, while 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are the two reverse regression slopes assuming 
that there are two regimes. The threshold variable is  𝑞𝑖𝑡, whereas γ is the threshold value 
which categorizes the observations above (high regime) and below the threshold value 
(low regime).  𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error term. I  is the indicator function signifying the regime 
indicated by the threshold variable qit and the threshold value γ.  This model by Kremer 
et al. (2013) treats  𝑚𝑖𝑡 as a vector of explanatory variables, which includes one regressor 
that is correlated with the error term and other regressors, which are not. Moreover, 
Kremer et al. (2013) extends Hansen’s (1999) specification by the regime dependent 
intercept, 𝛿1. According to Bick (2007), ignoring the regime intercepts would result in 
inconsistent estimates for both the threshold value and the coefficient magnitude of the 
regimes. 
In order to circumvent serial correlation in the transformed error terms, Kremer et al. 
(2013) opt for the GMM estimation method (Arellano and Bover, 1995).  To obtain its 
predicted values, Kremer et al. (2013), like Caner and Hansen (2004), estimate a reduced 
type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of instruments. In the first step, 
the predicted values replace the endogenous variable in the equation (4). In step two, 
equation (4) is estimated via ordinary least squares for a fixed threshold value where the 
threshold variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. The optimal 
threshold value is derived from the minimization of the concentrated sum of squared 
errors (Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). The 95% confidence interval of the threshold value 
is given by 𝛤 = {𝛾: 𝐿𝑅(𝛾) ≤ 𝐶(𝑎)}, where 𝐶(𝑎)  represents the asymptotic distribution 
of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic at the 95% level (Hansen, 1999; Caner and Hansen, 
2004). The above likelihood ratio has been adjusted to control for the number of time 
periods used for each cross section (Hansen, 1999). After the threshold value has been 
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estimated, the slope coefficients λ1 and λ2 could be determined by the GMM estimator 
(Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
2.4 Investment banking in the G7 and Switzerland and Data/Variables  
             2.4.1 Investment banking in the G7 and Switzerland 
Investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland demonstrated strong growth for 
the most part of the last decade and reached its peak in 2006. Due to the financial crisis, 
investment banking activities were substantially subdued in 2008. This slowdown has 
been reversed during recent years and the investment banking continues to form an 
important part of the financial markets in industrialised economies.8 
In North America, the US investment banks generated 58% of the global investment 
banking revenues in 2012, while 30% of US banking industry profits were from 
investment banking operations in the same year (Thomson Reuters, 2013). As a part of 
North America, Canadian banks facilitated the access of domestic issuers into foreign 
capital, resulting in a rapid growth of cross-border M&A operations.   
In Europe, the UK, as one of the leading financial markets, constitutes an important hub 
for international investment banking activities carried out by numerous foreign banks 
from Italy, Germany, the US, Switzerland and Japan (Burgess, 2011). Switzerland is 
another important financial centre. A large part (13%) of the income of Swiss banks was 
generated from M&A activity in 2010 (Swiss Bankers Association and Boston Consulting 
Group, 2011). In the German banking system, universal banks perform both commercial 
and investment banking operations. International investment banking in Germany, in 
                                                          
8Among the top fee-generating investment banks worldwide are: JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs and Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch in the US; Barclays in the UK; Deutsche Bank in Germany; BNP Paribas in France; 
Mediobanca and Banca IMI in Italy; Credit Suisse and UBS in Switzerland; RBC Capital Markets in 
Canada; and Nomura in Japan (Thomson, 2013). 
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particular, the M&A, has developed substantially following the Tax Reduction Act in 
2000 (Schroder et al., 2012). French investment banks primarily engage in market-based 
activities, such as trading of securities, and have a relatively lower number of investors 
than the UK and German banks, which also involve off-balance sheet activities (Vinals 
and Moghadam, 2012). Banks in Italy play a more predominant role in financing firms 
than those in Germany, France and the UK (Caselli et al., 2013).  
In Japan, which is the only Asian country in the G7, the operational framework of 
investment banks has been strengthened since 2001. During this period, banks in Japan 
adopted most of the operations that typical investment banks should cover. Moreover, 
following the legislation of 2007, foreigners were able to acquire Japanese firms by using 
their own stock (Stowell, 2012) enabling a higher level of M&A activity. 
In all countries considered, the investment banking has largely grown for the greater part 
of the last decade, as evident in the market capitalization data (see Figure 1). Market 
capitalization represents the equity aspect of financing and constitutes a major function 
of investment banks in the primary market. Figure 1 shows the domestic market 
capitalization in the G7 and Switzerland for the period 2000-2010 (as % of GDP). We 
observe that market capitalization peaks in 2000 and 2007, which would suggest thriving 
periods for stock prices before the technology bubble burst in 2001 and the financial crisis 
in the end of 2007. 
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Figure 1.Number of issued shares of domestic companies (Domestic Market 
Capitalization as % of GDP) across the G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010).  
 
Notes: the Figure shows the Domestic Market Capitalization (as % of GDP) across G7 and Switzerland countries 
(2000-2010). The left axis includes values that correspond to the US, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and 
Canada. The right axis includes only values that correspond to Switzerland. For Domestic Market Capitalization 
(as % of GDP) data, we use World Development indicators from the World Bank. 
Figure 2 shows M&A activity of firms operating in the G7 and Switzerland over 2000-
2010. M&A activity constitutes the main source of fee income for investment banks 
(Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). It is of note that during periods of financial stability 
(2004-2007) M&A transactions increased, while they declined during times of economic 
recession (2001-2003 and 2008-2009). The G7 and Switzerland reached a total 
transaction value of 3.48 (US$tr) for M&A in 2000, which was to decrease sharply to 
1.14 (US$tr) in 2003. From this low level of M&A activity, transaction value grew 
considerably to a total 3.58 (US$tr) in 2007 while decreased significantly to 1.53(US$tr) 
in 2010. 
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Figure 2. M&A activity transaction value across the G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010). 
 
Notes: the Figure shows the M&A transaction value in billion dollars across G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010). The left 
axis includes M&A transaction values that correspond to the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and 
Canada. The right axis stands for values that correspond to M&A market in the US. For M&A transaction value we use 
the Thomson One Banker database. 
 
2.4.2 Data and Variables 
 
We use financial data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database over the period 1997-
2010. Our sample includes 97 investment banks and a total of 707 observations for the 
following countries: the US, the UK, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan, France and 
Switzerland. Out of these 97 investment banks, 66 belong to a banking group while the 
rest (33) are stand-alone investment banks.9 
 
We follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) in employing the ‘intermediation’ approach 
identifying bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that the core function of 
banks is to use labour and capital in order to collect funds and transform them into loans 
and other earning assets. As inputs, we use labour and physical capital.  The price of 
                                                          
9We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this distinction. Subsidiary banks as a part of a larger 
banking entity could benefit from liquidity injections from the parent bank (Mayer and Carlyn, 2008). 
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labour is measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets while the price of 
physical capital as the ratio of operating expenses to fixed assets. As output, we employ 
other earning assets including loans, deposits from banks and credit institutions, 
government securities, and derivatives among others. Given that we are dealing with 
investment banks we opt for investment banking fees as an additional output (Radic et al., 
2012). Investment banking fees comprise a wide range of operations including trading 
gains, net commission and other fees. Fixed netputs include the total level of equity and 
of fixed assets. By including equity we correct for biases in our efficiency scores, as banks 
with high levels of equity are more likely to adopt risk adverse strategies to protect 
shareholders’ wealth than banks with lower levels of equity (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
To be consistent with the literature we also include the levels of fixed assets for each bank 
as a proxy for physical capital (Berger and Mester, 1997). We also include the following 
control variables: country dummies 10  to count for time-invariant home country 
characteristics and a dummy for listed banks. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of 
cost function variables. The main impression emerging from this table is similar with that 
which has been previously observed (Radic et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10As it is expected one dummy variable (Japan) is dropped from the sample to avoid multicollinearity issues.   
31 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the cost frontier 
estimations. 
Variable Description Mean  Stand. Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
TC Total Cost 1,688 5,142 0.0019 59,100 
Y1 Total Earnings assets 71,800 224,000 0.0033 2590,000 
Y2 
Investment Banking 
Fees 
0.999 2,694 0.0001 23,700 
N1 Equity 1,698 4,354 0.0011 50,100 
N2 Assets 37,700 0,361 0.0033 3,444 
P1 Price of labour 0.776 3.222 0.0002 1.8 
P2 Price of physical capital 27.54 160.82 0.0667 2072.00 
Notes: the Table reports the variables used in the cost frontier estimation for the period 1997-2010. Total Cost (TC): 
personnel, interest and non-interest expenses; Outputs (Y1 & Y2)); Total Earning assets (loans, deposits from banks and 
credit institutions, government securities, derivatives and other earning assets) and 2) Investment Banking Fees (net 
fees, commission and trading income); Netputs (N1 & N2)) Equity and 2) Total Assets; Inputs (P1 & P2)) Price of labour 
(personnel expenses over total assets) and 2) Price of physical capital (total operating expenses over fixed assets). The 
values of TC, N1, N2, Y1 and Y2, are in million dollars, while P1and P2 are ratios. 
   
To test for the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H1) that a decrease default risk asserts a positive 
impact on investment banking performance, we employ Z-Score as a measure of risk. We 
compute Z-Score as in Boyd and Graham (1986) by using the following formula: Z-
Score= (1+ ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE. The Z-Score has been used widely in 
recent banking studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Banks 
with lower Z-Score have a higher risk of default than banks with higher Z-Score. We also 
test the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H2) whereby an increase in liquidity asserts a positive 
impact on investment banking performance. Liquidity is defined as each bank as the ratio 
of liquid assets to total assets. This specification has been employed extensively in the 
literature (Altunbas et al., 2000; Kwan, 2003; Altunbas and Marques, 2008). Liquid assets 
include trading assets, loans and advances with less than three months’ maturity. Lower 
values of this ratio suggest that banks face more liquidity risk than banks with higher 
liquidity ratio. In addition, we use an income-associated ratio to test for the third 
hypothesis (H3) whereby less reputable investment banks, defined as banks that earn 
relatively low levels of investment banking fees, would benefit more from an increase in 
fees than more reputable banks (institutions that earn high levels of fee income). This 
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ratio is defined as the sum of the net commission, fees and net trading income over total 
assets. The conventional ratio of net income to total assets in the literature (Morgan and 
Stiroh, 2001; Bonin et al., 2005; Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009) 
is replaced by the ratio of investment banking fees to total assets. This transformation 
reflects the core revenue of investment banks that stems from non-traditional banking 
activities. 
In terms of bank-specific characteristics, we opt for a number of additional variables such 
as the ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy for capital (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Lepetit et al., 2008). We also use the ratio of securities to total assets as in Radic et al. 
(2012) to account for the varieties of investment banking operations concerning equity 
issuance and underwriting activities. Finally, we examine the impact of income 
diversification on bank performance as has been used in recent studies (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010).11 
In terms of country macroeconomic variables, we use GDP per capita as a wealth measure 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Maudos and Guevara, 2007; Maudos and Solis, 2009; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Empirical evidence and theory point in different directions 
concerning the impact of GDP per capita on bank performance. An increase of GDP per 
capita could result in the decline of banking costs as banks in more prosperous countries 
could benefit from access to new technologies (Lensink et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
an increase of GDP per capita could increase banking costs due to higher operating 
expenses to supply a given level of services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). 
To account for financial development, we include domestic credit to the private sector 
(DCPS) as a percentage of GDP. This is a proxy of banking activity, used in numerous 
                                                          
11Income diversification= (1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|)/Total Operating Income.  
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studies as an indicator of financial development (Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2004; Shandre 
and James, 2004; Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008). Financial development could have a 
positive impact on cost efficiency (Pasiouras, 2008; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). 
However, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) argue that banks with a primary role 
in financing firms might undertake high loan default risk during a period of financial 
distress.  
Higher FDI inflows may denote a higher presence of foreign investment banks in a 
country. If foreign banks manage to overcome the cross-border differences, they might 
increase the efficiency of the investment banking industry of a country (Berger et al., 
2000). Higher FDI outflows suggest a high internationalisation of domestic investment 
banks. Banks that are able to expand globally have superior practices and structures. 
Consequently, higher FDI outflows can signify that the most efficient banks go abroad to 
transfer their model. Thus, we expect FDI outflows to have a negative impact on 
efficiency (Beccalli, 2004). 
Moreover, we include the real effective exchange rate to control for exchange rate risk 
that investment banks could face due to foreign currency activities. The impact of the 
exchange rate on bank performance is subject to the net asset position of a bank in foreign 
currencies. A depreciation (appreciation) of the national currency with respect to a 
specific foreign currency, while the net asset position of a bank denominated in this 
foreign currency is positive (i.e. assets larger than liabilities), could lead to increased 
(decreased) gains for this bank (Grammatikos et al., 1986).  
 
We also use the stock and house price index of the countries considered (S&P500, 
FTSE100, DAX, CAC, FTSEMIB, SMI, SPTSX and NIKKEI), with the aim of capturing 
the asset price bubble, as in Bordo and Jeanne (2002). A recent study by Adrian and Song 
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Shin (2010) shows that when the asset and stock prices rise, investment banks’ leverage 
increases as well. Moreover, in order to control for asset bubble bursts, we follow 
Gerdesmeier et al. (2010) and adopt a composite asset price indicator to construct a 
dummy, which takes the value of 1 in the case of an asset price burst, and 0 otherwise.12  
In addition, we proxy Q/E by using the reserves held by central banks for the countries 
considered, following the definition of Kobayashi et al. (2002) who suggests that Q/E 
stands for the increase in central bank reserves. A number of recent studies look at the 
impact of Q/E policy on the economies of Japan and UK (Voutsinas and Werner, 2011b; 
Lyonnet and Werner, 2012) using central bank reserves, among other tools of Q/E, and 
highlight the positive impact of this non-conventional monetary policy.13  Hence, we 
expect the impact of central bank reserves on bank performance to be positive, as in 
Kobayashi et al. (2006). 
Finally, to account for the market risk we use the Volatility Implied Index (VIX). This 
financial indicator suggests that higher levels of VIX reflect higher degrees of financial 
turmoil in the US (Whaley, 2000). It follows that we should expect the VIX impact on 
investment bank performance to be negative. Over the study period (1997-2010), we 
                                                          
12If the composite indicator falls below a critical value the dummy takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
For the values of the composite indicator that are below the threshold value a burst exists. The critical value 
is determined as the mean of the composite indicator minus the standard deviation of the composite 
indicator times the factor μ. In our study we use μ=0.5, similarly to the study of Gerdesmeir et al. (2010) 
where μ=0.75. The composite indicator is estimated by the following equation: 𝐶𝐼 =
𝜑1𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜑2ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝜑1  equals to 1, while 𝜑2  is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the stock price index over the standard deviation of the house price index. Alternatively, 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011a) indicate the boom and the burst phase in their study based on the trend of 
lending growth rate in Japan over the 1980-1999 periods. The dummy variable equals 1 over the boom 
period (1980–1989), and 0 during the burst period (1990-1999).  
13In the study of Voutsinas and Werner (2011b) the case of Japan has been examined, as being the first 
country to implement the unconventional monetary policy of Q/E. In the early 90s Japan has experienced 
very low interest rates, triggering the implementation of new monetary policies. Similarly, Lyonnet and 
Werner (2012) look at the impact of Q/E on the nominal GDP growth for the UK. Only recently (2008), 
the Bank of England has implemented the relevant monetary policy (Joyce et al., 2011). The studies of 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011b) and Lyonnet and Werner (2012) investigate the impact of Q/E on the 
nominal GDP growth of Japan and UK respectively and conclude that credit creation, the original definition 
of Q/E (Werner, 1995), could form a stable relationship between a lending aggregate for GDP transactions 
and nominal GDP growth.   
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observe that volatility increases significantly in two instances: over 2001-2003 and 2008-
2009 (see Figure 3). Over 2004-2007 the relative market risk is lower, suggesting a period 
of financial stability. 
Figure 3. Volatility Implied Index (VIX) over the 1997-2010 period.
 
Notes: the Figure shows the average VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) over the period 
1990-2012. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows further descriptive statistics of the bank-specific and country-level 
variables used in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions.  
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the bank-specific and country-level variable. 
Country N 
Z-
Score 
Invest. 
Banking 
Fees/ Liquid./TA E/TA 
Income 
Divers. 
Securities 
/TA 
GDP 
per 
capita 
FDI 
Inflows 
FDI 
Outflows 
House 
Price 
Index 
Stock 
Price 
Index 
Reserves 
TA 
Canada 17 2.0823 0.0342 0.523 0.0547 -0.1807 0.6517 10.1286 3.58 3.914 152.41 155.38 24.2956 
France 63 1.2827 0.0556 0.3548 0.1055 0.242 0.2039 10.027 2.733 5.249 196.15 147.60 24.3474 
Germany 122 1.9408 0.1702 0.2146 0.2709 0.4383 0.6112 10.0852 1.885 2.864 94.89 134.53 24.666 
Italy 23 1.4954 0.0167 0.306 0.0919 -0.384 0.2018 9.8863 1 2.386 194.96 122.82 24.2341 
Japan 141 0.6568 0.1131 0.4957 0.2872 0.1012 0.2755 10.5545 0.177 1.096 74.96 83.04 27.272 
Switz. 21 1.9423 0.0431 0.6277 0.0606 0.4901 0.2143 10.4944 4.689 10.384 113.66 107.11 24.6329 
UK 176 2.346 0.0695 0.3525 0.1576 0.3306 0.2644 10.2306 4.62 5.384 259.73 107.01 24.4951 
US 143 2.262 0.1954 0.3908 0.1912 0.207 0.5225 10.5004 1.666 1.867 167.98 135.83 24.964 
Total 706       
Mean   1.751 0.0872 0.4081 0.1524 0.1556 0.3682 10.2384 2.544 4.143 156.84 124.16 24.8633 
Notes: the Table reports descriptive statistics of bank-specific and most of the country-level variables used to perform 
fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions. N stands for the number of observations by country. As bank-specific 
variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Invest. Banking Fees/TA= net fees, commission 
and net trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Income divers.= 
(1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|)/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities over total 
assets.  Some of the country level independent variables that we use are: GDP per capita (natural logarithm); FDI 
inflows (natural logarithm); FDI outflows (natural logarithm); House Price Index; Stock Price Index; Reserves (natural 
logarithm). For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables, we use 
World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997.  For the Stock Price Index data, we use Bloomberg database. 
 
Note that UK and US investment banks have lower default risk (the highest two Z-Scores 
of 2.346 and 2.262). French and Japanese investment banks have the highest default risk 
with Z-Scores of 1.282 and 0.656. US investment banks have the highest level of 
investment banking fees over total assets. In terms of the liquidity ratio, Switzerland, 
Canada and Japan have the highest ratios, while Germany and Italy have the lowest. 
 2.5 Results and Discussion 
     2.5.1 Cost Efficiency Estimations 
Table 3 shows the mean cost efficiency scores. Our mean efficiency scores rank Japan, 
Switzerland and Germany in the first three places. Our findings are broadly in line with 
Radic et al. (2012) who find that Japan and Switzerland rank in the second and third place. 
However, unlike in the present study, they find that US investment banks are the most 
cost efficient among the considered countries (G7 and Switzerland). Their study focuses 
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on the pre-crisis period (2001-2007) and so misses the post-financial turmoil period where 
the US investment banking industry confronted severe losses.  
 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of cost efficiency (1997-2010).  
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Canada       0.4946 0.1690 0.1848 0.7473 
France 0.5859                0.1817 0.1543 0.8582 
Germany 0.7769 0.1320 0.1767 0.9170 
Italy 0.6547 0.1426 0.4508 0.8812 
Japan 0.9197 0.0282 0.7230 0.9559 
Switz. 0.8557 0.0893 0.6718 0.9622 
UK 0.6029 0.1658 0.2099 0.9451 
US 0.6319 0.1484 0.2247 0.8373 
Mean 0.6903 0.1321 0.1767 0.9621 
Notes: the Table reports the mean efficiencies for the G7 and Switzerland over the period 1997-2010. Efficiencies are 
derived from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). 
 
In Figure 4, we report changes in the mean efficiency score over time. We observe a 
downward trend from 2004 to 2008. In 2003, the average efficiency score is 75.93%. It 
decreases to 72.26% in 2005, 66.60% in 2007 and 65.68% in 2008. It would appear that 
performance was affected adversely by the financial crisis of the 2007-2009 period. 
Figure 4. Mean efficiency score of investment banks over the 1997-2010 
period.
 
Notes: the Figure shows the average efficiency score of investment banks derived from Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA). 
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           2.5.2 Panel Estimations 
                 2.5.2.1 The Impact of the Z-core, Liquidity and Investment banking fees  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions, 
where bank performance is a function of bank-specific and country-level variables. In the 
dynamic panel analysis, we employ the two-step system GMM estimator of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) corrected (robust) 
standard errors. The two main characteristics of this estimator are that it follows the 
moments conditions on the level equations and uses the orthogonality conditions 
introduced by the Arellano and Bond (1991) model. This method serves as a control for 
possible biases brought by country-specific effects and endogeneity issues. Here, we 
employ as endogenous explanatory variables the lagged efficiency score, Z-Score, 
liquidity and fee-income ratios. According to Athanasoglou et al. (2008) in order to test 
the endogeneity of the variables we run the model twice. The first time we treated the 
three variables, Z-Score, liquidity and fee-income ratios, as investment banks’ 
endogenous variables, while all the other determinants as strictly exogenous. The second 
model treated all the variables as exogenous. The results support the hypothesis that bank- 
specific variables are better modeled as endogenous and country-level as exogenous (in 
accordance with Delis, 2012) because the Sargan test has 1.00 p-value. This suggests that 
the instruments are acceptable. On the other hand, in the case where all variables are 
treated as exogenous the p-value of the Sargan test is 0.003. For the GMM estimation, we 
use Roodman (2006) ‘xtabond 2’ specification in Stata. 
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Table 4. Fixed effects results for Z-Score, liquidity and investment banking fees as 
bank cost efficiency determinants in the G7 and Switzerland (1997-2010). 
     
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Z-Score 0.008**   0.009** 
 (0.0039)   (0.0038) 
 
Investment Banking Fees/TA 
  
0.128 
(0.0885) 
 
  
0.144* 
(0.0852) 
 
Liquid assets/TA   0.048 
(0.0327) 
 
0.069** 
(0.0307) 
 
E/TA 0.119** 0.106* 0.108* 0.111* 
 (0.0586) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0611) 
Securities/TA 0.172*** 0.182*** 0.170*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0447) (0.0407) (0.0420) 
Income diversification -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
GDP per capita -0.032 -0.039 0.001 -0.058 
 (0.156) (0.154) (0.155) (0.152) 
FDI inflows -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
FDI outflows -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
DCPS/GDP -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0319) 
Real effective exchange rate -0.000 -0.000 4.14e-05 -5.74e-05 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
House Price Index -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Stock Price Index -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006* -0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.0252** -0.0239** -0.0225** -0.0245** 
 (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0101) 
Reserves 0.046** 0.048** 0.044** 0.045** 
 (0.0193) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0183) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.0343 0.0293 -0.303 0.238 
 (1.529) (1.508) (1.500) (1.477) 
F-test 11.68*** 10.46*** 11.75*** 11.31*** 
Observations 706 706 706 706 
R-squared 0.185 0.190 0.183 0.206 
Number of banks 97 97 97 97 
Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 1997 to 2010. The 
dependent variable is cost efficiency derived using a SFA methodology. As bank-specific independent variables we 
employ: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and 
trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Income diversification= 
1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities over total 
assets.  As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); 
Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country 
variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems 
with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel results for Z-Score, liquidity and investment banking fees 
as bank cost efficiency determinants in the G7 and Switzerland (1997-2010). 
     
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Lag efficiency 0.371*** 0.459*** 0.425*** 0.278*** 
 (0.116)      (0.105) (0.104) (0.0874) 
Z-Score 0.013**   0.0152** 
 (0.0056)   (0.0069) 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.128**  0.116** 
  (0.0541)  (0.0489) 
Liquid assets/TA   0.0679 0.0813 
   (0.0553) (0.0605) 
E/TA -0.0765 -0.138* -0.037 0.018 
 (0.0786) (0.0714) (0.0988) (0.0807) 
Securities/TA 0.164*** 0.153*** 0.190*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0406) (0.0650) (0.0585) 
Income diversification -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
GDP per capita -0.211 -0.175 -0.240* -0.262 
 (0.180) (0.145) (0.140) (0.200) 
FDI inflows -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
FDI outflows 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.00192) (0.00164) (0.00160) (0.00201) 
DCPS/GDP -0.103** -0.0732* -0.0629 -0.0828* 
 (0.0435) (0.0418) (0.0524) (0.0464) 
Real effective exchange rate 4.63e-05 0.000276 0.000547 2.90e-05 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
House Price Index -0.0006** -0.0006*** -0.0005** -0.0005* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Stock Price Index -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.016 -0.015 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0140) (0.0175) 
Reserves 0.042** 0.0453** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0183) (0.0209) (0.0183) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Constant 1.859 1.272 1.387 1.796 
 (2.034) (1.700) (1.514) (1.978) 
Wald test 230.17*** 354.73*** 317.36*** 203.56*** 
Sargan (p-value) 43.5(0.19) 39.22(0.29) 38.89(0.31) 73.78(0.45) 
AR(1) -2.4202** -2.773*** -2.9819*** 2.4062*** 
AR(2) -0.9097 -1.0944 -1.044 0.9080 
Observations 
Number of instruments 
609 
45 
609 
45 
609 
45 
609 
89 
Number of banks 97 97 97 97 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 1997 to 2010. As bank-specific independent 
variables we employ: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees=Net fees, commission and 
trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA: equity over total assets; Income diversification=1- |Net 
Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities /TA=total securities over total assets.  As 
country variables, we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House 
price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. 
For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development 
indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as 
the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price 
Index, we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations 
of all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Windmeijer (2005) corrected (robust) standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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Consistent with Radic et al. (2012) and Berger and De-Young (1997), the fixed effect 
results reveal a positive relationship between the Z-Score and bank performance at the 5% 
level of significance (Model 1 in Table 4). This finding remains robust when we control 
for the rest variables of our main interest (Model 4 in Table 4), which are the liquidity 
ratio and investment banking fees. Similarly, the dynamic panel analysis shows that the 
Z-Score exerts a positive impact at the 5% level of significance on cost efficiency (Model 
1 and 2 in Table 5). These results lend support to our first hypothesis (H1), the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’. Moreover, the fixed-effect regressions indicate a positive effect of 
investment banking fees over total assets ratio on cost efficiency at the 10% level of 
significance (Model 4 in Table 4). Dynamic panel results provide additional evidence of 
the positive relationship between fee-based income and cost performance (Model 2 and 
4 in Table 5). This implies that banks with higher amounts of net income are more 
efficient (Bonin et al., 2005; Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; Lin and Yzhang, 2009). 
We also find a positive association between the liquidity ratio and cost performance at 
the 5% level of significance (Model 4 in Table 4) in the fixed effect model. While the 
dynamic panel analysis indicates that the liquidity ratio has a positive impact on bank 
performance, the result is not robust (Model 3 and 4 in Table 5). It appears that the results 
would confirm our second hypothesis (H2) and previous empirical work suggesting a 
positive relationship between liquidity and bank performance (Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). 
The findings above show that risk, estimated as the Z-Score, liquidity, and fee-income 
ratios are significant determinants of investment banking performance over the 1997-
2010 period. We go a step further in the next section (5.3) and employ the flexible 
approach of the dynamic panel threshold model (Kremer et al., 2013) to identify 
thresholds in these three variables with respect to cost efficiency and different underlying 
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regimes over the crisis period. This is essential due to both the inherent volatility of non-
interest income (De-Young and Roland, 2001) which can rise in crisis periods and also 
because of the importance of default risk and the low availability of liquidity during 
recessions. 
                2.5.2.2 Impact of the Control Variables 
Concerning other bank-specific variables, we find that the ratio of equity to total assets 
has a significantly positive impact on cost efficiency at the 5% level in the fixed effect 
model (Model 1 in Table 4) and at the 10% level of significance in the dynamic 
specifications (Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4). These results indicate that more capitalized 
banks are more cost efficient as in Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Lepetit et al. (2008). 
The securities to total assets ratio has a positive effect on performance at the 1% level of 
significance both in the fixed and dynamic panel regressions (all Models in Table 4 and 
5). This finding suggests that off-balance sheet activities may induce a higher risk of bank 
losses (Radic et al., 2012). Finally, results from fixed and dynamic panel regressions 
reveal that the income diversification variable asserts a negative impact on cost efficiency 
at the 1% level of significance (all Models in Table 4 and 5).  
Next we turn to the impact of the country-level control variables on cost efficiency. An 
important finding relates to the policy measure of Q/E that has been implemented by 
many countries in order to weather the financial crisis. In particular, we find central bank 
reserves, a proxy of Q/E, to have a positive and significant relationship with cost 
efficiency in both fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions (all Models in Table 4 and 
5). This result would suggest that in countries where the Q/E has been broadly 
implemented, investment banks perform better than in countries where the Q/E has been 
applied at a lower level. This finding is consistent with recent studies that provide 
evidence of a positive impact of Q/E on economic outcomes (Voutsinas and Werner, 
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2011b; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012) and justifies, from an investment banking perspective, 
the use of such unconventional monetary policies. The countries of our sample that have 
implemented Q/E on a large scale are Japan, the UK, and the US. The Bank of Japan is 
the first to follow this policy (Lyonnet and Werner, 2012). Furthermore, in response to 
the intensification of the financial crisis, the Bank of England implemented Q/E in the 
form of asset purchases backed by the central bank (Joyce et al., 2011). Similarly, the 
Federal Reserve launched a new set of non-conventional monetary ‘tools’, termed as 
‘crediting easing’, in order to rise the liquidity of the markets after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The rest of the economies in our sample, the ones belonging to the Eurozone 
area, also engaged in Q/E but at a lower extent in comparison with the large asset 
purchases in the US and the UK (Martin and Milas, 2012; Reichlin, 2013). 
Our fixed and dynamic panel analysis reveals that both the house price and the stock price 
index have a negative and significant impact on cost efficiency.14 As expected, a bubble 
burst has a negative impact on investment bank performance due to decreased investment 
activity (Allen and Carletti, 2010).15 We also find a strong negative effect of the VIX 
indicator on bank performance at the 1% level of significance (all Models in Table 4) in 
line with previous studies (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). Moreover, GDP per 
capita has a negative impact on cost efficiency, suggesting the higher operating and 
                                                          
14These results show that during boom periods, where a rise of asset and stock prices takes place, there 
exists a deterioration of investment bank performance. A recent study by Adrian and Song Shin (2010) 
shows that when the asset and stock prices rise, investment banks’ leverage increases as well in a pro-
cyclical manner. At low levels of leverage, any increase in leverage might moderate the conflicts between 
shareholders and managers regarding the choice of investment and the underlying risk (Myers, 1977). This 
is so because managers would need cash to service the debt rather than take excessively risky investments 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, when leverage becomes relatively high, any increase in leverage 
might raise conflicts between debt holders and shareholders, mainly due to the higher risk of default or 
liquidation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These conflicts would escalate agency costs between debt holders 
and shareholders and this would result in higher interest expenditures to pay debt holders for their estimated 
losses. 
15The bubble-burst indicator shows that there are two major bursts that concern the majority of the sample, 
these occur in the 2001-2003 and 2008-2010 periods. For all countries in the sample we identify the 2001-
2003 burst. The latter result corresponds to the technology bubble burst in 2001, while the second burst 
(2008-2010) coincides with the recent financial flood of 2007 (Lin, 2009). 
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financial costs for supplying a particular level of service (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 
2000). FDI inflows have a negative impact on cost performance, in line with Berger et al. 
(2000). Similarly, FDI outflows have a negative impact on bank performance, suggesting 
that most efficient banks go abroad to export their model (Beccalli, 2004). As for the 
financial development indicator, we find that the DCPS/GDP ratio has a statistically 
significant negative effect on cost efficiency, consistent with Demirgunt-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002). 
2.5.3 Threshold Estimations 
            2.5.3.1 Z-Score Threshold  
Our empirical estimations for threshold effects are based on an unbalanced dataset of 707 
observations including 97 banks for the period 1997-2010. Table 6 presents the dynamic 
panel threshold model with the Z-Score as threshold variable.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16We perform a general to the specific sensitivity analysis. In the first stage, we employ a wide range of 
instruments while in the second stage we include only one instrument. We find no significant difference in 
our results. We follow the same procedure for the liquidity and investment banking fees threshold analysis. 
The results are available on request. 
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Table 6.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Z-Score as 
threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Z-Score 1.516866 
95% confidence interval (1.318830-2.165600) 
Impact of Z-Score                                         S.E                   
λ1  0.012** 0.0058 
λ2  0.044** 0.0180 
Impact of covariates              S.E 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.056 0.0861 
Liquid Assets/TA  0.056 0.0372 
E/TA  0.108** 0.0403 
Securities/TA  0.190*** 0.0370 
Income diversification -0.016*** 0.0040 
GDP per capita -0.015 0.1274 
FDI inflows -0.008*** 0.0025 
FDI outflows -0.003 0.0018 
DCPS/GDP -0.001 0.0284 
Real Effective Exchange Rate  0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index -0.000** 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.024** 0.0103 
Reserves  0.041*** 0.0132 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ 0.018*** 0.0055 
Observations 609   
Low regime 372  
High regime 237   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Z-Score variable for banks range between 1.31883 and 2.1656.We 
denote as dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable 
we impose the (𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) which represents banks’ default risk. Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for 
regime dependent intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. For bank-
specific variables we use: Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and trading income over total assets; Liquid 
assets over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-
Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total assets. As country variables we employ: 
GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price 
Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific 
variable we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development indicators 
from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the 
base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg 
database. Also as endogenous variable for the model we impose the Investment Banking Fees, where 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables 
used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
 
We find that the threshold value for the Z-Score variable is 1.516 (see Table 6). This value 
splits the sample into two regimes: the first regime consists of banks with a relatively high 
risk of default; the second consists of banks with lower risk. The coefficient λ2 = 0.044 for 
banks within the high regime is positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that 
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a 1% decrease in Z-Score would benefit efficiency by 4.4%. This result is consistent with 
our first hypothesis (H1). A decrease in default risk for banks with low Z-Score, below 
the threshold value, is also significant at the 5% level and positively related to cost 
efficiency (λ1 = 0.012), although here at a lower magnitude than the one of the high regime.  
In Table 7, the percentage of investment banks classified as low-regime is consistently 
above the percentage of banks classified as high-regime with respect to the Z-Score. Note 
between 2000 and 2003 there is a clear negative trend in the number of investment banks 
with low exposure to risk (46 investment banks in 2000 decreases to 18 in 2003). The 
composite indicator of asset prices reveals the burst during 2001-2003 while the VIX 
indicator shows higher levels of risk during the same period (Figure 3). Between 2004 
and 2007, we observe a decreasing trend in the percentage of investment banks that have 
high-risk exposure, when according to the VIX indicator there should be lower market 
volatility. Finally, the percentage of investment banks with low-risk exposure (the high 
regime) has decreased significantly since 2008 due to the crisis. This result is supported 
by the identification of the 2008-2010 burst when again the associated risk (VIX) 
increases considerably (Figure 3).  
Table 7. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on threshold value of Z-Score. 
Threshold: Z-Score                         
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 64% 47% 53% 75% 78% 82% 62% 49% 52% 52% 54% 65% 67% 
High regime 36% 53% 47% 25% 22% 18% 38% 51% 48% 48% 46% 35% 33% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Z-Score threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. As threshold variable, we use: Z-Score= 
(1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE).  
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Concerning the other bank-specific variables, we find that the equity and securities to 
total assets ratios have a positive and significant relationship with cost efficiency. On the 
other hand, income diversification has a negative effect on performance. In terms of 
country-level determinants, we find that FDI inflows, house price and stock price index, 
bubble bursts and VIX indicator have a negative and significant impact on efficiency. 
Moreover, central bank reserves have a positive effect on efficiency. Overall, our results 
are similar to the fixed effect and the dynamic panel regressions. 
              2.5.3.2 Liquidity Threshold  
Table 8 presents the threshold effects due to liquidity measured as the ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets. 
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Table 8. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with liquidity as 
threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Liquidity 0.229967 
95% confidence interval (0.02045-0.59454) 
Impact of  Liquid Assets/TA                                       S.E                                      
λ1 -0.202** 0.0907 
λ2 0.017 0.0313 
Impact of covariates          S.E 
Z-Score  0.005 0.0053 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.141*** 0.0676 
E/TA  0.113** 0.0405 
Securities/TA  0.199*** 0.0377 
Income diversification -0.017*** 0.0043 
GDP per capita -0.047 0.1237 
FDI inflows -0.008*** 0.0025 
FDI outflows -0.003* 0.0018 
DCPS/GDP -0.004 0.0290 
Real Effective Exchange Rate  0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index -0.000* 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.024** 0.0099 
Reserves  0.045*** 0.0131 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ  0.049 0.0514 
Observations 609   
Low regime 195  
High regime 414   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The liquidity threshold value ranges between 0.02045 and 0.59454. We denote as 
dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we 
impose the liquidity (𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), which represents bank’s liquid assets over total assets. Following Bick (2007), the 
model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ).We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. For bank-specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking 
Fees= net fees, commission and trading income over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; 
Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over 
total assets. As country variables we employ: GDP per, capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Reserves (natural logarithm); Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); 
Volatility Implied Index . For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country 
variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. Also as endogenous variable 
for the model we impose Z-Score, where 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
  
Again we find evidence of two regimes. A liquidity threshold value of around 0.230 splits 
the sample into (i) banks with low liquidity ratios (higher liquidity risk) and (ii) banks 
with high liquidity ratios (lower liquidity risk). We find a negative and significant (at the 
5% level) relationship between liquidity and performance for banks within the low regime 
(high liquidity risk) as λ1 = -0.202. This result is consistent with the findings of Kwan 
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(2003) and Staikouras et al. (2008). On the other hand, the impact of liquidity on bank 
performance for the banks in the high regime is rather inconclusive as it is not significant, 
yet it takes a positive sign as in Athanasoglou et al.  (2008). 
Table 9 shows the classification of banks over time based on the liquidity threshold value 
(0.23). This classification implies that there are more banks classified in the high liquidity 
regime as opposed to the low one over the whole period. This also indicates that the 
majority of investment banks fall into the category of high liquidity and hence carry less 
liquidity risk in the event of a financial shock. Nonetheless, the number of banks within 
the low regime increases from 28% in 2007 to 37% in 2009. 
Table 9. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the 
two identified regimes based on threshold value of Liquidity. 
Threshold: Liquidity                         
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 45% 41% 31% 21% 22% 32% 29% 38% 32% 28% 36% 37% 30% 
High regime 55% 59% 69% 79% 78% 68% 71% 63% 68% 72% 64% 63% 70% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the liquidity threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets. 
 
For the remaining bank-specific determinants, we find that investment banking fees, 
equity, and securities to total assets ratios have a highly significant and positive impact on 
cost performance (see Table 8) while the income diversification variable has a negative 
impact on efficiency at the 1% level of significance. For the country-level variables, we 
find that FDI inflows, stock price index, bubble burst and VIX indicator have a strong 
negative impact on cost performance. Additionally, central bank reserves continue to have 
a strong positive effect on cost performance at the 1% level of significance.  
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               2.5.3.3 Investment Banking Fees Threshold 
In this section, we use the ratio of investment banking fees to total assets as the threshold 
variable to test the effect of investment banking fees on cost efficiency performance. We 
present our findings in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with investment 
banking fees as threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Investment banking fees 0.009322 
95% confidence interval (0.008271-0.009322) 
Impact of investment banking fees/TA                           S.E                                      
λ1 0.216** 0.0941 
λ2 -0.005 0.0633 
Impact of covariates  S.E 
Z-Score 0.007 0.0052 
Liquid Assets/TA 0.059 0.0366 
E/TA 0.117** 0.0414 
Securities/TA 0.020 0.0352 
Income diversification -0.016*** 0.0040 
GDP per capita -0.113 0.1261 
FDI inflows -0.009*** 0.0026 
FDI outflows -0.003 0.0017 
DCPS/GDP -0.027 0.0286 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index 0.000 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.026** 0.0097 
Reserves  0.046*** 0.0134 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ  0.146** 0.0672 
Observations 609   
Low regime 73  
High regime 533   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Investment Banking Fees variable for banks range between 
0.008271 and 0.009322. We denote as dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and 
the regime dependent variable we impose the Investment Banking Fees ( 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡) , which 
represents banks’ net fees commission and trading income over total assets.  Following Bick (2007), the model accounts 
for regime dependent intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. For bank-
specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Liquid assets over total assets; 
Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating 
Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total assets. As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; 
DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of 
the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm) ; Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific variables we use 
FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. 
As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. 
For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use 
Bloomberg database.. Also as endogenous variable for the model we impose Z-Score, where 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We 
check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels respectively.                                         
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The threshold value of fee-income is around 0.009. The variable splits the sample into two 
regimes. In line with Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) we find that for banks with low 
levels of investment fees (for banks in the low regime) an increase in fees asserts a positive 
and significant (at the 5% level) impact on performance as λ2 = 0.216. This finding 
supports our third hypothesis (H3). Nonetheless, banks within the high regime exhibit a 
decrease in performance when fees increase, but in this case, this effect is not statistically 
significant. 
Between 1998-2007 we observe a stable increase in the percentage of investment banks that 
belong to the low fee regime that peaks in 2008, while in 2009 and 2010 there is a decrease 
in banks that fall within this regime (see Table 11). 
Table 11. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the 
two identified two regimes based on Investment Banking Fees. 
Threshold: Investment Banking Fees                   
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 11% 10% 13% 12% 15% 19% 15% 14% 
High regime 95% 94% 94% 94% 94% 89% 90% 88% 88% 85% 81% 85% 86% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the investment banking fees threshold value 
that we obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use: 
Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets. 
 
Regarding the other cost efficiency correlates, we find equity to total assets to have a 
strong positive impact on cost performance. As in with our previous findings, income 
diversification has a strong negative effect on investment banking performance at the 1% 
level of significance. The relationship between FDI inflows, stock price index, the bubble 
burst and VIX indicator and efficiency remains negative and significant, in line with our 
previous results. Lastly, central bank reserves stimulate the cost efficiency of investment 
banks. 
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2.5.3.4 Does the impact of liquidity differ for investment banks as subsidiaries of 
banking groups? 
Subsidiary banks as a part of a larger banking entity can benefit from liquidity injections 
as these banks have ready access to liquidity from the parent bank (Mayer and Carlyn, 
2008). Banks that are members of a banking group can draw liquidity from the parent 
company in case of a financial shock (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010). We split the 
sample between banks that are part of a banking group and those which are not for this 
reason. Our findings are available in Tables 12 and 13. 
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Table 12. Sensitivity analysis with liquidity as bank cost efficiency determinant.  
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Lag efficiency 0.434*** 0.491*** 0.355*** 0.223* 
 (0.0993) (0.119) (0.172) (0.176) 
Liquid assets/TA 0.105* 0.147** -0.103* -0.087** 
 (0.0645) (0.0707) (0.0652) (0.0430) 
Z-Score  0.015*  0.081** 
  (0.0076)  (0.0036) 
Investment banking fees/TA  0.388***  0.096 
  (0.145)  (0.091) 
E/TA -0.136       -0.179 0.043 -0.002 
 (0.120) (0.132) (0.079) (0.011) 
Securities/TA 0.244*** 
(0.0629) 
 
0.272*** 
(0.0592) 
 
0.079* 
(0.0472) 
0.211** 
(0.0831) 
Income diversification -0.021*** 
(0.0022) 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.0019) 
 
-0.102*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0394) 
GDP per capita -0.290 -0.473*** -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.178) (0.172) (0.0319) (0.295) 
FDI inflows -0.009** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.003) 
FDI outflows 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.0019) (0.00241) (0.0025) (0.0015) 
DCPS/GDP -0.086** -0.067 -0.093 -0.190 
 (0.041) (0.0444) (0.107) (0.11) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.001 0.001 -1.39e-06 0.001 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
House Price Index -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Stock Price Index -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0075* -0.0006** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.023 -0.020 0.019 0.009 
 (0.0159) (0.0194) (0.0139) (0.017) 
Reserves 0.084*** 0.051* 0.067* 0.061** 
 (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0367) (0.0308) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.001 0.001 -7.19e-05 0.000347 
 (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Constant 1.471 4.003** -0.187 -1.001 
 (1.958) (1.700) (3.938) (3.005) 
Wald test 365.63*** 1058.80*** 110.82*** 194.33*** 
Sargan (p-value) 36.98(0.35) 21.25(0.45) 18.65(0.52) 18.73(0.56) 
AR(1) -2.42** -2.13** -2.12** -2.22** 
AR(2) -1.156 -0.81851 1.1053 1.13 
Observations 390 390 219 219 
Number of instruments 23 23 23 23 
Number of banks 64 64 33 33 
Notes: Models 1&2 refer to dynamic panel results for banks that belong to a group and Models 3&4 for stand-alone 
investment banks. The Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 1997 to 2010. 
The dependent variable is cost efficiency derived using a SFA methodology. As bank-specific independent variables 
we employ: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and 
trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Income diversification= 
1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities over total 
assets.  As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); 
Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country 
variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index, we use Bloomberg database. Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
(robust) standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Sensitivity analysis with liquidity as threshold variable. 
                       Investment banks 
  
Threshold estimate                                                           Model (1)                                       Model (2) 
Liquidity 0.525295 0.314819 
95% confidence interval (0.289233-0.557692) (0.02081-0.541402) 
Impact of  Liquid Assets/TA                                        
λ1    -0.086** -0.105 
λ2       -0.008      -0.032 
Impact of covariates   
Z-Score                    0.004* 0.0068 
Investment Banking Fees/TA                    0.018 0.1040 
E/TA                     0.106*** 0.0630 
Securities/TA                     0.041 0.0420*** 
Income diversification                    -0.099*** -0.0155*** 
GDP per capita                    -0.448*** 0.1523 
FDI inflows                   -0.001 -0.0150** 
FDI outflows                   -0.001 -0.0013 
DCPS/GDP                   -0.014 -0.0071 
Real Effective Exchange Rate                    0.000 0.0003 
House Price Index                   -0.001* -0.0006** 
Stock Price Index                   -0.000 -0.0008** 
Burst of the asset bubble(dummy)                   -0.011 -0.0331** 
Reserves                    0.068 0.0400** 
Volatility Implied Index                   -0.000 -0.0025*** 
δ                     0.005 0.0022 
Observations 219 390 
Low regime 160  137 
High regime 59 253 
Notes: Model 1 refers to dynamic panel threshold results for stand-alone banks and Model 2 for investment banks that 
belong to a group. The Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 
5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). The liquidity threshold value for non-banking group ranges between 0.289233 
and 0.557693 while for banking group banks between 0.02081 and 0.541402. We denote as dependent variable banks’ 
efficiency scores(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we impose the liquidity (𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), 
which represents bank’s liquid assets over total assets. Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent 
intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. For bank-specific variables 
we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and trading 
income over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest 
Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total assets. As country variables we 
employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House price Index; 
Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. For 
bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World 
Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. Also as endogenous variable for the model we 
impose Z-Score, where 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 . We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.                                   
 
A number of previous studies have found a positive relationship between liquidity and 
bank performance (Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et 
al., 2008). Our results show that for banks as part of a banking group, an increase in 
liquidity has a positive effect on efficiency at the 10% and 5% levels of significance 
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(Model 1 and 2 in Table 12). Yet an increase in liquidity for stand-alone banks has a 
negative impact on efficiency at the 10% and 5% levels of significance (Model 3 and 4 
in Table 12). The negative relationship between liquidity and bank performance is 
supported by empirical evidence (Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007). The first result supports the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H2) concerning the 
positive impact of liquidity on cost efficiency. However, our findings imply that the 
impact of liquidity on performance varies and depends on whether investment bank could 
draw liquidity from a larger banking entity. Table 13 presents threshold estimations for 
stand-alone banks, revealing that an increase in liquidity for the low liquidity regime 
banks has a negative effect on investment bank performance at the 5% level of 
significance as λ= -0.086 (Model 1 in Table 13). Moreover, threshold estimation for 
subsidiary banks shows that for both the low and high regime investment banks there 
exists a negative relationship between efficiency and liquidity but the coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero (Model 2 in Table 13). The results for both banking groups 
may indicate that our significant threshold liquidity effects for the whole sample are 
driven by banks with low liquidity that are mainly banks that do not belong to a larger 
banking entity. 
 
Table 14 shows that the majority of stand-alone investment banks fall within the low 
liquidity regime. Lastly, the number of banks in the low liquidity regime decreases 
markedly (20%) from 2007 to 2008 with the burst of the financial crisis (Panel A in Table 
14).  
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Table 14. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the 
two identified regimes based on liquidity (stand-alone and group-banks). 
Panel A: Liquidity 
(stand-alone banks) 
                        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 73% 77% 79% 74% 62% 80% 71% 77% 77% 80% 60% 67% 63% 
High regime 27% 23% 21% 26% 38% 20% 29% 23% 23% 20% 40% 33% 37% 
Panel B: Liquidity 
(group-banks) 
                        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 55% 47% 32% 28% 28% 38% 33% 44% 43% 36% 44% 41% 37% 
High regime 45% 53% 68% 72% 72% 62% 67% 56% 57% 64% 56% 59% 63% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks (stand-alone and group-banks) based on the threshold 
values that we obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. As threshold variable 
we use the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  The low regime stands for the percentage of banks that have bank-
specific values for the liquidity measure below the threshold, while the high regime stands for the percentages of banks 
that have bank-specific values above the liquidity threshold value. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology introduced by 
Kremer et al. (2013) and find that the positive impact of Z-Score on investment bank 
performance, as measured by cost efficiency, is more pronounced for banks with lower 
risk. This result is important in the context of the investment banks whose operations are 
inherently riskier than those of conventional banks (Bertay et al., 2013). Furthermore, we 
find that liquidity has a negative impact on cost efficiency for banks that belong to the 
low liquidity regime. This effect is driven for the most part by stand-alone banks that 
could neither draw liquidity from a larger banking entity nor rely on deposits  as 
commercial banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev et al., 2009). The analysis also reveals 
that the fee income ratio  has a positive impact on cost efficiency only for banks belonging 
to the low fee-income regime. This suggests that an increase in investment banking fees 
comes at the expense of increased risk for investment banks in the high fee-income regime. 
This is a major difference between investment banks and conventional, as for the latter a 
rise of the fee-income could bring diversification benefits (De-Young and Rice, 2004; 
Chiorazzo et al., 2008). 
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Notably, we find important changes in the percentages of banks that fall within each 
threshold regime before and during the financial crisis. In particular, the percentage of 
banks in the regime of high default risk (low Z-Score), increases considerably in the 2008-
2010 period. This indicates that investment banks underwent a period of substantial 
financial distress. Moreover, the number of banks belonging to the low liquidity regime 
increases in the years of the crisis. This, in combination with the negative impact of 
liquidity on cost efficiency for stand-alone investment banks in the low liquidity regime 
could denote the high costs of drawing liquidity during financial turmoil (Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen, 2009). Finally, there is a slight increase in the number of banks belonging 
to the low fee-income regime over the crisis period. The positive impact of fee-income 
on the performance of banks in the low regime could suggest the importance of income 
generation capability in order to weather the financial crisis.  
Measures to strengthen bank stability are warranted. One of the regulatory gaps revealed 
by the credit crunch was the absence of strict capital adequacy ratios for investment banks. 
This became evident during the crisis period as the intensification of investment banking 
risk led to significant losses both for the financial institutions and the entire economy. 
More stringent legislation related to capital requirements such as the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010) in the US and the Capital Requirements Directive 4 (CRD 4) in Europe could act 
as a defence mechanism against default risk and thus improve investment bank 
performance. In terms of liquidity, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) proposed in Basel 
III and in CRD 4 could ensure sufficient short-term liquidity and thus diminish the need 
for banks to seek external funding during periods of financial turmoil. The LCR measure 
could be of particular importance for stand-alone investment banks who cannot rely on 
deposit funding. 
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Chapter 3: The effect of corporate governance on the performance of 
US investment banks 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
The liberalization and the globalization of financial services in combination with rapid 
advances in the financial innovation have broadened significantly the variety of 
operations in which investment banks engage in over the last two decades. Such 
operations are the issuance of debt or equity securities in the primary market, while they 
also include the financial advisory services and the trading of securities in the secondary 
market. As a result, the performance of investment banking industry, through complex 
and far-reaching operations, is of utmost importance for the well-functioning of global 
financial markets. Yet, few studies (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 
2010; Radic et al., 2012) appear to examine the underlying determinants of the 
performance of investment banks. This chapter bridges this gap in the literature and 
further reveals a crucial link between corporate governance and the performance of these 
financial institutions. 
 
Investment banking activities have been particularly important in the US economy as they 
captured more than half (58%) of the global investment banking revenues in 2012, while 
the US investment banking accounted for 30% of the total US banking industry profits 
during the same year. However, the investment banking industry has also been held 
accountable for the credit crunch in 2008 that hit the US and then was transmitted globally. 
In fact, the turmoil reveals the possible detrimental impact of the investment banking on 
the financial market (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga; 
2010). Moreover, the US financial market towards the end of the last decade entered a 
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period of unprecedented instability where the estimated losses due to subprime mortgages 
were between 400 (US$bn) and 500 (US$bn). Consequently, investment banks went 
through some very dramatic changes. Bear Stearns was acquired by JP Morgan with the 
financial support of the Federal Reserve Bank, Merrill Lynch had to raise a substantial 
volume of capital to cover high realised losses on assets, whereas Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Acharya and Richardson (2009) 
argue that part of the causes of the crisis should be attributed to the considerably complex 
activities of investment banks. The shift of financial institutions from deposit-taking 
activities into highly complex operations might have contributed to the crisis resulting in 
the underperformance of investment banks and the financial system as a whole 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).17 The degree of complexity of the investment 
banking is related closely to the underlying corporate governance. To this end, an inquest 
into the operations of investment banks necessitates a detailed study of their corporate 
governance.   
 
In this chapter, we focus on the impact of the corporate governance on investment bank 
performance. Due to the crisis of 2007, the governance of financial institutions has been 
into the spotlight (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Erkens et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013), whilst a growing 
perception about the destructive role of corporate governance has gained support 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). Coming up with a definition of corporate governance is not an easy 
task. Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as an internal mechanism that 
is linked closely to the system of acts, laws, and dynamics that control the operations of 
a firm. Therefore, corporate governance is very complex particularly for banks which are 
                                                          
17 Fernando et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms that had as their main equity underwriter Lehman 
Brothers suffered economically and their earnings experienced a substantial fall.  
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unique and differ fundamentally from non-banking institutions. This, in turn, implies that 
corporate governance in banks has an important role because of the specialness of these 
institutions. Banks have three main characteristics that motivate a separate examination 
of the corporate governance in banking. Firstly, according to the banking theory, the 
nature of financial intermediation makes banks more opaque compared to other 
institutions due to the difficulty of outsiders to monitor bank assets (Diamond and Rajan, 
2001; Levine, 2004). Moreover, the special nature of banks is reflected on the complexity 
of the bank business model (Furfine, 2001). In the case of investment banks, the high 
level of operational complexity is of utmost importance because it distinguishes the 
business model of these financial institutions from that of other types of banking and non-
banking institutions (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010). Therefore, the issue of bank opacity in combination with the complexity of the 
bank business model makes it difficult for the outside shareholders to monitor bank 
operations raising in this way information asymmetries (Andres and Vallelado, 2008).  
 
Secondly, banks are heavily leveraged institutions and this can have implications in terms 
of corporate governance (Hagendorff, 2014). Banks’ equity is relatively low compared to 
the standards of other institutions. However, shareholders in banks appear to control the 
main mechanisms of corporate governance such as the executive compensation and the 
board of directors. Hence, despite the fact that creditors are more important than equity 
investors for the wealth of banks, the shareholders of banks have a predominant role in 
the governance of banks and thus can take decisions intended to maximize their own 
wealth. This is particularly important as shareholders are risk-neutral while creditors risk-
averse and thus, they have different risk preferences. (Hagendorff, 2014).  This, in turn, 
implies that under a high level of leverage the power of shareholder rises as they have a 
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key role in the decision-making process of banks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Hagendorff, 2014). In this case, shareholders hold large claims on bank’s assets and hence 
they are encouraged to raise risk aiming to increase their equity value. However, an 
increase of bank risk would bear losses for creditors and thus, this would decrease their 
wealth.  
Thirdly, regulation plays a crucial role for banking institutions due to the importance of 
banks in the economy and the opacity of bank activities (Hagendorff, 2014). This special 
monitoring of regulators for banks is a supplementary governance, as for example in the 
US regulators have imposed restrictions on the executive compensation (Board of 
Governors et al., 2010). Moreover, with regards to the banking industry, the government 
can also own banks and thus act in its own interests (Santomero, 1997). Previous studies 
show that state-owned banks underperform compared to private banks (Iannotta et al., 
2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009). This is due to the fact that state-owned banks have to provide 
primarily funding for governmental projects that might dampen bank performance 
(Altunbas et al., 2001). 
Investment banks focus primarily on non-interest income activities and thus they differ 
principally from other types of banks, such as commercial banks, that concentrate on 
interest income operations (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). In addition, after the hit 
of the financial crisis of 2007, the government intervention in the investment banking is 
particularly evident as many US investment banks had to convert their status into Bank 
Holding Companies (BHCs) in order to gain access to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
(FDIC) support (Volcker, 2010) and other funding programs such as the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). The status of investment banks as part of BHCs implies that the 
main stakeholders have become other banks in the group and the government. These 
structural changes could lead to a rise in moral hazard  of investment banks because it 
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enables them  to rely on  the funds of the other banking institutions that belong to the 
BHC (Mayer and Carlyn, 2008) and on the ‘implicit government guarantee’ that the 
access to FDIC support implies (Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006; Gropp et al., 2013). 
Therefore, examining the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 
investments banks is important for both bank managers and regulators. Furthermore, an 
advantage of our analysis is that it tests for threshold-effects of important corporate 
governance variables with respect to bank performance over a period that covers the 
financial crisis and the immediate period after. Possible changes in the percentage of 
banks that belong to threshold regimes would imply transformations in the structure of 
corporate governance mechanism of investment banks before and after the turmoil. Thus, 
this study could also shed light on the effect of corporate governance changes on 
investment bank performance since the period that investment banks have been converted 
to BHCs. 
The current banking literature focuses on various dimensions of corporate governance. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the recent studies that examine the impact of corporate 
governance on bank performance. A number of papers put emphasis on board structure 
(Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Tanna et al., 2011; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Pathan and 
Faff, 2013; Liang et al., 2013), i.e., board size, board composition and gender diversity, 
and its impact on bank performance. Other studies look at the impact of executive 
compensation and managerial incentives on performance (Pi and Timme, 1993; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012) and bank risk 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Berger et al., 2014). A smaller amount of studies 
examines the relationship between CEO power and bank performance (Mishra and 
Nielsen, 2000) and risk (Pathan, 2009). Lastly, there is also empirical evidence of the 
effect of operational complexity on bank performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012). Hence, 
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according to the literature, there are five broad mechanisms of corporate governance: 
board structure, executive compensation, managerial incentives, CEO power, and 
operational complexity. 
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Table1. Recent studies on the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                *The list of the Bank of England’s (2006) Institutions included within the United Kingdom banking sector –nationality analysis. 
 
References Countries in Sample Years in sample 
Specialisation of 
banks 
Measure of 
performance 
Methodology 
Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) 
Spain, Italy, France, Canada, United States, and the United 
Kingdom 
1995-2005 Commercial banks Tobin’s Q, ROA and 
annual returns of bank 
shareholders 
Two-step ‘system’ 
GMM estimator 
Tanna et al. 
(2011) 
United Kingdom 2001-2006 
Commercial, saving 
and investment 
banks* 
Efficiency (Data 
Envelopment 
Analysis-DEA) 
OLS 
Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012) 
United States 2007-2008 Commercial banks Buy-and-hold returns Cross-sectional 
regressions 
Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz(2011) 
United States 2007-2008 Commercial banks Buy-and-hold returns Cross-sectional 
regressions 
Erkens et al. 
(2012) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Cyprus,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Iceland,India
,Ireland,Italy,Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
2007-2008 
Commercial banks, 
brokerages, and 
insurance companies 
Buy-and-hold returns 
OLS and Tobit 
regressions 
Pathan and Faff 
(2013) 
 1997-2011 Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ROE,POI ratios 
Two-step ‘system’ 
GMM estimator 
Liang et al. 
(2013) 
China 2003-2010 Commercial ROA and ROE 
Two-step ‘system’ 
GMM estimator 
Adams and 
Mehran (2012) 
United States 1965-1999 Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Fixed-effect 
estimator 
Aebi et al. (2012) United States 2007-2009 Commercial and 
Saving banks 
Buy-and-hold returns, 
ROA, and ROE 
Time-series 
regressions 
Mishra and 
Nielsen (2000) 
United States 1975-1989 Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) 
ROA and ROE OLS and 2SLS 
Choi and Hasan 
(2005) 
Korea 1998-2002 Commercial banks ROA, ROE, and 
Efficiency 
OLS 
Pi and Timme 
(1993) 
United States 1987-1990 Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) 
ROA and Efficiency OLS and Tobit 
regressions 
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Some of the above studies (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang et 
al., 2013) use a dynamic panel regression framework (two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator) 
for their analysis, while others (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) 
employ cross-sectional type of estimations as they examine only a short period of time 
(2007-2008). However, the usage of a dynamic panel is relevant in the context of this 
study as it accounts for endogeneity issues that arise from the examination of the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. Additionally, the well-
known persistence in bank profits (Berger et al., 2000) could be treated by the usage of 
the lagged dependent variable among the regressors (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). With 
regards to the methods employed for the estimation of bank performance most of the 
studies use accounting-based indicators (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan and Faff, 
2013; Liang et al., 2013; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Mishra and Nielsen, 
2000), neglecting in that way the importance of using also a structural approach of 
measuring performance, i.e. the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The SFA approach 
of measuring bank performance has the advantage of accommodating a full set of 
information from bank balance sheets, and not just a single ratio as simple accounting 
indicators, whilst it is based on the fundamental notion of microeconomic theory of 
optimising when it comes to performance. In addition, according to Hughes and Mester 
(2010) using SFA for measuring bank performance reveals bank managers’ decisions 
regarding both expected revenues, costs, and the related risk. In this study, we opt for 
both the SFA approach and accounting-based indicators. In addition, the majority of 
existing studies examines the impact of corporate governance on bank performance of 
commercial or BHCs banks (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). However, none of these studies 
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focuses exclusively on the examination of the underlying relationship between corporate 
governance and the performance of investment banks. 
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It is the first study to 
examine the impact of corporate governance on investment bank performance during both 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Secondly, we employ a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance measures which includes board structure, compensation, 
managerial ownership, CEO power and operational complexity. Thirdly, we use both 
simple accounting-based financial indicators and the SFA approach to proxy for bank 
performance, providing in that way additional evidence for the validity of our findings. 
Finally, we opt for a dynamic threshold model (Kremer et al., 2013) to investigate 
possible threshold-effects of some key corporate governance determinants of investment 
bank performance under a period of financial distress. The main advantage of this analysis 
is that different regimes could be identified endogenously from the underlying data 
generating process.  
 
Our results show that the board size asserts a negative effect on performance consistent 
with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’, particularly for banks with board size higher than ten 
members. The threshold analysis reveals that in the post-crisis period most of the 
investment banks opt for boards with less than ten members, aiming to decrease the 
agency conflicts endemic in large boards.  We also find evidence of a negative association 
between operational complexity and performance. Moreover, CEO power asserts a 
positive effect on performance in line with the ‘stewardship hypothesis’. In addition, an 
increase in the share ownership of board members has a negative impact on performance 
for banks below an identified threshold. On the other hand, for banks with share 
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ownership of board members above the threshold value, this effect turns positive, 
indicating an alignment between shareholders’ and managers’ incentives. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the hypotheses 
development and discusses further the related literature review. Section 3.3 introduces 
the data while Section 3.4 discusses the methodology. Section 3.5 provides the empirical 
findings and Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Related literature and hypotheses development  
           3.2.1 Board size and bank performance 
 
Agency theory posits that a large board can be less efficient than a small board due to a 
rise in agency conflicts because of inefficient communication and cooperation costs 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Turning now to the empirical research that 
focuses on the banking industry, Pathan and Faff (2013) study the impact of board size 
on bank performance for a sample of US BHCs over the 1997-2011 periods. In support 
of the agency cost theory, the authors observe a negative relationship between board size 
and performance as estimated by Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) ratios. In an earlier study, Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) show that there exists an inverted U-shaped association between board 
size and bank performance for 69 commercial banks from six European countries over 
1995-2005 periods. This indicates that an increase in the number of board members to a 
certain extent enhances the performance of banks, as large financial institutions benefit 
from more board members who can legitimate the company to its external environment 
(Pfeffer, 1972). However, when the board size becomes very large this, in turn, can have 
the adverse effect on performance due to high information asymmetries between the 
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board members. Based on the above theoretical framework and previous empirical 
findings, the first hypothesis, H1, can be defined as: 
H1: An increase in the number of board members has a negative effect on the 
performance of investment banks. 
3.2.2 Board composition and bank performance 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that more independent oriented boards are positively 
related to firm performance. Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that independent directors 
minimize managerial entrenchment risk through their expertise and objectivity in the 
decision-making process. However, recent empirical evidence that focuses on the banking 
industry suggests that there exists a negative relationship between bank performance and 
board independence. In particular, Pathan and Faff (2013) find a negative association 
between bank performance, estimated by various financial indicators, and board 
independence for the 1997-2011 periods. This study lends support to the ‘stewardship 
theory’ (Donaldson, 1990), that an increase in the proportion of non-independent 
directors (insiders) could positively contribute to firm performance as insiders have more 
experience and better firm-specific knowledge (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Also, 
a higher level of independence may result in infertile political activity by non-independent 
members that could lessen the productivity of the outsiders and decrease the cooperation 
among the board members (Westphal, 1998, 1999). In support of this argument, Erkens 
et al. (2012) find that board independence dampens the performance, as estimated by buy-
and-hold stock returns, of 296 banks across 30 countries over the financial crisis period 
(2007-2008).  Therefore, based on the above discussion our second hypothesis can be 
formulated as: 
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H2: An increase in the proportion of independent directors has a negative impact on the 
performance of investment banks. 
3.2.3 Gender diversity and bank performance 
 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) suggest that female directors are likely to be more 
committed to their duties and communicate better with the other board directors. In 
support of the view that women are more productive at this level of hierarchy, Eagly and 
Carli (2003) argue that the ‘glass ceiling’ effect motivates females to be even more 
proficient in order to reach these kind of positions in a firm. The ‘glass ceiling hypothesis’ 
describes the gender discrimination in a firm. Under this hypothesis, there is a 
misperception that women have inferior skills than men and, therefore, they face 
additional hurdles entering the market and hold a directorship (Martell, 1999; Baxter and 
Wright, 2000). Even though, the existing findings are contradictory on the relationship 
between gender diversity and performance, most studies support that more women in the 
boardroom increase the firm performance. In particular, Pathan and Faff (2013) find that 
gender diversity, estimated as the percentage of female directors on the board, has a 
positive impact on bank performance proxied by Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and POI ratios. 
Additionally, García-Meca et al. (2015) find that an increase in the proportion of women 
in the board exerts a positive effect on performance, as estimated by ROA, for a sample 
of 159 banks in nine countries over the 2004-2010 period. Thus, following the preceding 
discussion, our third hypothesis is formulated as:  
H3: An increase in the proportion of female board members has a positive impact on the 
performance of investment banks. 
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3.2.4 CEO power and bank performance 
 
According to the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ (Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990), CEO 
duality could enhance firm performance. This theory suggests that a CEO who is also the 
chairman of the board (COB), would act as a good agent of company’s assets and a firm 
would take advantage of the unity of direction, strong command, and control that the 
powerful CEO would offer. Therefore, the agency conflicts would rather be moderated 
when the positions of the CEO and COB in a company are occupied by the same 
individual. Similarly, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) suggest that the unity of control, 
as expressed by the CEO duality, encourages CEOs to make decisions determinedly. This 
unity of command can prove to be beneficial particularly in terms of firm performance in 
the event of an outside thread, such as a hostile acquisition, which requires concentration 
of the control and stringent monitoring (Alvarez and Svejenova, 2005). Turning to the 
empirical evidence, an early study by Donaldson and Davis (1991) finds that the CEO 
duality improves performance, lending support to the stewardship theory. Moreover,  Lin 
(2005) finds that the CEO duality exerts a positive effect on the financial performance of 
Taiwan companies between 1997-1999 period. Additionally, Pathan (2009) finds that the 
CEO duality decreases risk-taking that in turn could improve bank performance for a 
sample of US BHCs over the 1997-2004 periods. Drawing from these arguments, our 
fourth hypothesis can be stated as: 
H4: Higher CEO power has a positive impact on the performance of investment banks. 
3.2.5 Executive compensation and bank performance 
Executive compensation has attracted the interest of researchers as it could be perilous to 
the corporate governance of firms (Barro and Barro, 1990; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; 
Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Crawford et al., 1995; Bedchuk et al., 2009). Compensation is 
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typically categorized into two forms: 1) cash that includes base salary and bonus 2) and 
equity-based compensation that includes stock options and restricted stock grants and 
constitutes a form of long-term compensation. Agency theorists argue that a long-term 
form of compensation better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ incentives (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), as long-term pay normally reward managers when they meet firms’ 
performance goals (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
examine the impact of executive compensation on the performance of 77 banks for the 
2007-2008 crisis period. Their results show a positive association between equity-based 
compensation and performance, estimated as buy-and-hold returns, during the turmoil.  
Another study by Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) looks at the impact of compensation 
on bank risk focusing on the cash bonus payment of CEOs. They conclude CEO cash 
bonus has a negative effect on bank default risk, implying a positive impact on the former 
on bank performance. Apart from the compensation of CEO and its impact on bank 
performance, the compensation of top executives (top management team, TMT) has 
received very little empirical attention due to the assumption that the compensation 
schemes of TMT are ‘isomorphic’ with those of CEO (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). 
However, Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1996) and Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) 
argue that there is no evidence to support the convergence in the compensation of CEO 
and TMT, while Hambrick (1995) shows that there is large gap between them. Therefore, 
it is important to control for the effect of TMT compensation when one examines the 
relationship between CEO compensation and bank performance. Overall, the above 
theoretical and empirical analysis shows that the association between the CEO equity-
based compensation and performance could be positive, thus: 
H5: An increase in the CEO equity-based compensation has a positive impact on the 
performance of investment banks, after controlling for the TMT compensation. 
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3.2.6 Ownership and bank performance 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989), the distinction of the 
ownership and managerial control leads to the misalignment of shareholders’ and board’s 
interests. Corporate governance analysts claim generally that managers’ interest are in 
line with shareholders’ when the former have partial ownership of the company (Murphy, 
1999). In support of this perception, Pi and Timme (1993) find that for banks with non-
chairman CEO there is a positive relationship between ownership and performance, 
estimated by ROA and efficiency, for a sample of US banks over the 1987-1990 periods. 
Lately, the financial crisis has motivated researchers to examine the corporate governance 
of banking entities in terms of managers’ incentives over the period of the financial crisis.  
However, Fahlenbrach and  Stulz (2011) find that there is no statistical evidence to show 
that the CEO incentives were not aligned with the shareholders’ interests during the 
period of the turmoil. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) stress that banks with a higher 
proportion of board ownership operate worse than banks with less board ownership for a 
sample of US banks over the 2007-2008 period. The reason being that banks with high 
ownership boards have been positioned in ways that managers assumed that would 
maximize shareholder wealth. However, this policy left banks exposed to high risk and 
had a negative effect on bank performance. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis H6.A and the 
competing hypothesis H6.7 is specified as follows:  
H6: An increase in managerial ownership has a positive impact on the performance of 
investment banks.   
3.2.7 Operational complexity and bank performance 
Operational complexity denotes the variety of activities which are related to a firm’s 
operations (Child, 1972). The higher the level of complexity is, the more apparent 
becomes the need of higher expertise and knowledge specific to the environment. This 
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implies that co-ordination problems between specialists rise and can correspondingly 
increase communication costs of the firm (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967). Adams and 
Mehran (2012) observe a  negative impact of complexity on bank performance which is 
consistent with the theoretical argument by Lawrence and Lorch (1967). In addition, 
authors find that his negative effect turns to be positive when banks have more lead 
directors that sit on subsidiary boards. These directors are capable of managing effectively 
the bank and hence can deal with increased complexity. This also implies that banks might 
need more independent members in their boards so as to improve the expertise and 
knowledge to the banks. However, as director independency increases, the level of the 
attendance and effort of independent members on board and committee meeting decreases, 
resulting in the rise of free-riding problems that large banks suffer from (Jensen, 1993). 
The above discussion shows that the association between operational complexity and 
performance could be negative after controlling for committee and board related variables, 
thus:   
H7: An increase in operational complexity has a negative impact on the performance of 
investment banks, after controlling for board and committee related variables. 
3.3 Data and preliminary analysis  
Our sample consists of the major 23 listed investment banks headquartered in the US with 
standard industry classification (SIC) of 6211 and 6282. Our unbalanced panel dataset 
includes 203 observations over the period 2000-2012. The data are collected from DEF 
14A proxy statements, 10-K annual reports, Bankscope and Thomson Financial’s Banker.  
The corporate governance data are hand collected from DEF 14A proxy statements of 
annual meetings found in the SECs EDGAR filings. Following previous studies (Pathan, 
2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013) governance data are measured 
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from the date of the proxy statement. Financial information on investment banks is firstly 
sourced from Thomson Financial’s Banker and secondly from 10-K annual reports of 
SEC’S filings and Bankscope. We include only listed investment banks as information 
on corporate governance data are standardized through the SEC Edgar platform. Our main 
inclusion criterion is that we include in the sample only financial institutions that their 
main source of income consists of fees, commission and trading revenues reflecting in 
that way their distinctive operational nature.  
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Table 2. Definitions of variables used in the fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations. 
Variables  Measures                     
Corporate governance (explanatory variables)            
Board size (BS) The number of members in the board  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations)    
Board composition % (IND) The percentage of independent directors         
Gender diversity(GD) The percentage of female directors         
CEO ‘internally’ hired (CEOIN) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long-term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise   
CEO duality (CEODUAL) A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise      
CEO tenure (CEOTEN) The number of years that the CEO has served in the position (we  use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel est imations)   
CEO age (CEOAGE) The age of the CEO (we use the natural logarithm, in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Executives' Compensation (bonus &base salary) (EXECASH) The cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations) 
Executives' Compensation (equity) (EXEEQ) The equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock options (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)  
CEO Compensation  (bonus &base salary) (CEOCASH) The cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)  
CEO Compensation (equity) (CEOEQ) The equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel)   
Executives' bonus incentive(EXEBON) The ratio of bonus over executives' total  cash compensation       
CEO's bonus incentive (CEOBON) The ratio of bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation       
Board ownership % (BOARDOWN) The percentage shares that the directors hold        
CEO ownership % (CEOOWN) The percentage shares that the CEO holds         
Number of board committees (NBCOM) The number of board committees  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Fees paid for board meetings (FBCOM) Fees paid to directors for attending the board committees  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)    
Number of audit committee meetings(NMAUD) Number of meetings of audit committee  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Number of Segments (SEG) Number of different business segments  (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)     
Number of Subsidiaries (SUBS) Number of subsidiaries (we use the natural logarithm in the fixed and dynamic panel estimations)      
Performance measures (dependent variables)            
1. Return on average assets (ROAA) The net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets.     
2. Return on average equity (ROAE) The net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity      
3. Pre-tax operating income (POI) The pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets       
4. Profit efficiency (EFF) Efficiency scores obtained from the SFA          
Other control variables            
Equity over total assets (E/TA) The ratio of equity over total asset         
Investment banking fees (FEES) The ratio of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets      
Other earnings assets (EARN) The ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets      
Risk to default (RISK) Z-score= (1+ ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE        
Volatility Implied Index (VIX) Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index        
Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act   period (PSOX) A dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise.       
Crisis period (CRS) A dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010.               
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Our corporate governance data comprise five general dimensions; board structure, CEO 
power, compensation of the CEO and TMT, ownership of CEO and board members and 
operational complexity measures. In particular, we account for three board characteristics, 
namely board size, board composition and gender diversity. The first two variables have 
been used extensively in the corporate governance literature (Adams and Mehran, 2008; 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Staikouras et al., 2007; Busta, 2007; Tanna et al., 2011). 
Board size is the number of members that constitute the board, while board composition 
refers to the proportion of independent members in the board. Gender diversity is the 
percentage of females in the boardroom (Shrader et al., 1997; Campel and Minguez-Vera, 
2008; Francoeur et al., 2008).  
We employ two measures of the CEO power; CEO duality and ‘internally’ hired CEO. 
CEO duality is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 
0 otherwise (Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Daily and 
Dalton, 1992, 1993; Daily, 1995; Boyd, 1995; Baliga et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; 
Ballinger and Marcel, 2010). CEO ‘internally’ hired is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one 1 if the CEO is either the founder or has been member of the board before 
being moved to the CEO position, while otherwise it takes the value of zero (Adams et 
al., 2005; Pathan, 2009; Fahlenbrach 2009). As additional CEO characteristics, we control 
for the CEO tenure and the CEO age. The CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of the years 
that the CEO has served in the same position (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 
2008; Pathan and Faff, 2013). Finally, the CEO age is the natural logarithm of the age 
that the CEO has (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Cornett et al., 2008). 
In order to examine the impact of ownership on bank performance we use the number of 
shares hold by the CEO and TMT as the percentage of the total outstanding number of 
bank’s shares (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012). We also control for the cash 
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short-term incentives by employing the ratio of bonus to total cash compensation of the 
CEO and the TMT (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). Moreover, we examine the impact of 
cash and equity compensation of CEO and TMT on investment bank performance. The 
natural logarithm of cash-based compensation includes the base salary and bonus, while 
the natural logarithm of equity-based compensation includes restricted stock and stock 
options. Decomposition of the compensation has been used in a number of different 
studies that investigate differences on the impact of cash and equity-based compensation 
on performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Frye, 2004; Carpenter and Sanders, 
2002). We also examine the impact of operational complexity on bank performance. 
Operational complexity is proxied by the number of different business segments (Booth 
and Deli, 1999; Bushman et al., 2004; Linck et al., 2007) and subsidiaries (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). Moreover, we control for the total outstanding number of board 
committees (Vafeas, 1999), the fees paid to the board committees and the number of audit 
committee meetings (Xie et al., 2003; Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006). 
Turning to the bank-specific control variables that are not related to corporate governance, 
we opt for the ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy of leverage (Berger and Bonaccorsi 
di Patti, 2006). We also use the ratio of other earning assets over total assets in line with 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), so as to capture the different nature of investment banks 
centered on equity issuance and underwriting activities. We further employ the ratio of 
investment banking fees over total assets as non-interest income reflects the main activity 
of investment banks (Radic et al., 2012). Lastly, we control for the insolvency risk 
estimated by z-score, as in Boyd’s and Graham (1986).18 
                                                          
18Z-score= (1+ ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE. The z-score has been used in recent banking studies 
(Lepetit et al., 2008; Radic et al., 2012). 
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 In addition, in our analysis, we account for the regulatory mandates with the introduction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 as a dummy, which takes the value of 0 if the 
year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise consistent with Pathan and Faff (2009).19 
We also impose a crisis dummy which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007-2010 and 
zero otherwise in order to account for the financial crisis period (Pathan and Faff, 2009; 
De Jonghe et al., 2012). Finally, in order to capture the market risk, we use the Volatility 
Implied Index indicator (VIX).20 This financial indicator suggests that higher levels of 
VIX reflect higher degrees of financial turmoil in the US (Whaley, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 In particular, Section 301 of SOX Act obligates the audit committee to be comprised solely by 
independent members. 
20VIX is the volatility implied index for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. For the data 
collection we use Bloomberg database. 
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3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the fixed effect and 
dynamic panel regressions. 
Notes: the Table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions All the  
variables are in absolute values except the compensation determinants (EXECASH,EXEEQ,CEOCASH and CEOEQ)  which are in 
million dollars. BS: the number of members in the board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female 
directors; CEOIN: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long-term relationship with the bank, and 0 
otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number 
of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that the directors 
hold; CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; NBCOM: the number of board committees;  NMAUD: number of meetings 
of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for attending the board committees; SEG: the  number of different business segments; 
SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus; 
EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock options; CEOCASH: the cash 
compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted 
stock and stock options; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: 
ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; 
VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index); ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the 
average book value of total equity; ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets;  
POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA.  
 
Variables Mean SD     MIN MAX       Median 
Panel A: Corporate governance variables   
BS 8.3 3.5 5 16 9 
IND 0.66 0.25 0.4 0.92 0.71 
GD 0.11 0.1 0 0.44 0.11 
CEOIN 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
CEODUAL 0.72 0.49 0 1 1 
CEOTEN 7.74 8.25 0 41 5 
CEOAGE 55.35 8.18 39 72 56 
BOARDOWN 12.27 15.43 0 67.21 6.68 
CEOOWN 6.08 8.59 0.01 55.71 1.83 
NBCOM 3.32 1.20 0 6 3 
FBCOM 0.31 1.031 0 1,25 0 
NMAUD 8.01 4.04 0 18 8 
SEG 3.04 1.76 0 8 3 
SUB 114.6 236.4 0 1255 15 
EXECASH 16,500 20,700 0 139,000 7,897 
EXEEQ 20,100 30,300 0 209,000 7,234 
CEOCASH 4,303 6,063 0 41,200 1,950 
CEOEQ 5,720 8,219 0 42,400 1,356 
Panel B: Bank-specific and country level variables     
E/TA  0.2324 0.2456 0.0105 0.97 0.1022 
FEES  0.4703 0.8905 0.0004 5.21 0.0676 
EARN  0.6094 0.3765 0.0001 3.756 0.6638 
RISK  3.0961 6.3524 -42.59 52.82 2.1066 
VIX   20.97 7.5946 11.56 40 21.68 
Panel C: Bank performance measures       
ROAE  8.02 29.77     -305.05 122.82 8.97 
ROAA  1.96 11.73       -50.6 72.97 0.74 
POI  3.32 14.99   -63.15 91.17 0.99 
EFF   0.65 0.39    0.12 0.97 0.78 
      
Panel D: Year by year corporate governance variables   
Year   BS IND CEODUAL CEOOWN BOARDOWN 
2000   8.7 0.66 0.80 6.78 10.40 
2001   8.2 0.65 0.92 5.68 9.75 
2002   7.8 0.60 0.87 6.92 9.89 
2003   7.4 0.60 0.80 6.91 11.11 
2004   8.9 0.69 0.87 7.97 9.23 
2005   8.5 0.68 0.81 7.45 9.64 
2006   9.0 0.69 0.83 7.30 13.57 
2007   8.5 0.66 0.82 6.39 14.20 
2008   8.1 0.64 0.60 2.84 13.05 
2009   8.4 0.66 0.59 7.35 14.84 
2010   8.1 0.66 0.56 5.27 12.91 
2011   8.0 0.66 0.47 4.08 14.57 
2012   8.4 0.67 0.46 3.73 14.05 
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The sample mean of board size in Panel A of Table 3 is 8.30, which is similar to that of 
10 in Coles et al. (2008) and 9 in Francis et al. (2012). Moreover, our sample mean of 
gender diversity of 0.11 is comparable to that of 0.076 in Pathan and Faff (2013). Turning 
to the CEO characteristics, the sample mean of CEO duality is 0.72, while that of CEO 
‘internally’ hired is 0.65 which is similar to that of 0.58 in Pathan and Skully (2010). The 
CEO age sample mean is 55.35 (years), which is comparable to that of  56.26 in Cornett 
et al. (2009). Also, the mean tenure of the CEO is 7.74 (years) and is similar to that of 
8.85 in Pathan and Skully (2010). With regards to the ownership, the sample mean of 
board ownership is 12.27 %, which is comparable to that of 10.25% in Pathan and Skully 
(2010) and to that of 9.63% in Andershon and Fraser (2000). Our CEO ownership sample 
mean is 6.08% which is consistent to that reported (4.41%) by Pathan and Skully (2010). 
The sample mean of the number of board committees is 3.32, and is in line to that found 
(4.9) by Adams and Mehran (2003). Lastly, the sample mean of the total outstanding 
number of business segment is 3.04, which is also comparable to that of 2.6 in Coles et 
al. (2008). 
In Panel B of Table 3 we present some descriptive statistics of control variables, namely 
E/TA, FEES, EARN, Z-SCORE and the VIX financial indicator. The sample mean of 
return on average equity, ROAE, in Panel C of Table 2 is 8.02%, which is similar to the 
sample mean of 9.92% in Pathan and Faff (2013). Moreover, our mean efficiency score 
for US investment banks is 0.65, which is similar to the sample mean of 0.66 in Radic et 
al. (2012).  
Panel D shows an upward trend in the average percentage of independent members of the 
board over time, with a notable increase from 60% in 2003 to 69% in 2006. This increase 
is attributed to the independent board requirements imposed by SOX.  Lastly, we also 
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observe that the mean of CEO ownership was sharply reduced from 6.39% in 2007 to 
2.84% in 2008. 
3.4 Methodology 
     3.4.1 Bank Performance measures 
There are two broad approaches to evaluate bank performance; 1) the structural method 
that is based on the economics of profit maximization or cost minimization under which 
bank performance is estimated as a function (profit or cost) by employing either a 
parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis-SFA) or a non-parametric methodology (Data 
Envelopment Analysis-DEA) and 2) the non-structural method that refers to the 
accounting-based performance indicators such as are return on average assets (ROAA), 
return on average equity (ROAE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) as a percentage of 
the average total assets (Hughes and Mester, 2010).  
There are numerous empirical studies (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Casu and Girardone, 2010; 
Sun and Chang, 2011; Barth et al., 2013) that employ structural methods (SFA or DEA) 
to evaluate bank performance, while others use accounting-based financial ratios 
(Klapper and Love, 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Aebi et al., 
2012). In our study, we employ the SFA approach as estimated by a profit function and 
three accounting-based ratios, namely ROAA, ROAE and POI. The reason that we 
employ a profit function, instead of a cost-function, is because corporate governance can 
be seen as a set of internal mechanisms aiming to maximize the value of a bank (Denis et 
al., 2001). Besides, investment banks are revenue-motivated institutions and hence the 
profit function is appropriate when one estimates the efficiency of these financial 
institutions consistent with Radic et al. (2012). In addition, ‘profit maximization is 
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superior to cost minimization for most purposes because it is the more accepted economic 
goal of firm’s owners’ as argued by Berger and Mester (1999, pg. 3). 
By employing both the profit function and accounting ratios we rely on two different 
approaches, strengthening in that way the robustness of our results. One might argue that 
because SFA’s efficiency scores and accounting-based performance indicators might be 
highly correlated that in turn would lead both estimation approaches to give similar results. 
The SFA approach of measuring bank performance has the advantage of accommodating 
a full set of information from bank balance sheets, and not just a single ratio as in 
accounting indicators, whilst it is based on the fundamental notion of microeconomic 
theory of optimising when it comes to performance. In addition, according to Hughes and 
Mester (2010) using SFA for measuring bank performance reveals bank managers’ 
decisions regarding both expected revenues, costs, and the related risk. Furthermore, 
Beccalli (2007) argue that accounting-based ratios do not count for changes in the 
production process and input and output mix. Therefore, these two performance measures 
might reflect different type of information and thus, the correlation between them might 
be fairly low. Indeed, our findings show that the correlation between profit efficiency 
scores (EFF) and the three accounting based ratios (ROAA, ROAE and POI) is positive 
but is relatively low (see Table 4), as in Bauer et al. (1998) and Koetter (2006). 
Table 4. Correlation of efficiency and accounting-based ratios. 
  EFF ROAE ROAA POI 
EFF 1       
ROAE 0.0952 1   
ROAA 0.0889 0.6915 1  
POI 0.1107 0.6701 0.7913 1 
Notes: the Table shows the correlation of efficiency and accounting-based ratios for a sample of  the US 
investment banks over 2000-2012 periods. EFF denotes the profit efficiency scores obtained from the SFA, 
ROAE is the return on equity , ROAA is the return on assets and POI denotes the pre-tax operating income. 
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We opt for the SFA, as introduced by Aigner et al. (1977), to estimate profit efficiency 
scores. The advantage of this parametric methodology relative to the non-parametric 
(DEA) approach is that both the random error and inefficiency are combined in a 
composite error term (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). To do so we use a fixed-effect 
specification where efficiency scores are independently and identically distributed 
(Greene, 2002). 
In particular, we use the following specification for the profit frontier: 
 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                          (1), 
where 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 is pre-tax profits for bank i in year t.
21  𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a vector of input prices,  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of outputs, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is a fixed net-put. The term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 stands for the error term, while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
denotes bank inefficiency.  
Moreover the translog profit function, opted in the study, takes the form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖   
+∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑖   
+∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡 +
1
2⁄ 𝜇2𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜈𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖 +∑ 𝜉𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑖   
+𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ± 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
                                 (2) 
Ordinary linear homogeneity and symmetry limitations are employed. We estimate 
equation (2) with a maximum likelihood method parameterized based on the variance 
parameters: 22 
                                                          
21In order to deal with negative values of profits we follow the approach suggested by Bos and Koetter 
(2011). In particular, negative values of profits are replaced by the value of 1 in the left had side, while 
simultaneously we use a new variable, namely negative profit indicator at the right hand side. This indicator 
in case of losses takes the absolute value of negative profits while in case of positive profits takes the value 
of 1. 
22We estimate bank-specific efficiency scores using the distribution of efficiency term conditional to the 
estimate of the composite error term as in  Jondrow et al. (1982). 
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𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2  
                                                            and  𝛽 = 𝜎𝑢2 𝜎𝜀2⁄                               
(3) 
Following Sealey and Lindley (1977) we employ the ‘intermediation’ approach in order 
to define bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that banks use labour and 
capital in order to collect funds and transform them into loans and other earning assets.  
We follow this approach which is used widely in numerous previous studies (Altunbas et 
al., 2001; Isik and Hasan, 2002, 2003; Fries and Taci, 2005; Casu and Girardone, 2006; 
Gaganis and Pasiouras; 2013) that estimate efficiency and which is also employed by 
Radic et al. (2012) that is the only study to this date that examines the performance of 
investment banks in terms of profit efficiency. Hence, with regards to inputs used we also 
employ the price of labour and physical capital, which is the norm in the banking literature 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The price of labour is measured as the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets, while the price of physical capital is measured as the ratio of 
operating expenses to fixed assets. The selection of outputs for investment banks should 
reflect their operational nature and hence we could not use loans because this is the 
standard output used for the efficiency estimation of commercial banks. Investment banks 
differ fundamentally from commercial banks, as the former engage primarily in non-
interest operations and hence they lack the deposit base that conventional banks have. 
Therefore, for the selection of the outputs we follow Radic et al. (2012) and employ two 
outputs that are associated closely with the operational nature of investment banks; 1) we 
use the sum of other earning assets that include trading securities, derivatives, treasury 
bills and bonds 2) and the total level of investment banking fees that include net 
commission, fees and trading gains and comprises the main source of income of 
investment banks. Lastly, as fixed netput, we employ the total level of fixed assets that is 
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also standard in the literature related to efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Berger and Mester, 2003). 
3.4.2 Second-stage regressions 
 3.4.2.1 Dynamic Panel Analysis  
For the second stage regressions, we opt for the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator 
(Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), as used in previous papers to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance (Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Liang et al., 2013; Pathan and Faff, 2013), aiming to account for 
endogeneity issues. In their early study, Jensen and Warner (1988), claim that managerial 
ownership could be influenced by firm characteristics, such as the size and performance. 
Moreover, recent studies suggest that corporate governance characteristics, such as the 
board size, compensation, board ownership and performance might be interrelated and 
this, in turn, causes endogeneity problems (Wintoki et al, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012). With 
regards to the instruments used in the dynamic panel specifications, the only instrument 
used is the lagged dependent variable. The reason is that the sample size is fairly small 
(184 observations), suggesting that the usage of many instruments would result in 
estimation bias.23  In addition to this, the documented persistence in bank profits (Berger 
et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2004) is treated by the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors, according to Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Therefore, the 
use of the dynamic panel two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is relevant to the context of 
this study. The two-step estimates of standard errors are likely to be downward biased 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) and thus, we follow a finite sample correction introduced by 
Windmeijer (2005). The estimates are also tested via Hansen’s diagnostic test for 
                                                          
23As robustness test we use panel-VAR methodology and we find that indeed the relationship runs from 
corporate governance characteristics to bank performance. 
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instrument validity and the test for second-order autocorrelation of error terms introduced 
by Arellano and Bond (1991).The dynamic panel model that we use takes the following 
form: 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝜑(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1(𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑋)𝑡 + 𝑎2(𝐶𝑅𝑆)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟 −
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 +𝛾𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
1
𝑗=1 ]                                                                                  (4), 
where i signifies individual investment bank (i = 1,2,...,23) and t is the period that we 
cover (t = 2000,2001,. . .,2012). α, β, γ are parameters to be estimated. (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡  is 
the dependent variable and stands for the performance of investment banks estimated by 
ROAA, ROAE, POI and EFF while  (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡−1  stands for the lagged performance 
independent variable. (𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑋)t  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 in the post 
SOX period (2000-2001) and 1 otherwise. (𝐶𝑅𝑆)𝑡  is a crisis dummy that takes the value 
of 1 if year is 2007-2010, and 0 otherwise. (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟 − 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 consists of five 
different dimensions of corporate governance variables: 1) board size, board composition 
and gender diversity 2) CEO ‘internally’ hired, CEO duality, CEO age and CEO tenure 
3) cash and equity compensation of TMT and CEO 4) CEO/board ownership and 
CEO/TMT bonus as a percentage of total cash compensation and 5) number of business 
segments, number of subsidiaries, number of board committees, fees paid for the 
attendance of members in board committees and number of audit committee meetings. 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 comprises a number of bank-specific and country-level control variables 
while ei,t denotes the error term.
24 
 
                                                          
24For estimations that we employ EFF as a measure of bank performance, we exclude from the regression 
models two bank-specific control variables, FEES and EARN, which are used as outputs in the estimation 
of profit efficiency using SFA.  
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3.4.2.2 Threshold Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
As a further step, we employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology (Kremer et al., 
2013) to identify threshold-effects in important corporate governance determinants of the 
performance of investment banks.25 The main advantage of this econometric technique is 
that identifies threshold values of key corporate governance variables and could observe 
any change on the impact of these threshold variables on bank performance during the 
examined period. This is important particularly as our study covers the period of financial 
crisis where major changes in the number of banks that belong to each threshold regime 
might be identified, suggesting important changes in the structure of corporate 
governance mechanism of investment banks before and after the turmoil. Note that we 
use this methodology for two of the corporate governance variables found, in the initial 
dynamic panel regressions, to be negatively associated with the performance of 
investment banks. These are the board size and the board ownership.   
Therefore, our equation takes the following specification: 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜆1𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝛪(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   
(5),        
where 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable (ROAE) and  μ is the bank-specific fixed 
effect parameter. The two reverse regression slopes are 𝜆1 and  𝜆2  and are defined based 
on the assumption that there exist two regimes. 𝑞𝑖𝑡 stands for the threshold variable (board 
size and board ownership), 𝛾 is the threshold value which splits the observations into two 
                                                          
25In this study, we use the model proposed by Kremer et al. (2013). That is an extension of the threshold 
methodology introduced by Hansen (1999). The extended method of Kremer et al. (2013) is built on the 
cross sectional technique of Caner and Hansen (2004), where GMM estimators are employed to account 
for endogeneity. As an extension to Caner and Hansen (2004) model, Kremer et al (2013) opt for a dynamic 
threshold methodology. 
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regimes: 1) above the threshold value (high regime), and 2) below the threshold value 
(low regime). 𝜀𝑖𝑡  stands for the residual. 𝐼 is the indicator term that signifies the regime 
specified by the threshold variable qit and the threshold value 𝛾.  As in Kremer et al. 
(2013), we  use  𝑚𝑖𝑡 as a vector of independent variables.
26 Moreover, Kremer et al. (2013) 
extends the Hansen’s (1999) model by including the regime dependent intercept, 𝛿1. Bick 
(2007) suggests that ignoring the regime intercepts would cause biased estimation of 
threshold value and the the scale of the regimes’ coefficients.27 
3.5 Empirical Results 
             3.5.1 Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the dynamic panel analysis. The appropriateness 
of the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is held by the significant lagged performance 
variable in all the corresponding models of Tables 5, 6 and 7. Moreover, regarding basic 
diagnostics the tests (AR (2)) for second-order autocorrelation in second differences and 
the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions are insignificant (see Tables 5, 6 
and 7). 
 
 
                                                          
26We include all the explanatory variables of dynamic panel estimations apart from the crisis (CRS) dummy 
variable. The reason being that we opt for the threshold methodology to allow our data to determine this 
period of the turmoil through the identification of changes in the number of investment banks that belong 
to each regime based on threshold values of important corporate governance determinants of investment 
bank performance. 
27Kremer et al. (2013) employ the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) so as to avoid serial 
correlation in the residuals. Then, they measure a short type regression to obtain the predicted values of the 
endogenous variables using a function of instruments (Caner and Hansen, 2004). As a first step, the 
endogenous variable is replaced with the predicted values in equation (5). As a second step, threshold value 
is obtained via OLS method where the threshold variable has been replaced by its predicted values estimated 
in the first step. The threshold value is obtained so as to minimize the concentrated sum of squared errors 
(Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Once threshold value has been determined, the regression slopes, λ1 and λ2 
can be estimated by employing the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel regressions over the period 2000 to 2012 for US investment bank performance (board structure and CEO characteristics). 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before 
interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ BS: the number of members in the 
board; IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors; CEOIN: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is the founder or has a long-term relationship with the bank, and 0 otherwise; CEODUAL :a dummy that takes the value of 
1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: 
ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 
if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.  
 
            Board     Structure      CEO     Characteristics   
VARIABLES ROAE(1)          ROAA(2)      POI(3)    EFF(4)  ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8) 
Lag performance 0.3539** 0.3405** 0.3612*** 0.986*** 0.2088** 0.1874** 0.4721** 0.976*** 
 (0.1426) (0.1664) (0.1207) (0.142) (0.0906) (0.087) (0.1974) (0.178) 
E/TA 0.3842 -0.5491** -0.1291 -0.00016     -1.412*** -0.5543** -0.6541** 0.00143 
 (0.4728) (0.2332) (0.0916) (0.00052) (0.268) (0.2681) (0.2962) (0.00119) 
EARN -0.0312 -0.0595*** 0.0470 - 0.0319 -0.0317** -0.0115  
 (0.0406) (0.0205) (0.0387)  (0.0420) (0.0178) (0.0207) - 
FEES -0.0515 0.0240 0.0611** - 0.5491*** 0.3566 -0.0019  
 (0.0674) (0.0486) (0.0287)  (0.131) (0.297) (0.0415) - 
RISK 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0024 -3.15e-06 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0056  
 (0.0097) (0.004) (0.0037) (9.49e-06) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0035) 0.0005 
PSOX -0.0959** -0.0397*** 0.0398 0.00016 -0.0564*** -0.0981*** -0.0460 (0.0013) 
 (0.0477) (0.0151) (0.0347) (0.0001) (0.0161) (0.0272) 0.0750 -0.000135** 
VIX -0.0079** -0.0043*** -0.0066** -0.0000* -0.0063** -0.0067** 8.38e-06 (0.00059) 
 (0.0031) (0.0011) 0.0033 (9.77e-06) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.00590) -0.00008* 
CRS -0.0906* -0.0647** -0.0942* -0.0001** 0.0320 0.0431 -0.1286*** (0.00004) 
 (0.0498) (0.0329) (0.0562) (0.00005) (0.0136) (0.3281) (0.0429) 0.00092 
BS 0.01922 -0.0316*** -0.5018*** -0.00017* - - - - 
 (0.0351) (0.0096) (0.1815) (0.0001)     
IND 0.2335 -0.0468 -0.2072 -0.00033 - - - - 
 (0.3347) (0.1247) (0.2235) (0.00051)     
GD 0.1131 0.0031 0.0855 0.0000 - - - - 
 (0.7499) (0.0513) (0.3851) (0.00006)     
CEODUAL 
 
CEOAGE 
- - - - 0.2512** 
(0.1165) 
0.3077 
0.2218 
(0.7688) 
-0.1195 
0.0035 
(0.0918) 
-0.0342 
0.00573* 
(0.00294) 
0.00315 
 - - - - (0.2703) (0.3716) (0.2737) (0.0105) 
CEOTEN     -0.1493 0.3609 -0.0030 0.00015 
 - - - - (0.0705) (0.3522) (0.0267) (0.00012) 
CEOIN - - - - 0.3960** 0.1759*** 0.183** 0.0012 
     (0.1875) (0.0635) (0.079) (0.0019) 
Constant -0.1441 0.3732*** 1.195*** -0.0011 -0.1271 0.5608 0.2348 0.00749 
 (0.3266) (0.0830) (0.3613) (0.0007) (1.465) (1.545) (1.141) (0.0404) 
Wald chi2 216.22*** 94.41*** 335.68*** 479.25***      133478.85*** 73.56*** 68.30*** 145.39*** 
AR(1) test stat -2.10** 1.69* -1.69* -2.27** -1.96* 2.03** -1.72* -2.18** 
AR(2) test stat 0.95 0.35 -0.32 -0.15 0.26 0.63 -1.03 -0.23 
Hansen J-stat 1 0.675 0.907 0.482 0.674 0.984 0.889 0.897 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
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With regards to the board size, we find a strong negative impact of the board size on bank 
performance. The result remains robust at the 1% level (Table 5, Models 2 and 3) and at 
the 10% (Table 5, Models 4 and 4) level of significance. This finding supports the ‘agency 
cost hypothesis’ by Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggesting that an increase in the 
members of the board could result in higher information asymmetry and communication 
costs. We also find that CEO duality has a positive impact on bank performance at the 5% 
(Table 5 Model 5) and 10% significance level (Table 5 Model 8), which is consistent with 
the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ (Donaldson, 1990; Barney, 1990). Under this hypothesis, 
the CEO who chairs the board would act as a good agent of the firm and would offer a 
unity of direction and strong control resulting in the improvement of performance. Our 
finding is consistent with a number of previous studies (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Boyd, 1995; He and Wang, 2009). Although there is robust evidence to support that the 
CEO duality has a positive impact on bank performance, there is no empirical study to 
examine the relationship between the ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank performance. Our 
results also lend support to the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ as there exists a positive 
relationship between ‘internally’ hired CEO and bank performance (at the 1% level of 
significance, Table 5 Model 6; at the 5% level of significance, Table 5 Model 5 and 7).  
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Table 6. Dynamic panel regressions over the period 2000 to 2012 for US investment bank performance (compensation and 
ownership). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average book value of total equity; 2) 
ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3) POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4) EFF: efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent 
variables we employ  EXECASH: the cash compensation of the top management team  which includes base salary and bonus; EXEEQ: the equity compensation of the top management team which includes restricted stock and stock options; 
CEOCASH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; CEOEQ: the equity compensation of the CEO which includes restricted stock and stock options; BOARDOWN: the percentage shares that the directors hold; 
CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: bonus over executives' total  cash compensation; CEOBON:  bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net 
trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the 
value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.  
          Compensation    Ownership   
VARIABLES ROAE(1) ROAA(2)   POI(3) EFF(4) ROAE(5) ROAA(6) POI(7) EFF(8) 
Lag Performance 0.3789** 0.4266*    0.3098***  0..954*** 0.2074* 0.4392*** 0.2592** 0.972*** 
 (0.1919) (0.2245) (0.0779) (0.153) (0.1142) (0.0955) (.1090) (0.148) 
E/TA -1.956*** -0.3703* 0.0988 0.0007 -0.0118 -0.1747*** -0.4124** -0.000693* 
 (0.750) (0.2125) (0.0607) (0.0010) (0.2461) (0.0642) (0.2001) (0.000413) 
EARN -0.0377 -0.0117 -0.0555 - -0.0446*** -0.0255****       -0.0616*** - 
 (0.084) (0.0242) (0.0926)  (0.0169) (0.0086) (0.0138)  
FEES -0.0225 0.0079 -0.0059 - 0.0554* 0.0262*   0.0924*** - 
 (0.0505) (0.0440) (0.0200)  (0.0278) (0.0152) (0.0175)  
RISK 0.0102* 0.0023 0.0018 0.00078 0.0088 0.0028 -0.0041 0.00006 
 (0.0058) (0.00256) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0117) (0.0019) (0.0119) (0.0005) 
PSOX 0.0296 -0.0455 -0.035** 0.00092 -0.0952 -0.0538 -0.1125 0.00011 
 (0.0435) (0.1178) (0.015) (0.0022) (0.1036) (0.0766) (0.1306) (0.0003) 
VIX -0.0045* -0.0026 0.0010 0.00040 -0.0066 -0.0107*** -0.0122*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0024) (0.00225) (0.0031) (0.00027) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0000) 
CRS -0.1245** 0.0534 -0.064* -0.00066*** -0.1408***  -0.1020*** 0.0500 -0.0001*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0543) (0.0362) (0.00002) (0.0360) (0.0313) (0.1102) (0.0000) 
EXECASH -0.0483* -0.1121* 0.0215 -0.00016 - -    - - 
 (0.0265) (0.0629) (0.07055) (0.0003)     
EXEEQ -0.01853 0.0072*** -0.0089 0.000278 - -   - - 
 (0.0117) (0.00270) (0.0146) (0.0005)     
CEOCASH 0.0282***                       -0.0730    0.00618*** 0.000145 - -   - - 
 
CEOEQ 
(0.0089) 
0.0069** 
(0.0750) 
0.0117** 
(0.00115) 
0.00238 
(0.000178) 
0.000327* 
 
- 
 
- 
 
   - 
 
 (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0029)           (0.000184)    - 
BOARDOWN - - - - -0.0092*** -0.0042*** -0.0081** 0.00002 
     (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.00003) 
CEOOWN -                 -          - - 0.0118** 0.0021 0.0100* 0.00005* 
     (0.0055) (.0021) (0.0056) (0.00003) 
EXEBON -          -           - - -0.0060 -0.0182 0.0464* 0.00001*** 
     (0.0331) (0.0146) (0.0277) (0.0000) 
CEOBON -          -           - - -0.0053 0.0024 0.0132 0.00001** 
     (0.0441) (0.0096) (0.0181) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.8893 0.2944 0.129 1.72*** 0.2622 0.4694*** 0.3653 -2.80*** 
 (0.6705) (0.2165) (0.796) (0.335) (0.3894) (0.1559) (0.3599) (0.0981) 
Wald chi2 324.86*** 52.12*** 424.60*** 412.24*** 464.92*** 253.27*** 2979.09*** 470.30*** 
AR(1) test stat -1.72* -1.86* -2.04* -2.20** -2.16** -1.97*** -2.32** 2.08** 
AR(2) test stat -0.06 0.26 -0.52 -0.73 -0.21           0.06 -1.44 0.14 
Hansen J-stat 0.829 0.595 0.252 0.286 0.522 1 0.516 0.961 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
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Concerning the impact of CEO and TMT compensation on performance, the results show 
some variation depending on the different kinds of compensation, i.e., cash or equity-
based compensation. Specifically,  we  find a negative impact of cash-based 
compensation of TMT on bank performance at the 10% level of significance (Table 6 
Model 1 and 2), while there exists a positive impact of equity compensation of TMT on 
bank performance at the 1% level of significance (Table 6, Model 2). These findings are 
not surprising since cash compensation does not create sufficient incentives to executives 
to increase corporate value, while equity compensation constitutes a form of long-term 
pay and could align better incentives between executives and shareholders (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1998). Regarding CEO compensation, we find that CEO cash compensation 
asserts a positive effect on investment bank performance at the 1% level of significance 
(Table 8, Model 1 and 3) as in the previous studies of Harris and Raviv (1979) and 
Grossman and Hart (1983). Similarly, we find that CEO equity-based compensation has 
a positive impact on bank performance. The result remains robust at the 5% (Table 6 
Model 1 and 2) and 10% (Table 6 Model 4) significance level. 
Board ownership asserts a negative impact on bank performance at the 1% (Table 6 
Model 5 and 6) and 5% (Table 6 Model 7). This finding is consistent with earlier studies 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Laeven and Levine, 2009) which document that banks with 
boards of higher bank ownership perform worse compared to banks with lower board 
ownership. This is because board members of high bank ownership position banks in a 
way that maximizes shareholder value. This behaviour of board members can worsen the 
performance as banks are exposed to high risk. On the other hand, CEO ownership has a 
positive impact on performance at the 5% (Table 6 Model 5) and 10% (Table 6 Model 7 
and 8) significance level. Our finding supports the idea that the partial ownership of CEO 
reduces the agency costs and aligns better shareholders’ and managers’ incentives 
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resulting in a positive impact on bank performance (Murphy, 1999). Also, we find 
evidence of a positive impact of CEO and TMT bonus as a percentage of total cash 
compensation on bank performance. This result is comparable with that of Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz (2011), as they find that banks that pay higher cash bonuses as a proportion of 
total compensation to their executives perform better that those that pay a lower level of 
bonuses over total compensation over the crisis period. 
   
 
 
94 
 
Table 7. Dynamic panel regressions over the period 2000 to 2012 for the US investment bank performance (governance 
complexity). 
  Other    Governance   characteristics   
VARIABLES    
  
   ROAE(1)        ROAA(2)        POI(3)                 EFF(4) 
Lag performance 0.1844*** 0.2800*** 0.2229* 0.9762*** 
 (0.0676) (0.1077) (0.1180) (0.119) 
E/TA 
 
     
0.2205                           -0.4860** -0.8901** -0.0026* 
 (0.4529) (0.2027) (0.3852) (0.0014) 
EARN 0.0114 0.0162 -0.0444 - 
 (0.0104) (0.0377) (0.066)  
FEES 0.0178 -0.0369 0.0172 - 
 (0.0208) (0.0237) (0.0624)  
RISK 0.0192*** 0.0040 0.0019 0.0000* 
 (0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.00001) 
VIX -0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0072*** -0.00003*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.00001) 
CRS -0.1503*** -0.0555** -0.1187** -0.00019*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0263) (0.0517) (0.00006) 
PSOX -0.0914*** -0.0337 -0.0213            -0.00024* 
 (0.0275) (0.033) (0.0481) (00014) 
NBCOM -0.2694* -0.2261* -0.1477** -0.00061* 
 (0.1571) 0.1296 (0.0714) (0.00036) 
NMAUD 0.1732*** 0.0405 -0.0102 0.00010 
 (0.0553) (0.0492) (0.0495) (0.00009) 
FBCOM 0.00039 -0.0011 -0.7538* 0.00021 
 (0.00565) (0.0128) (0.444) (0.0015) 
SEG 0.0312 -0.1873*** -0.2296*** -0.0003 
 (0.0859) (0.0491) (0.0872) (0.00025) 
SUB -0.0460 -0.02873** 0.0653 0.00011 
 (0.0344) (0.0137) (0.0412) (0.00008) 
 -0.3371 -0.0025 0.7851*** -0.002** 
Constant (0.3374) (0.1744) (0.2867) (0.0009) 
Wald chi2 83.71*** 554.62*** 218.11*** 479.23*** 
AR(1) test stat -2.27** -1.67* -1.91* -2.03** 
AR(2) test stat -0.37 -0.45 -0.14 0.51 
Hansen J-stat 0.747 0.517 0.738 0.744 
Instruments 23 23 23 23 
Observations 184 184 184 184 
Number of banks 23 23 23 23 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 2000 to 2012. The dependent variable is the performance of investment banks 1) ROAE: net income after tax as a percentage of the average 
book value of total equity; 2)ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of total assets; 3)POI: pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets; 4)EFF: 
efficiency scores obtained from the SFA. As independent variables we employ NBCOM: the number of board committees;  NMAUD: number of meetings of audit committee; FBCOM: fees paid to directors for 
attending the board committees; SEG: the  number of different business segments; SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total 
assets; EARN: ratio of trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 
and the value of 1 otherwise; CRS: a  dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007-2010; VIX: Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  For Volatility Implied Index data 
(VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables.
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In addition, the dynamic panel estimations reveal a negative impact of operational 
complexity on bank performance. We find that an increase in both the number of different 
business segments and the total outstanding number of subsidiaries reduces bank 
performance. The results are robust at the 1% (Table 7, Model 2 and 3) and 5% (Table 7, 
Model 2) level of significance respectively. These findings imply that banks that have 
high operational complexity operate less efficiently because co-ordination problems 
between specialists rise and this can increase correspondingly communication costs of 
the bank (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967). Also, we find evidence that an increase in the 
number of committees reduces performance at the 10% (Table 7, Model 1,2 and 4) and 
5% (Table 7, Model 3) significance level. This implies that although an increase in the 
amount of task’s delegation from board to committees might reduce the time and effort 
that boards devote as a group of directors, this could rise the amount of the resources that 
the board should divert for the supervision of the increased number of outstanding 
committees (Vafeas, 1999). Lastly, we also find that fees paid to the board committees 
are associated negatively with performance at the 1% significance level (Table 7, Model 
2 and 3).  
In terms of the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we find that an increase in 
leverage (decrease in the equity over total assets ratio) has a positive impact on 
performance. The reason being that higher leverage mitigates the agency costs from the 
outside equity that arises from the choice of investment (Myers, 1977), the risk of bank 
liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990) and the undertaken risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
We also report a positive impact of investment banking fees over total assets ratio on bank 
performance. Fees constitute the main source of income for investment banks, hence, an 
increase in net income improves bank profitability (Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; 
Lin and Zhang, 2009). Also, the risk, proxied by z-score, asserts a negative impact on 
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bank performance consistent with the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ by Berger and De-Young 
(1997). 28  The dynamic panel analysis provides also evidence of the negative and 
significant impact of other earning assets over total assets ratio on performance. The 
negative coefficient suggests that activities such as trading securities may induce high 
risk of bank losses (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).  
We also find that the VIX indicator has a negative effect on bank performance, signifying 
that higher market volatility decreases bank performance consistent with previous studies 
(Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). Also, as it is expected, there is a negative impact 
of the financial crisis on bank performance (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Lastly, we find a 
strong negative impact of the PSOX period on performance, indicating that more board 
independency reduces the level of meeting attendance of the independent board members 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007), resulting in the increase in the free-riding problems that large 
banks suffer from (Jensen, 1993). 
    3.5.2 Dynamic Threshold Analysis 
In this section, we opt for the dynamic threshold methodology (Kremer et al., 2013) and 
investigate threshold-effects of important corporate governance variables with respect to 
investment bank performance. We employ this econometric technique for two of the key 
variables in our previous analysis (5.1). These are the board size and board ownership 
that we find them to be associated negatively with investment bank performance.  
According to Andres and Vallelado (2008), there is a non-linear relationship between the 
board size and bank performance for a sample of commercial banks in Europe over the 
1995-2005 period. This, in turn, suggests that increases in the number of board members 
                                                          
28Under the  ‘bad luck hypothesis’ if an unexpected event  increases the risk of a  bank, the bank would 
start to spend more resources in risk-monitoring operations increasing in this way its costs and consequently 
decreasing its net profits and performance (Berger and De-Young, 1997) . 
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to a certain extent would improve bank performance as large boards would increase the 
monitoring and the expertise to deal with problems of the bank-specific environment. 
However, when the board size rises above a certain degree, thereby increasing 
information costs considerably, this, in turn, would affect negatively the performance of 
banking institutions. Furthermore, agency theory underlies that an increase in the board 
ownership better aligns incentives between the managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Murphy, 1999). Therefore, boards that hold higher 
ownership are more likely to take decisions to increase the corporate value. However, our 
findings in the dynamic panel estimations (5.1) indicate that an increase in board 
ownership decreases bank performance, as in Beltrazzi and Stulz (2011). To this end, the 
threshold analysis enables us to investigate, if and at which level, the board ownership 
asserts a positive impact on investment bank performance. 
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Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board size variable for banks range between 2.1972 and 2.3973. 
We denote as dependent variable banks’ ROAE (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable 
we impose the BS (𝐵𝑆 𝑖𝑡), which represents the natural logarithm of banks’ board size. We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes a 
number of explanatory variables. IND: the percentage of independent directors; GD: the percentage of female directors;  
E/TA: equity over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of 
trading securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation 
of ROE; PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: Volatility 
Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for 
regime dependent intercepts (δ). 
 
  
Our analysis finds a threshold value of the board size around ten.29 This threshold value 
splits the sample into two regimes. The low regime with banks that have board size lower 
than ten members and the high regime with banks of more than ten members in their 
boards. The results indicate that there is a highly negative impact at the 1% level of the 
board size on investment bank performance for the high regime banks, as  λ2=-1.3778 
(see Table 8). This finding is consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Moreover, the threshold value indicates that the board size of the 
investment banks should be less than ten members, which is similar to the argument of 
                                                          
29We use the natural  logarithm of the board size to perform our estimation. The threshold value that is 
equal to 10 members (exponential  value  of  2.30259) 
Table 8. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with board size as threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
BS  2.30259 
95% confidence interval ( 2.197220 -2.397900) 
Impact of board size                                                    S.E                                      
λ1                   -0.0524 0.046 
λ2                 -1.3778*** 0.416 
Impact of covariates               S.E 
E/TA -0.538 0.505 
RISK 0.0017 0.002 
EARN -0.0302** 0.013 
FEES 0.0459* 0.025 
IND  0.1314 0.105 
GD -0.0951 0.157 
PSOX -0.0741** 0.034 
VIX -0.0042*** 0.001 
δ -0.5948*** 0.164 
Observations 184   
Low regime 117  
High regime 67   
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Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who suggest the restraining of the membership of boards to ten 
people, with the desired size of eight or nine members. Regarding the impact of the board 
size on bank performance for the low regime banks, we still find a negative coefficient 
but the result is not statistically significant. 
Table 9. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on a threshold value of Board size. 
Threshold: Board size                       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Low regime 70% 62% 64% 64% 67% 56% 56% 47% 73% 65% 75% 73% 62% 
High regime 30% 38% 36% 36% 33% 44% 44% 53% 27% 35% 25% 27% 38% 
Notes:  Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board size (natural logarithm) threshold 
value that we obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel.  
 
Moreover, Table 9 shows that the percentage of banks with large boards constantly 
increases and reaches the highest level (53%) in 2007. This implies that the majority of 
US investment banks underperformed with an increase in their board size above the 
threshold value of 10 board members. After the burst of the financial crisis, we observe a 
sharp decrease (from 53% to 27%) in the proportion of investment banks that had large 
boards, suggesting the need for these financial institutions to reduce agency costs from 
the high information asymmetry that large boards caused in the period of the turmoil.  
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Table 10. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with board ownership as threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
BOARDOWN 8.54313 
95% confidence interval ( 0.276317-23.428200) 
Impact of Board ownership                                                    S.E                                      
λ1 -0.026*** 0.008 
λ2 0.116** 0.053 
Impact of covariates                     S.E 
E/TA -0.4462 0.380 
RISK 0.0022* 0.001 
EARN -0.0163 0.011 
FEES 0.0423** 0.021 
CEOOWN 0.0055** 0.002 
EXEBON   0.0069*** 0.001 
CEOBON   -0.0017*** 0.000 
PSOX -0.0716** 0.031 
VIX -0.0021* 0.001 
δ -0.0006 0.001 
Observations 184   
Low regime 94  
High regime 90   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Board ownership variable for banks range between 0.276317 and 
23.4282. We denote as dependent variable banks’ ROAE  (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) , while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose the BOARDOWN (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡), which represents the percentage of bank’s shares 
hold by the board members. We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes a number of explanatory variables.  Following Bick (2007), the 
model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). CEOOWN: the percentage shares that the CEO holds; EXEBON: 
bonus over executives' total  cash compensation; CEOBON:  bonus over CEOs' total  cash compensation; E/TA: equity 
over total assets; FEES: of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; EARN: ratio of trading 
securities, derivatives, treasury bills and bonds over total assets; RISK: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE; 
PSOX: dummy which takes the value of 0 if year is 2000-2001 and the value of 1 otherwise; VIX: Volatility Implied 
Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index).  
Regarding the board ownership threshold analysis, we find a threshold value of 8.54% 
(see Table 10). This value splits the sample into investment banks with boards that hold 
higher ownership (high regime) and those with boards that hold lower ownership (low 
regime). We find that for the banks in the low regime, an increase in the board ownership 
has a negative impact on performance at the 1% level of significance (λ1=-0.026). This 
result is similar to that in the previous section (5.1). However, it further reveals that the 
negative impact of board ownership refers explicitly to banks that have lower levels of 
board ownership, that is below the threshold value. Turning to the high regime, which 
denotes banks of higher board ownership level, we find that there is a positive relationship 
between the board ownership and performance at the 5% level of significance (λ2=0.116). 
This result is confirmed by the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
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Eisenhardt,1989) and a number of previous studies that indicate a positive impact of the 
managerial ownership on firm performance (Kosnik, 1990; Malatesta et al., 1988; Pi and 
Timme,1993). 
Table 11. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on a threshold value of Board ownership. 
Threshold: Board ownership                     
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Low regime 70% 69% 50% 57% 53% 50% 44% 47% 53% 35% 50% 53% 46% 
High regime 30% 31% 50% 43% 47% 50% 56% 53% 47% 65% 50% 47% 54% 
Notes:  Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Board ownership threshold value that we 
obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel.  
 
Lastly, Table 11 shows that there is a constant increase over time in the percentage of 
banks that belong to the low regime which includes banks with boards that hold lower 
levels of ownership. In the 2005-2007 period, we also observe that the majority of 
investment banks is classified in the high regime, indicating that during the financial crisis 
investment banks opt for a high level of board ownership. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 
the US investment banks between 2000 and 2012. We find that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and performance. The threshold analysis reveals that this 
negative impact is enhanced when board size increases above the critical value of around 
ten board members. This implies that above a threshold value the rising costs of 
monitoring and communication deteriorates the performance of investment banks, 
consistent with the ‘agency cost hypothesis’ (Jensen, 1993). Adams and Mehran (2008) 
and Andres and Vallelado (2008) show that the impact of the board size on the 
performance of commercial banks is positive. Hence, investment banks appear to react 
differently compare to other banks with respect to the effect of board size on performance. 
Threshold analysis also reveals that most of the investment banks scaled down their 
boards, aiming to reduce agency conflicts that banks with large boards suffer from since 
the crisis of 2007. Also, we find evidence that the CEO power exerts a positive impact on 
bank performance consistent with the ‘stewardship hypothesis’ (Donaldson, 1990; 
Barney, 1990). This indicates that investment banks perform better when the CEO chairs 
the board as well or has a long-term relationship with the bank, ‘internally’ hired CEO. 
Thus, investment banks could benefit from the unity of control that the powerful CEO 
would offer. Our result sheds new light and provide an alternative view to Mishra and 
Nielsen (2000) who argue that the CEO power could have a negative impact on the 
performance of commercial banks. With regards to the ownership held by the board, we 
find, similarly to Beltratti and Stulz (2012), that it has a negative impact on performance. 
This effect is present predominantly in banks with board ownership below a threshold 
value. On the contrary, the impact of board ownership on investment bank performance 
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turns to positive above a threshold value. Additionally, we find evidence of a negative 
association between operational complexity and bank performance. 
Our results, also in the light of the financial crisis, are of importance for both policy 
makers and market participants.  In response to the severe financial crisis, regulators in 
the US passed the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), a major financial reform that has a significant 
impact on bank corporate governance along with other aspects of the financial markets. 
The transformation of investment banks into BHCs and their subsequent access to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) support (Volcker, 2010) and other subsidy programs 
such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) could lead to a rise in moral hazard 
problems for investment banks. Therefore, policy makers should ensure that the corporate 
governance of investment banks is geared towards structures that are beneficial to the 
performance of these institutions. To this end, the identification of threshold-effects in 
this study could be of assistance to future regulatory mandates. Regulators could look for 
example at the evidence where investment bank performance declines with board’s size 
more than ten members, while enhances with boards’ ownership above a threshold value. 
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Chapter 4: The impact of M&A fees on investment bank 
performance. Is there convergence during crisis? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increased (Berger, 2003; Humphrey et 
al., 2006; Evanoff and Ors, 2008), reaching a transaction value of $3.5 US trillion the 
years before the crisis.This upward trend of the M&A activity led to the rise of the 
importance of the M&A advisory role of investment banks worldwide. 30 Investment 
banks, as financial advisors for the acquirers and targets wealth, evaluate the assets of the 
bidder companies and advise acquirers to take value-enhancing decisions with the scope 
to create substantial synergies (Bao and Edmans, 2011). As this particular function of 
investment banks was developed substantially (Walter et al., 2008; Kolasinski and 
Kothari, 2008), this resulted in a considerable rise in the level of fees received from 
advisors offering M&A services. In fact, the total value of M&A fees generated by 
investment banks in G7 and Switzerland grew significantly from 38,00 (US$bn) in 2000 
to 75,98 (US$bn) in 2007. Despite the importance of M&A fees for investment banks, 
there is no study to this date, to the best of our knowledge, that looks into the impact of 
M&A fees on investment banks’ performance. This study fills this gap in the existing 
literature regarding the underlying relationship between M&A fees and investment bank 
performance for a sample of such institutions in the G7 and Switzerland.  
The high level of financial integration in the first half of the 2000 decade resulted in a 
rapid growth of the investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland (Morana, 
2008). Some of the deregulations that have taken place the last two decades have also 
                                                          
30 The terms ‘investment banks’ and ‘advisors’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
105 
 
contributed to this upward trend of the investment banking industry. In particular, the 
Glass-Steagall Act (1999) imposed in the US allowed commercial and investment banks 
to merge and operate together. Also, international investment banking in Germany has 
demonstrated substantial improvement in the Tax Reduction Act (2000) that has made 
Germany an attractive financial market for investment via M&A activity. However, the 
strong growth of investment banking industry significantly subdued due to the recent 
financial crisis. Investment banks’ total income from M&A advisory operations in G7 
and Switzerland reached a total value of 52.06 (US$bn) in 2008. Overall, the performance 
of investment banking industry faced an extraordinary decline that also led to the collapse 
of many financial institutions. Moreover, this deterioration of investment banks has 
significantly affected a large number of their shareholders (individuals, companies, and 
governments). To demonstrate this, a recent study by Fernando et al. (2012) reveals that 
companies that had as a lead equity underwriter Lehman Brothers faced substantial losses 
after the collapse of the investment bank in 2008. Hence, the examination of investment 
bank performance is of utmost importance not only for the industry but also for the 
economy as a whole.  
 
The literature to this date focuses on the estimation of bank performance, in terms of 
inefficiency, by employing parametric and nonparametric econometric techniques. A 
number of studies (Bonin et al., 2005; Bos et al., 2007; Pasiouras et al., 2009;  Fiordelisi 
et al., 2011; Casu and Girardone, 2010) use the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) while 
others (Pasiouras et al., 2009; Tanna et al., 2011; Paradi and Zhu, 2013) employ the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the inefficiency of banks. Regarding the 
performance of investment banking industry, there is only one study  (Radic et al., 2012) 
that estimates the inefficiency of investment banks in the pre-crisis period (2001-2007). 
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The study, however, by focusing only on the 2001-2007 period, lacks important 
information concerning the performance of the investment banking industry under high 
levels of financial distress. Investment banks have higher exposure to risk compared to 
commercial, saving and co-operative banks due to the complexity of the operations that 
engage (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). De-Young and Rice (2004) argue that 
investment banks could not exploit risk diversification benefits as their income, such as 
M&A fees, stems primarily from non-interest income operations which are considered to 
be more volatile. Investment banks also face more liquidity constraints during economic 
recessions than deposit-taking banks (Brunnermeir and Pederson, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 
2008, 2009), as the latter could count on deposits  (Gatev and Strahan 2006; Gatev et al. 
2009). In order to account for the risks associated with investment banking activities, we 
opt for the enhanced hyperbolic distance function (EHDF) as introduced by Cuesta et  al. 
(2009) that allows the inclusion of the risk as an undesirable output in the translog 
function.  
 
The financial crisis of 2007 has posed serious challenges to the performance of investment 
banks. This turmoil also had a detrimental effect on the banking integration process 
(Rughoo and Sarantis, 2014), decreasing in this way the level of convergence among the 
investment banks. Based on this effect, we examine the level of convergence of 
investment banks with respect to the technical inefficiency and M&A fees variables. We 
focus our convergence analysis on technical inefficiency, that captures the performance 
of investment banks, and the level of M&A fees, that constitutes the main source of 
income of these financial institutions. We test for convergence in these two variables 
because these factors have been affected considerably by the turmoil and hence they could 
illustrate the level of financial integration in the investment banking industry before 
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(1997-2007), during (2007-2010) and after the financial crisis (2010-2012). The existing 
literature focuses on the convergence in the efficiency of commercial, co-operative and 
saving banks. In particular, Casu and Girardone (2010) examine the presence of 
convergence in technical efficiency for commercial banks in EU-15 markets. They 
estimate bank efficiency by employing DEA (Charnes, 1978), while for the convergence 
test they use the concepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence to test also for the speed 
of convergence among banks (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1991). The authors find evidence 
of convergence towards the European average. In similar lines, Weill (2009) studies if 
financial integration has taken place in the EU-10 member countries by investigating the 
convergence in banking cost efficiency for commercial, cooperative and saving banks 
over the 1994-2005. They estimate cost efficiency by using a SFA while they also opt for 
the concepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence to perform the convergence test. They 
conclude that there is convergence in terms of cost efficiency for the banks in their sample. 
 
An earlier study by Mamatzakis et al. (2008) performs a cross-country analysis for 
commercial banks of the EU-10 member countries to examine the presence of 
convergence in efficiency over the 1998-2003 period. The authors opt for a SFA 
methodology and estimate both profit and cost efficiency and similarly to previous studies 
they employ the beta and sigma convergence tests. Their results show that while there is 
an indication of convergence in cost efficiency there is no robust indication of 
convergence in profit efficiency among the EU members. Similarly, Fung (2006) 
examines whether there is convergence in productivity, estimated as technical efficiency, 
among US bank holding companies (BHC). They estimate technical efficiency based on 
DEA methodology and find some evidence of ‘conditional’ convergence which suggests 
that the steady-state efficiency to which a BHC is converging depends on the BHCs 
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individual level of efficiency. Lastly, Tortosa-Ausina (2002) shows that there is 
convergence in cost efficiency, estimated by the DEA methodology, for a sample of  
Spanish banks between 1985-1999. Against this background, in our study, we test for 
convergence in the investment banking industry under a period of a serious downturn. In 
order to do so, we opt for the Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence methodology that 
enables us to identify the presence of convergence clubs in technical inefficiency and 
M&A fees variables among investment banks in G7 and Switzerland. 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. This is the first study to 
examine the impact of M&A fees on investment banks performance for the 1997-2012 
period. Our analysis also employs a dynamic panel vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology to support the validity of our findings. Moreover, for the first time, the 
performance of investment banks in G7 and Switzerland is estimated by employing the 
enhanced hyperbolic distance function (Cuesta et al., 2009). The advantage of this 
methodology is that it allows the inclusion of an undesirable output in the translog 
function. In this study, we employ as an undesirable output the level of risk exposure of 
investment banks. This is of major importance for the estimation of the technical 
inefficiency of investment banks as these financial institutions engage primarily in highly 
complex and risky operations (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Lastly, we also test 
for the presence of convergence in inefficiency and the level of M&A fees for investment 
banks over the pre-crisis (2004-2007), during the crisis (2007-2010) and post-crisis 
(2010-2012) period. To do so, we opt for the Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence 
methodology that enables us to identify if there are convergence clubs of investment 
banks within our sample.  
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Our results show that M&A advisory is an important determinant of investment bank 
performance, as we find that there is a strong negative relationship between M&A fees 
and technical inefficiency. Moreover, we provide evidence of convergence in inefficiency 
over the pre-crisis period (2004-2007), while also there is a divergent club in the 2007-
2010 period. Interestingly, we find presence of convergence in M&A fees over both the 
pre-crisis and during crisis period. Lastly, we find no indication of convergence in both 
inefficiency and M&A fees over the post-crisis period (2010-2012). 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents our hypotheses 
development. Section 4.3 describes the hyperbolic distance function. Section 4.4 presents 
our data and variables. Section 4.5 describes the convergence methodology and discusses 
our results. Section 4.6 develops our sensitivity analysis while Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
One of the main functions of investment banks is to offer their M&A advisory services 
to acquirer and bidder companies in order to form valuable collaborations. M&A advisory 
fees is the source of income that investment banks gain as a result of these activities. 
Investment banks’ M&A advisory role requires particular skills to be implemented (Bao 
and Edmans, 2011), thereby, in this section, we develop our main hypothesis with regards 
to the impact of M&A advisory fees on the investment bank performance. 
 
In a recent study by Bao and Edmans (2011) establish the ‘skilled-advice hypothesis’ 
which indicates that investments banks are capable of identifying higher gains in targets 
companies. Capable investment banks could improve the quality of matches between 
acquirer and target companies and consequently facilitate the merging procedure 
(Diamond and Maskin, 1979; Mortensen, 1982). Moreover, under this hypothesis 
investment banks could demonstrate specialized knowledge and ability in negotiating in 
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transactions. Also, it could be argued that skillful investment banks, in cases of substantial 
synergies that could not be easily executed due to increased information asymmetry, are 
able to employ the required skills so as to successfully complete the deal (Chahine and 
Ismail, 2009). For instance, investment banks might have specific knowledge with regard 
to the characteristics of specific sectors and companies, such as financial and product 
market potential, that could help to reduce information asymmetry for both parties 
(Servaes & Zenner, 1996). Therefore, under the ‘skilled-advice hypothesis’ investment 
banks are able to identify quality matches between acquirer and targets companies, based 
on specialized knowledge and ability in negotiating in transactions. Moreover, it is well-
established in the literature that there is a positive association between the ability and 
expertise of investment banks to allocate efficiently their resources and the level of M&A 
advisory fees that gain (Bowers and Miller, 1990). Thus, these institutions would not need 
to waste resources into monitoring M&A deals, thereby increasing the net benefits arising 
from their advisory role. Therefore, an increase in M&A fees under the skilled-advice 
hypothesis might not lead to an increase of the inputs (resources) used for the increase of 
output. Along these lines, there is empirical evidence to suggest that top-tier investment 
banks could successfully identify and negotiate the profitable opportunities (Golubov et 
al., 2012).  
Based on the above discussion, we formulate our main hypothesis as: 
H.1: An increase of M&A fees has a positive impact on the investment bank performance 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Estimation of inefficiency  
In this chapter we opt for the enhanced hyperbolic distance function (Cuesta et al. 2009), 
an extension of Fare’s and Primont (1995) production technology technique,  to estimate 
the performance of investment banks. This is expressed by the following specification:  
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𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) = inf {𝜃 > 0: (𝑥𝜃, 𝑦/𝜃, 𝑏𝜃)є 𝛵}                                                                        (1),                        
where 𝐷𝐸   stands for the hyperbolic distance function of a bank i= (1, … , 𝑁)from the 
frontier.  𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥1𝑖, … , 𝑥𝐾𝑖)є 𝑅+
𝐾 stands for a vector of input vectors that a bank i could 
transform  into vectors of desirable 𝑦𝑖 = (𝑦1𝑖, … , 𝑦𝐾𝑖)є 𝑅+
𝐾 and undesirable outputs 𝑏𝑖 =
(𝑏1𝑖, … , 𝑏𝐾𝑖)є 𝑅+
𝐾. Following Cuesta et al. (2009), the production technology is expressed 
by the enhanced hyperbolic distance function (EHDF) that requires the simultaneous and 
equiproportionate expansion of the desirable output and contractions of the inputs and the 
undesirable output proportionally by 𝜃. Under the EHDF, a bank i is considered to be an 
efficient bank when 𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) = 1.  On the contrary, if 𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) < 1 the bank could 
improve its technical efficiency by increasing its production of desirable outputs and 
proportionately decreasing the production of inputs and undesirable outputs. The 
incorporation of undesirable outputs in the EHDF assures the following criteria: 1) it is 
almost homogeneous  𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝜇𝑦, 𝜇
−1𝑏) =  𝜇𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) , 2) it is non-decreasing in 
desirable outputs with  𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝜆𝑦, 𝑏) ≤ 𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏), λ є [0,1], 3) it is non-increasing in 
undesirable outputs with  𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆𝑏) ≤ 𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏), λ ≥ 1 and 4) it is non-increasing in 
inputs with  𝐷𝐸(𝜆𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) ≤ 𝐷𝐸(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏), λ ≥ 1. 
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) using the EHDF incorporates both the random error 
and the inefficiency in a composite error term. More specifically, we use the following 
specification for the frontier:  
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑀𝑖,𝑡
)= 𝑓(𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (2),                  
where the 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑀𝑖,𝑡
) is the distance from the frontier of bank i in year t as a proportion of 
its production of the desirable output, 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡,  which is estimated as the sum of earning 
assets and net trading income. 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of input prices,𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of desirable 
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output𝑠, 𝑏𝑖,𝑡   is vector of undesirable outputs, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of fixed netputs and  𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is 
a vector of bank specific and country-level variables. Lastly, the term vi,t stands for  the 
error term.  
Since inefficiency, or the distance from the frontier  𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 , is captured by 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  the 
translog function opted in the study is: 
 
−𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +∑𝛼𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 1 2⁄ ∑∑𝛼𝑘𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀−1
𝑛=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝑀−1
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑗=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡
+∑𝛾𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑅
𝑟=1
+ 1 2⁄ ∑∑𝛾𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡 
𝑅
𝑠=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
+∑∑ 𝜌𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀−1
𝑛=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+  ∑∑𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡 
𝑅=1
𝑟=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜁𝜑𝑙𝑛𝑁𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝛷
𝜑=1
+ 1 2⁄ ∑∑𝜁𝜑𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑁𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝛷
𝑙=1
𝛷
𝜑=1
+ 1 2⁄ ∑∑𝜃𝜅𝜑𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝛷
𝜑=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 1 2⁄ ∑ ∑𝜂𝑚𝜑𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝛷
𝜑=1
𝑀−1
𝑀=1
+∑∑𝜅𝑟𝜑𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝛷
𝜑=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
+∑𝜇𝑛𝑖𝐷𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
                                                                            (3) 
For the estimation of the EHDF the regressors 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡and 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡 have to enter the model 
in a product form where 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡/𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡. In 
our model, we employ the desirable output of net trading income , 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡,  to impose the 
almost homogeneity property on the translog function. Note that when in equation (3) 
when 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 we have 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡/𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡=1 and hence the logarithm of 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 equals 
zero. Therefore, the summations regarding 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 in equation (3) are over M – 1. Moreover, 
since the technical inefficiency is directly influenced by a number of bank-specific and 
country level variables, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 , that are included in the translog function, we follow a single-
step methodology (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The term 𝑣𝑖𝑡  stands for the error term which 
is identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) and has 𝑁(𝑂, 𝜎𝜈
2 ). The technical 
inefficiency term,  𝑢𝑖𝑡   , is assumed to be independently but not identically distributed, such 
113 
 
that 𝑢𝑖𝑡   is estimated as truncations (at zero) of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖,𝑡, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 ) distribution where the 
mean is calculated by the following form: 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡𝛿                                                                                                                                      (4),       
 
where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables that could influence the level of technical 
inefficiency for bank  𝑖  and time 𝑡 and 𝛿  is a vector of coefficients to be calculated. 
Moreover, the parameters of the model are measured via a maximum likelihood procedure, 
while the technical inefficiency is estimated based in Battese and Coelli (1988) as 
𝐸[exp (𝑢𝑖𝑡) │𝑣𝑖,𝑡].   
4.4 Data and Variables of the EHDF 
Our analysis includes data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database for the 1997-2012 
periods. For the M&A fees data, we use both Bankscope and SDC platinum of Thomson 
Banker One database. Our final sample includes 100 investment banks and 767 
observations for the G7 and Switzerland.  
For the identification of bank inputs and outputs, we follow the ‘intermediation’ approach 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977) that assumes that banks are financial intermediaries that use 
capital and labour in order to collect funds and transform them into other earning assets 
and loans. Based on this approach, we employ as inputs labour and physical capital. 
Labour is estimated as the outstanding amount of personnel expenses while physical 
capital is the sum of interest and non-interest expenses that stand for the operating costs 
of banks. Moreover, following Cuesta et al. (2009), we use in the EHDF two desirable 
and one undesirable output. As desirable outputs, we employ the sum of other earning 
assets including loans, deposits from banks and credit institutions, government securities, 
derivatives among others and the net trading gains stemming from associated activities. 
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As an undesirable output, we employ bank default risk that reflects the risk that 
investment banks carry due to the level of complexity and the kind of the operations that 
engage (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). We measure bank default risk by using the 
z-score index, employing the following formula: Z-score= (1+ROE)/Standard Deviation 
of ROE (Boyd and Graham, 1986). This indicator of bank default risk has been broadly 
used in the banking literature (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). 
Higher values of the index show lower risk of bank default. Moreover, as fixed netput we 
use the total  level of fixed assets.31 Table 1 shows some of the descriptive statistics of 
the variables employed for the estimation of the EHDF.  
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the technical inefficiency estimation 
Variable Description Mean  Stand. Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
P1  Physical capital 0,4687 1,1695 0,0008 13,100 
P2  Labour 0,7952 2,1054 0,0007 17,000 
N2   Fixed Assets 0,1584 0,4235 0,0010 3,444 
Y1  Trading gains 0,4599 0,1778 -23,500 12,400 
Y2  Earnings assets 91,400 0,2270 0,4147 2,080,000 
Y3  Z-score 1.784 2.843 -4.944 21.494 
Notes: the Table reports the variables used in the EHDF for the period 1997-2010. Inputs (P1 & P2)); 1) Physical capital 
(total operating expenses) and 2) Labour ( personnel expenses); Netput (N1)) 1) Fixed Assets; Outputs (Y1, Y2 & Y3));1) 
Trading gains that stand for the first desirable output 2) Total Earning assets which stands for the second desirable 
output (loans, deposits from banks and credit institutions, government securities, derivatives and other earning assets) 
and 2) Z-score that stands for the undesirable output (Z-score= (1+ ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE). The values are 
of P1, P2, N1, Y1 and Y2 in million dollars, while Y3 is an index. 
 
In order to control for bank individual characteristics, we opt for a number of bank-
specific variables. The main variable of our interest is M&A fees estimated as the sum of 
net fees and commissions, that are principally generated from M&A activities. The 
conventional ratio of net income to total assets in the literature (Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; 
Bonin et al., 2005; Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009) is replaced 
by the ratio of M&A fees to total assets.  This ratio represents the main source of revenue 
of investment banks that stems from M&A advisory services. Figure 1 depicts the upward 
                                                          
31 We use the level of fixed assets as a fixed netput so as to account for the level of physical capital for each 
bank (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
115 
 
trend of M&A fees in G7 and Switzerland the period under examination. In particular, 
the total value of M&A fees increased from 31,80 (US$bn) in 2000 to 75,98 (US$bn)  in 
2007. However, this growth of investment banking industry was significantly subdued 
due to the financial turmoil as M&A fees dropped, reaching a total value of 45,30 (US$bn) 
in 2012.  
  
Figure 1. M&A fees across the G7 and Switzerland (1997-2012).
 
Notes: the Figure shows the M&A fees value in million dollars across the G7 and Switzerland countries (1997-
2012).The data are obtained from the Bankscope and SDC platinum of Thomson Banker One database. 
 
We also include the ratio of equity to total assets in order to proxy of capital 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008) and the natural logarithm of banks’ total 
assets that captures banks’ size (Fries and Taci 2005; Pasiouras, 2008; Mamatzakis et al., 
2013). We also account for liquidity estimated as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
for each bank. A bank with a lower level of liquidity might face increased risk in case of 
a financial crisis compared to a bank with a higher level of liquid assets. Based on the 
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‘bad luck hypothesis’ (see Berger and De-Young, 1997), an increase of liquidity risk 
would prompt the bank to spend more resources in managing the risk that could increase 
banks’ costs  and which would have as a result the decline bank performance. Similarly, 
a number of studies have found a positive impact of liquidity on bank performance  
(Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, numerous studies indicate that there exists a negative impact of liquidity on 
performance due to increased storage costs (Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008) and  low 
returns (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Also, we employ a dummy variable for listed 
banks as in Beccalli et al. (2006) and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) in order to account 
for the diversification of the information supplied by the market to the customers of 
investment banks. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the investment bank is a listed 
company in the stock exchange, otherwise, it takes the value of 0. Based on the empirical 
evidence, we expect to find a negative relationship between listed banks and inefficiency 
(Beccalli et al., 2006).   
Turning to the country-level control variables, we employ GDP per capita as an indicator 
of wealth (Maudos and Guevara, 2007; Brissimis et al. 2008; Maudos and Solís, 2009; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). The empirical evidence with regard to the impact of GDP per 
capita on bank performance points in different ways. Banks in countries with higher GDP 
per capita could benefit from lower banks’ costs as they might have easier access to new 
technologies compared to banks in countries with lower GDP per capita (Lensink et al., 
2008). However, high GDP per capita might imply an increase in bank’s costs because of 
high operating expenses for supplying a given amount of services to customers (Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000).  
In addition, we use the consumer price index inflation so as to capture the monetary stance 
(Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). Revell (1979) suggests that the impact of inflation 
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on bank performance is conditional on whether bank’s salaries and other operating costs 
could rise at a faster degree than the inflation rate. Hence, the impact of the inflation on 
bank performance depends on how successfully a bank could predict the rate of inflation 
and therefore accordingly manage its operating costs. In particular, if a bank’s 
management could accurately forecast the inflation rate, a bank could adjust interest rates 
so as to rise earnings faster than expenses and thus increase bank efficiency. On the other 
hand, if a bank’s management could not precisely predict the inflation rate this, in turn, 
would lead to inappropriate adjustment of interest rates and, therefore, might increase 
faster costs than revenues of a bank that would consequently decrease bank efficiency. 
However, most studies find a positive association between inflation and bank 
performance (Bourke 1989; Molyneux and Thornton 1992).  
We also employ a stock price index with the scope to account for the asset price bubble 
similar to Bordo and Jeanne (2002). 32 Investment banks’ leverage increases when the 
asset and stock prices rise as well. An increase of leverage, at low levels of leverage, 
might mitigate the conflicts between shareholders and managers regarding the choice of 
investment (Myers, 1977). The reason being that managers would require cash to service 
the debt rather than take considerably risky investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
When leverage becomes relatively high, a rise of leverage could increase conflicts 
between debt holders and shareholders, mainly because of the high  risk of liquidation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These conflicts would intensify agency costs among debt 
holders and shareholders and this could lead to higher interest expenses to pay debt 
holders for their estimated losses. In addition, in order to account for asset bubble bursts, 
we employ a composite asset price indicator as in Gerdesmeir et al. (2010) proxied by a 
                                                          
32 The stock market indexes that we use are: S&P500, FTSE100, DAX, CAC, FTSEMIB, SMI, SPTSX and 
NIKKEI.  
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dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there exists an asset price burst among the  
countries in our sample, and 0 otherwise.33 We expect the impact of asset  bubble burst 
to be negative on bank efficiency, as a burst is accompanied by reduced  investment 
activity and could have as a result of a banking crisis (Allen and Carletti, 2010). Finally, 
we include the following control variables: country 34 and time dummies to count for 
time-invariant home country characteristics and neutral technical change respectively. 
Table 2 reports some further descriptive statistics of the bank-specific and some of the 
country-level variables used as determinants of technical bank inefficiency in the translog 
function.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of bank-specific and country-level variables. 
Country N Size E/TA Liquidity M&A fees 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
Stock 
price 
index 
Canada 18 16.251 0.044 0.659 0.031 10.453 100.340 160.611 
France 71 14.371 0.135 0.452 0.051 10.447 107.879 133.407 
Germany 132 12.813 0.365 0.458 0.117 10.335 99.803 133.081 
Italy 23 15.934 0.099 0.293 0.012 10.364 107.559 108.348 
Japan 143 15.344 0.277 0.502 0.082 10.303 100.597 82.112 
Switz. 24 14.673 0.117 0.602 0.067 10.583 99.946 107.320 
UK 208 15.740 0.142 0.342 0.043 10.388 104.270 107.437 
US 148 16.137 0.157 0.404 0.169 10.620 97.260 134.866 
Total 767   
Mean   15.158 0.167 0.464 0.063 10.437 102.207 120.897 
Notes: the Table reports descriptive statistics of bank-specific and most of country-level variables used to perform fixed 
effect and dynamic panel regressions. N stands for the number of observations by country. As bank-specific variables 
we use: size= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Liquidity= liquid assets over total assets; 
M&A fees = net fees and commission stemming from M&A advisory services.  Some of the country level independent 
variables that we use are: GDP per capita (natural logarithm); Population Density; Consumer Price Index and Stock 
Price Index. For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use 
World Development indicators from World Bank.  
 
                                                          
33 If the composite indicator falls under a critical value the dummy takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
For the values of the composite indicator that are below the threshold value a burst takes place.  The critical 
value is determined as the mean of the composite indicator minus the standard deviation of the composite 
indicator times the factor μ. In our study, we employ μ= 0.5, consistent with the study of Gerdesmeir et al. 
(2010). The composite indicator is calculated by the following specification: 𝐶𝐼 = 𝜑1𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +
𝜑2ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥. 𝜑1 equals to 1, while 𝜑2 is the ratio of the standard deviation of the stock price 
index over the standard deviation of the house price index.  
34 For multicollinearity issues we dropped from the sample one dummy variable (Japan).   
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We observe that US investment banks have the highest amount of total assets and M&A 
fees across the G7 and Switzerland. Moreover, in terms of the level of capitalization, 
Germany and Japan and appear to have the most capitalized investment banks, while 
Canada and Italy have the less capitalized banks within the sample.  
4.5 Results and Discussion 
      4.5.1 Inputs’ and undesirable’s output elasticities of the EHDF  
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates of the EHDF. The input elasticities of operating 
expenses (α1) and personnel expenses (α2) with respect to the distance of the frontier have 
a negative sign and are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Table 3. Estimates of parameters and bank technical inefficiency 
determinants 
Parameter              Estimate t-Statistic 
A0      25.741***  10.81 
α1               -0.282* -1.690 
α2               -0.329* -1.730 
α11               -0.008* -1.790 
α22     -0.011** -2.040 
α12                0.003  0.650 
β1        0.869***  4.320 
β2       3.861***               -18.72 
β11     -0.019** -2.450 
β22     -0.011** -2.040 
β12       -0.072*** -8.910 
γ1     -0.307** -2.070 
γ11               -0.004 -1.320 
ρ11               -0.009 -1.630 
ρ21        0.015*** 2.460 
ρ12                0.016* 1.950 
ρ22                0.004 0.540 
φ11       0.011*** 2.720 
φ12       0.028*** 3.730 
η11                0.003 0.850 
η12    -0.006** -2.050 
Size       0.017*** 2.780 
E/TA       0.070*** 3.130 
M&A fees                0.041** 2.290 
Liquidity               -0.001 -0.170 
Listed banks      0.015** 2.140 
Consumer Price Index      0.001** 2.090 
GDP per capita     -0.010** -2.070 
Stock price index      -0.000** -2.030 
Burst                -0.002 -0.680 
Year dummies                   Yes                                   Yes 
Country dummies                   Yes                                   Yes 
 Wald chi2          24731.47   
 Prob > chi2                0.000   
Number of banks                  100  
Observations                                     767   
Notes: the αk  stand for the coefficients of the input variables; βk stand for the coefficients of the outputs 
variable; the γk stand for the coefficients of the net-put variable; and ρk, ηk and φk stand for the cross-term 
coefficients. The table reports information on the influence of the z variables employed in the estimation 
technical inefficiency scores of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland countries. The dependent 
variable is technical efficiency derived using an EHDF methodology. As bank-specific variables we use: 
size= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Liquidity= liquid assets over total 
assets; M&A fees = net fees and commission stemming from M&A advisory services; Listed banks= 
dummy of listed banks and T-dummy=time dummy. Country level independent variables that we use are: 
GDP per capita; Consumer Price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) and Country 
dummy. For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables 
we use World Development indicators from World Bank. 
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This implies that an increase in the amount of inputs used would result in a greater 
distance from the frontier. Also, the magnitude of operating expenses (α1=-0.282) as an 
input elasticity compared to that of personnel expenditures (α2=-0.329) indicates that the 
latter plays a more important role in the production process of investment banks in G7 
and Switzerland. In addition, the elasticity of the desirable output of other earning assets 
(β1=0.869) has a positive sign suggesting that an increase in the amount of the desirable 
output for an investment bank would cause a decrease in the distance from the frontier. 
On the other hand, the undesirable output parameter β2, that is significant at the 1% 
significance level, has also the expected positive sign (β1=3.861). This finding indicates 
that any increase of z-score, a decrease of the banks’ default risk, would reduce the 
distance from the frontier. When compared to the magnitudes of the input and desirable 
output elasticities estimates, the undesirable output’s elasticity value has a relatively 
higher level of impact on the production function, suggesting the appropriateness of 
employing the bank’s default risk for the estimation of investment banks’ inefficiency.   
Table 4 shows the mean technical inefficiency scores across the G7 and Switzerland. As 
the mean technical inefficiency for the estimated translog hyperbolic distance function is 
21.43%, this implies that investment banks in these countries could improve technical 
efficiency by increasing desirable output by 27,3% (1/0.7857=1.2727) and 
simultaneously decrease undesirable output and inputs by 21.43% (1-0.7857=0.2143). 
Our estimations rank banks in Switzerland, the US and Japan as the most technical 
efficient among the banks in our sample. These findings are widely similar to Radic et al. 
(2012) that also find that Switzerland and Japan rank among the most efficient in the G7 
and Switzerland. However, unlike us, they estimate bank performance by using cost and 
profit inefficiencies. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of technical inefficiencies -investment 
banking industry (1997-2012). 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Canada 0.2168 0.0063 0.2079 0.2292 
France 0.2144 0.0228 0.1706 0.2721 
Germany 0.2187 0.0523 0.0175 0.2718 
Italy 0.2215 0.0659 0.1216 0.3183 
Japan 0.2100 0.0249 0.1517 0.2748 
Switz. 0.2082 0.0441 0.1538 0.2674 
UK 0.2151 0.0284 0.1566 0.3205 
US 0.2098 0.0308 0.1060 0.2742 
Mean 0.2143 0.0344 0.0175 0.3205 
Notes: the Table reports the mean inefficiencies for the G7 and Switzerland over the period 1997-
2012. Inefficiencies are derived from the EHDF. 
Changes in the mean technical inefficiency over time  are reported in Figure 2. We 
observe that there is a growing trend from 1999 to 2008. In particular, the average 
technical inefficiency score increases from 19.95% in 1999 to 23.65%  in 2008. Hence, 
our estimations illustrate the negative impact of the late 2007 financial crisis on the 
performance of investment banks. Lastly, the technical inefficiency of investment banks 
decreases from 23.65% in 2008 to 21.39% in 2012. 
Figure 2.Technical inefficiency scores over the period 1997-2012.
 
Notes: the Figure shows is the average technical inefficiency scores derived from the EHDF (Cuesta et al., 2009). 
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           4.5.2 Determinants of Technical Inefficiency 
Also, Table 3 shows the results of the impact of bank-specific and country-level variables 
on the technical inefficiency of investment banks in G7 and Switzerland.  
Our finding shows that M&A fees have a negative impact on technical inefficiency at the 
5% level of significance (see Table 3). This finding confirms the ‘skilled-advice 
hypothesis’ proposed by (Bao and Edmans, 2011), implying that an increase in M&A fees, 
which suggests the higher involvement of investment banks in M&A transactions in terms 
of the magnitude and the value of operations, could have a positive impact on the 
performance of investment banks. This is so as capable investment banks could better 
deal with complex processes of completing M&A contracts and negotiating their terms 
without increasing their resources and costs towards these activities. 
Moreover, there is a negative relationship between bank size and technical inefficiency 
at the 1% level of significance (Table 3). This result might suggest that large banks tend 
to raise less expensive capital and, therefore, this could decrease their inefficiency (Bikker 
and Hu, 2002; Goddard et al., 2004).  We also find a negative relationship between equity 
over total assets and technical inefficiency (at the 1% significance level), suggesting that 
less capitalized investment banks are more technical inefficient compared to investment 
banks that hold a higher level of capital (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). 
In addition, listed banks perform better, in terms of technical inefficiency, than non-listed 
financial institutions. The result is significant at the 5% level and is similar to that in 
Radic et al. (2012) and Beccalli et al. (2006). Also, we find some evidence of a positive 
association between liquidity and technical inefficiency, which is consistent with 
numerous previous studies (Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008). However, the result is 
not statistically significant. 
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Turning to the country-level variables, there is a positive and significant at the 5% level 
impact of GDP per capita on bank technical inefficiency (see Table 4).This result suggests 
that banks in countries of higher GDP per capita might have increased operating 
expenditures for a given level of services that offer to customers (Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas, 2000). The second country-level control variable, that appears to be an important 
determinant of bank technical efficiency, is the inflation rate. We find a strong negative 
relationship between the inflation rate and technical inefficiency (see Table 4) at the 1% 
level of significance, which is consistent with previous studies (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux 
and Thornton 1992). This finding suggests that investment banks’ management might 
accurately predict the inflation rate and hence they are able to adjust interest rates 
accordingly so as to increase revenues faster than costs and consequently this would 
decrease bank inefficiency (Revell, 1979). We also find that the stock price index has a 
positive impact on technical inefficiency at the 5% significance level. This result suggests 
that an increase in stock prices, which could be observed during prosperous times, could 
rise the level of leverage that investment banks hold (Adrian and Song Shin, 2010). High 
leverage during periods of financial distress could increase the inefficiency of investment 
banks mainly due to the higher risk of liquidation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Lastly, 
as it is expected, we find that burst of an asset bubble exerts a negative impact on technical 
efficiency of investment banks but the result is not statistically different from zero. 
4.6 Testing for convergence 
Due to the variability that we observed in the technical inefficiency over time we opt for 
convergence in inefficiency and M&A fees for investment banks over the pre-crisis 
(2004-2007),  the crisis (2007-2010) and the post-crisis (2010-2012) period. We 
determine the crisis period as the 2007-2010 period following previous studies in the 
banking literature (Dietrich et al., 2014; Al-Najjar, 2014; Caporale et al., 2014). We 
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employ Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence methodology that enables us to identify if 
there are convergence clubs among investment banks over time.  
4.6.1 Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence test 
We follow Phillips and Sul (2007) model that allows us to identify convergence clubs 
with respect to the technical inefficiency and M&A fees variables. This analysis requires 
a balanced dataset, hence during 2004-2007, 2007-2010 and 2010-2012 periods we 
remained with 50, 48 and 28 investment banks respectively.  This methodology employs 
a non-linear time-varying factor model that includes the possibility of transitional 
divergence.  
In more detail, we consider a set of observable series 𝑋𝑖𝑡 of bank i such that: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                (5),                                                                                          
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the panel data for technical inefficiency and M&A fees variables. Based on 
Phillips and Sul (2007), we decompose 𝑋𝑖𝑡 into two parts, the  𝑔𝑖𝑡 that is the systematic 
and the 𝑎𝑖𝑡   which stands for the transitory component. The equation (5) takes the 
following specification: 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝜇𝑡
) 𝜇𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑡        for all i and t,                                                               (6),                                                                        
where 𝜇𝑡 is the common element while  𝛿𝑖𝑡  is the idiosyncratic component. To this end, 
testing for convergence is equivalent of examining whether the 𝛿𝑖𝑡  components converge. 
In order to estimate  𝛿𝑖𝑡 , Phillips and Sul (2007) eliminate the common element 𝜇𝑡 by 
rescaling using the panel average as follows: 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 =
𝑋𝑖𝑡
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝛿𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑡
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝛿𝑖𝑡
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                       (7),    
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the ℎ𝑖𝑡 captures the transition path of a bank i compare to the panel average. A formal 
econometric technique of convergence and an empirical algorithm to define convergence 
requires the loading coefficients  𝛿𝑖𝑡 that are defined  as follows: 
𝛿𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑖+𝜎𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                  (8),                                  
where 𝜎𝑖𝑡 = 
𝜎𝑖
𝐿(𝑡)𝑡𝑎 
 , 𝜎𝑖>0, t ≥1 for all i. 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is weakly dependent over t and identically and 
independently distributed (0,1) over i. 𝐿(𝑡) is a slowly varying function , which is equal 
to the 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡, and 𝑎 stands for the speed of convergence. Based on the above transformation 
of 𝛿𝑖𝑡 , the null hypothesis of relative convergence is as follows: 
𝐻0 : 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿 and 𝑎≥ 0                                          
While the alternative of non-convergence is: 
𝐻𝐴 : 𝛿𝑖 ≠ 𝛿  for all 1,  or  𝑎˂0 
Step one: The cross-sectional variance  
𝐻1
𝐻𝑡
  is estimated as follows: 
𝐻𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ (ℎ̂𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 - 1)
2                                                                                                                      
(9) 
                
Step two: Following Phillips and Sul (2007), we test the null hypothesis using the 
subsequent 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 specification:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐻1
𝐻𝑡
)- 2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝑡)=?̂?+?̂?𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                              (10),                 
where 𝐿(𝑡)=log (𝑡 + 1). The fitted coefficient of  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 is ?̂? = 2?̂?, where ?̂? is the estimate 
of 𝑎 in  𝐻0 .  
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Step three: Phillips and Sul (2007) use a one side t-test of null hypothesis   𝐻0  and a 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator to estimate the residual. The 
t-statistic is normally distributed and therefore at the 5% significance level, the null 
hypothesis is not upheld when  𝑡𝑏 ≤ −1.65.   
However, following Phillips and Sul (2007) the rejection of the null convergence 
hypothesis does not necessarily imply that there are not sub-group convergence within 
the panel. Hence, Phillips and Sul (2007) in order to investigate the existence of sub-
group convergence develop an empirical algorithm based on a three-step procedure. As a 
first step, we order the banks of out panel according to the last observation. Secondly, we 
organize core groups of banks by estimating the convergence t-statistics, 𝑡𝑘  , for 
sequential  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 regression based on the k highest members with 2≤ k ≤ N. The group of 
banks with the maximum 𝑡𝑘  , with 𝑡𝑘  >- 1.65, is the core group. As a third step, we 
include new members in the group when the associated 𝑡𝑘 > 0. Lastly, we run the 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 
regression for the set of banks in the club which constitute a cluster. In case this cluster 
converges, there are two subgroups in the panel. If not, we should repeat the three 
previous steps to investigate if there is a smaller convergent club in the panel. If there is 
no core group in our panel data, we conclude that banks display non-converge behaviour.  
4.6.2 Convergence in technical inefficiency 
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the period before the financial crisis (2004-2007) three 
convergence clubs are identified. The existence of convergence clubs before the turmoil 
suggests the high level of financial integration in the investment banking industry. The 
core group comprises of six investments from Japan, France, Germany and the UK.  The 
second group includes eight investments of which five are German. Hence, German 
investment banks are more present in the first and the second convergence club. The third 
convergence club includes the majority of investment banks (36 out of 48) the period 
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under examination. Investment banks in this convergence club are mostly from Japan, the 
US and the UK and less from the rest countries within the sample. Moreover, it could be 
observed that the speed of convergence is faster for the second convergence (b-
coef=0.364) club compared to that of the core (b-coef= -0.224) and the third convergence 
club (b-coef= -0.386).  
Table 5. Convergence in technical inefficiency for investment banks in G7 and 
Switzerland. 
Period Convergence club classification     
  Group membership b-coef  (t-stat) 
Panel A: Technical Inefficiency before crisis     
2004-
2007 
Core Group: 4 investment banks  -0.224 (-1.559) 
 2nd Group: 8 investment banks 0.364 (-0.822) 
 3rd Group: 36 investment banks -0.386 (-1.503) 
Panel B: Technical Inefficiency during crisis     
2007-
2010 
Core Group: 6 investment banks  0.028 (-0.183) 
  Divergent banks:   44 investment banks -3.261 (-38.167) 
Panel C: Technical Inefficiency after crisis     
2010-
2012 
Core Group: 4 investment banks  3.177 (4.135) 
  Divergent banks:   24 investment banks -2.821 (-33.216) 
Notes: the Table shows the results of the Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence test in technical efficiency for investment 
banks in G7 and Switzerland across three different periods:1) 2004-2007 (pre-crisis)  2) 2007-2010 (during the crisis) 
and 3) 2010-2012 (after the crisis). b-coef stands for the speed of convergence among the investment banks within a 
club and the  t-stat  tests for the existence of convergence club. When t-stat>-1.65 there is convergence within the club 
of investment banks formed.  
 
Figure 3 shows the relative transition curves for the investment banks in G7 and 
Switzerland and indicates that during the pre-crisis period the majority of investment 
banks follow almost parallel paths. These curves depict the behaviour of the technical 
inefficiency of an investment bank relative to the panel average of all banks included in 
the sample. For investment banks of the second convergence club that is comprised 
mainly of German banks, their curves are above 1, while for the rest investment banks, 
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that comprises the third convergence club and are located in the UK, the US, Japan, 
France, Switzerland , Canada and Italy their curves are below 1.    
Figure 3. Relative Transition Curves of Inefficiency for G7 and Switzerland (2004-
2007).
Notes: the Figure shows the relative transition curves of inefficiency for each investment bank in the G7 and 
Switzerland (2004-2007). 
In addition,  Panel B  shows that evidence during the financial crisis (2007-2010) there 
exists one core group that includes five investment banks while the rest of the investment 
banks within the sample diverge (t-statistic: -38.167). This result suggests that investment 
banks during the crisis period show a diverge behaviour with respect to the technical 
inefficiency contrary to the high convergence identified in the pre-crisis period. A similar 
picture emerges from Figure 4 that indicates a low level of convergence especially for the 
2008-2010 period when most of the investment banks diverge. The core convergence club 
includes five investment banks that diverge during almost the whole 2008-2010 period 
and appear to converge at the end of the period under examination. 
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Figure 4. Relative Transition Curves of Inefficiency for G7 and Switzerland (2007-
2010). 
Notes: the Figure shows the relative transition curves of inefficiency for each investment bank in the G7 and 
Switzerland (2007-2010). 
 
Lastly, Panel C indicates that during 2010-2012 the investment banks form one core 
convergence group that includes four investment banks from the UK and Italy. The rest 
of investment banks within the sample diverge (t-statistic: -33.216). The same conclusion 
arises from Figure 5 where investment banks curves based on technical inefficiency 
scores follow diverge.  
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Figure 5. Relative Transition Curves of Inefficiency for G7 and Switzerland (2010-
2012). 
 
Notes: the Figure shows the relative transition curves of inefficiency for each investment bank in the G7 and Switzerland 
(2007-2010). 
 
           4.6.3 Convergence in M&A fees 
Table 6 shows the presence of convergence clubs for investment banks  with the respect 
to the level of M&A fees the pre-crisis period (2004-2007), over the crisis (2007-2010)  
and after the crisis period (2010-2012). Crisis period (2007-2010) is determined based on 
previous empirical studies in the banking literature (Dietrich et al., 2014; Al-Najjar, 2014; 
Caporale et al., 2014). 
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Table 6. Convergence in M&A fees for investment banks in G7 and Switzerland. 
Period Convergence club classification   
  Group membership b-coef (t-stat) 
Panel A: M&A fees before crisis     
2004-2007 Core Group: 13 investment banks -0.012 (-0.437) 
 2nd Group:  35 investment banks -0.267 (-0.200) 
Panel B: M&A fees during crisis     
2007-2010 Core Group: 13 investment banks 0.387 (-5.016) 
 2nd Group: 37 investment banks 4.512 (7.236) 
Panel C: M&A fees after crisis     
2010-2012 Core Group:3 investment banks  -1.327 (-0.214) 
  Divergent banks:   25 investment banks -2.791 (-32.768) 
Notes: the Table shows the results of the Phillip and Sul’s (2007) convergence test in M&A fees for investment banks 
in G7 and Switzerland across three different periods:1)2004-2007 (pre-crisis)  2) 2007-2010 (during the crisis) and 3) 
2010-2012 (after the crisis). b-coef stands for the speed of convergence among the investment banks within a club and 
the  t-stat  tests for the existence of convergence club. When t-stat>-1.65 there is convergence within the club of 
investment banks formed.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the identification of two convergence clubs among the 
investment banks over the pre-crisis period. The core convergence club includes 13 
investment banks the majority of whom are from the UK, the US and Japan. The second 
convergence club consists 35 out of 48 investment banks. In addition, Figure 7 illustrates 
that the relative transition curves for the investment banks in G7 and Switzerland are 
homogeneous and follow parallel paths. The transition curves of the core group are those 
that follow a downward trend while the relative curves of the second convergence group 
diverge. 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 6 shows the existence of two convergence clubs during the 
crisis period (2007-2010). The core convergence club includes 19 investment banks the 
majority of which are German banks while the second club 31 banks mostly from the US, 
the UK, and the Japan.  In addition, it could be noted that the speed of convergence is 
133 
 
faster for the second convergence club (b-coef=4.512) compared to that of the core group 
(b-coef= -0.267). The identification of investment bank clubs with respect to the M&A 
fees in both the pre-crisis and during crisis period indicates the high level of financial 
integration in the investment banking industry. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that investment 
banks follow parallel paths during the whole period under study. Moreover, investment 
banks in the core group have transition curves that follow a decreasing trend while 
investment banks that form the second convergence club follow an increasing path. 
Figure 6. Relative Transition Curves of M&A fees for G7 and Switzerland (2007-
2010).
 
Notes: the Figure shows the relative transition curves of M&A fees for each investment bank in the G7 and Switzerland 
(2007-2010). 
 
Finally, Panel C of Table 6 shows the existence of a low level of convergence of 
investment banks with regard to the M&A fees over the 20010-2012 period. In particular, 
we identify one core convergence group that includes 3 investment banks from the UK. 
The rest investment banks that are mostly from Italy, France, and the Japan do not appear 
to form a convergence club (t-statistic: -32.768). Similarly, Figure 7 depicts that the 
majority of investment banks curves based on M&A fees diverge.  
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Figure 7. Relative Transition Curves of M&A fees for G7 and Switzerland (2010-
2012).
 
Notes: the Figure shows the relative transition curves of M&A fees for each investment bank in the G7 and Switzerland 
(2010-2012). 
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4.7 Testing for endogeneity – Panel-Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimation 
The usage of the  Panel-Vector Autoregressive methodology (Panel-VAR) is appropriate 
in the context of our study as this econometric technique allows all variables to enter as 
endogenous in a system of equations, whereby the underlying relationships between the 
variables could be identified (Lütkepohl, 2005). Regarding the estimation, we employ the 
STATA software with the code written by Love and Zicchino (2006). The authors follow 
Arellano and Bover (1995) to estimate each equation included in the system of equations. 
Once the system of equations is estimated, it is then used to perform dynamic simulations. 
This analysis offers the estimation of variance decompositions (VDC) and impulse 
response functions (IRF) and suggests addressing a common identification problem. We 
deal with this issue by using a preference ordering suggesting that more exogenous 
variables affect on the more endogenous based on a sequential order according to the 
identification strategy as developed by Choleski (1924). In order to proceed with the 
estimation of the panel-VAR, we should first choose the optimum lag order j of the right-
hand variables in the system of equations (Lutkepohl, 2006). Hence, we employ the 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for the for the lags of j=1,2 and 3. Following the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), we find that the optimal lag order is one. This is also 
confirmed by the Arellano- Bond AR tests. In addition, to test for autocorrelation we add 
more lags. The Sargan tests suggest evidence of optimal lag order one.35  
The panel-VAR analysis allows the investigation of the impact of M&A fees and the 
equity over total assets (E/TA) variables on technical inefficiency (Inef). The impulse 
response function (IRFs) obtained from the panel-VAR methodology are reported in 
                                                          
35 For a formal exposition of the panel-VAR econometric technique see Appendix. 
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Figure 9. The first row depicts the response of inefficiency (Inef) to a one standard 
deviation shock in the M&A fees and ETA variables. 
Figure 8. Impulse response functions (IFRs) for technical inefficiency (Inef), M&A 
fees (M&Afees) and equity over total assets (E/TA).  
 
It is apparent that the impact of M&A fees on Inef is negative, while this effect becomes 
less pronounced after the second year. This result confirms again the ‘skilled-advice 
hypothesis’ (Bao and Edmans, 2011). In the case of M&A fees, the panel-VAR 
methodology appears to confirm the findings of the preceding single-step analysis. 
Moreover, Figure 9 shows that the impact of ETA on technical inefficiency is positive in 
the period under study, which comes in contrast with our previous results. However, we 
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observe that the standard errors of the corresponding impact are relatively large and hence 
this raises concerns regarding the validity of this finding. 
Table 7 suggests further evidence of the impact of M&A fees and E/TA on technical Inef 
as presented by the variances decompositions (VDCs) estimations. These results are 
consistent with the IRFs and suggest that the two bank-specific variables are important in 
explaining the variation in technical inefficiency. Equity over total assets (E/TA) is 
confirmed to be an important determinant of technical inefficiency (Inef) as 2.02% of the 
forecast error of technical inefficiency after ten years is explained by shocks in the E/TA 
variable. Also, around 0.46% of forecast error variance of technical inefficiency after 10 
years is captured by M&A fees disturbances. On the other hand, a small part, less than 
0.02%, of the variation of M&A fees is explained by technical inefficiency. This result 
suggests that the causality would run from M&A fees to technical inefficiency. 
 
Table 7. Variance decompositions (VDCs) for technical inefficiency (Inef), bank 
M&A fees (M&A fees) and the level of equity over total assets (E/TA). 
 
Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for M&A fees (M&A fees),  
the ratio of equity to total assets (E/TA) and the bank technical inefficiency (Inef) 
   s Inef  M&A fees  E/TA 
Inef 10 0.97527 0.00454          0.02020 
M&A fees 10 0.00024 0.99892 0.00084 
E/TA 10 0.00255 0.00203 0.99542 
Inef 20        0.97070 0.00455 0.02475 
M&A fees 20 0.00024 0.99891 0.00085 
E/TA 20 0.00257 0.00202 0.99542 
Inef 30 0.97051 0.00455 0.02494 
M&A fees 30 0.00024 0.99891 0.00085 
E/TA 30 0.00257 0.00202 0.99542 
Notes: the Table shows the Variance Decompositions for investment banks’ M&A fees (M&A fees), the ratio of 
equity to total assets (E/TA) and the technical inefficiency (INEF). 
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4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we estimate technical inefficiency scores for investment banks in G7 and 
Switzerland by employing the enhanced hyperbolic distance function (Cuesta et al., 2009). 
We further examine the impact of M&A fees on bank performance. Our results show a 
positive association between M&A fees and performance of investment banks consistent 
with the ‘skilled-advice hypothesis’ (Bao and Edmans, 2011). The dynamic panel-VAR 
results using impulse response functions and variance decomposition further support this 
finding. Also, as the investment banking industry has become increasingly global in its 
operations we examine the presence of investment bank convergence clubs with respect 
to technical inefficiency and M&A fees by employing Phillip and Sul’s (2007) 
methodology. Our results show evidence of convergence in inefficiency over the pre-
crisis period (2004-2007), while also there is a divergent club in the 2007-2010 period. 
Interestingly, we also find the presence of convergence in M&A fees over both the pre-
crisis and during the crisis period. Lastly, we find no indication of convergence for both 
inefficiency and M&A fees for the post-crisis period (2010-2012). 
The results could be of interest for bankers and regulators alike. With regard to the 
relationship between M&A fees and investment bank performance, the latter could 
benefit from an increase of fees when the investment bank has specialized knowledge and 
experience in completing M&A transactions. Moreover, the presence of convergence 
clubs with respect to the M&A fees shows the high level of financial integration in the 
investment banking industry both the pre-crisis and during the crisis period. This, in turn, 
implies that investment banks despite that they operate in different countries when they 
follow analogous strategies, i.e., raise their M&A fees, they get exposed to the same risk. 
Hence, this suggests that regulators should promote regulatory harmonization policies, 
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such as similar capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, that would improve the 
financial stability of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 
Panel VAR Methodology 
 We use a panel-data vector autoregression methodology and study the causality 
associations between technical inefficiency (Inef), M&A fees (M&Afees), and the ratio 
of equity to total assets (E/TA) by using a first order 3x3 panel-VAR model following 
Love and Zicchino (2006): 
tiitiit e ,1  XX  ,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…,T.                                                (1),   
where Xit is a vector of three bank-specific variables; the technical inefficiency (Inefit), 
the ratio of M&A fees over total assets (M&Afeesit) and the ratio of equity to total assets 
(ETAit). Thus, Φ is a 3x3 matrix of coefficients, μi is a vector of m individual effects and 
ei,t are the errors which are iid.  For the estimation purposes, following Love and Zicchino 
(2006) we use a system-based GMM as developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), thereby 
the panel-VAR takes the following specification: 
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(2) 
Following Arrelano and Bover (1995), the moving averages (MA) specification of the 
model sets Inefit, M&Afeesit, and ETAit equal to a set of present and past errors e1, e2  and 
e3: 
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Based on the endogeneity assumption the errors would be correlated and hence the 
coefficients of the MA representation could not be interpreted. Hence, the residuals 
should be orthogonal. We achieve this by multiplying the MA representation with the 
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the errors. The orthogonalized 
representation according to Love and Zicchino (2006) is as follows: 
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and  
(
𝛽11𝑗𝛽12𝑗𝛽13𝑗
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where P is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the errors as 
developed by Cholesky (1924): 
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  )
  =𝑃𝑃−1 
               
                                                                                                                                         (6)   
We employ fixed effects in the panel-VAR estimation to ensure heterogeneity in the 
levels, represented by 𝜇𝑖. Moreover, similar to Love and Zicchino (2006) we are forward 
mean-differenced the data based on the Helmert process (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
Lastly, we opt for Monte Carlo simulations to compute standard errors for the impulse 
response functions (IRFs). Note that for simplicity reasons and in order to facilitate the 
exposition of the vectors and matrixes of panel-VAR model (1) we restrict our analysis 
to two bank-specific variables (M&A fees and E/TA).  
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Chapter 5: The impact of unconventional monetary policy on risk-
taking of the US investment banks 
 
5.1 Introduction and Related Literature 
This chapter places emphasis on the effect of unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) 
on risk-taking of the US investment banks. Our focus on this topic is driven by the 
importance of monetary policy for central bank’s policy making as the initiation of 
suitable strategies would foster economic growth and affect significantly the stability of 
financial institutions. In particular, as a response to the recent financial crisis, the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Fed) in the US has been engaged in unconventional monetary policies 
such as large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). Fed’s transaction included purchases of 
trillions of the US long-term Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) over 
the 2008-2013 period suggesting a large expansion of its balance sheet assets. The 
existing literature has examined extensively the relationship between monetary easing 
and risk-taking of the US commercial banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Delis 
et al., 2011; Buch et al., 2014; Fungacova et al., 2014). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the effect of UMPs on the risk-taking of investment banks has not been 
investigated yet thoroughly in the extant literature. To this end, we try to fill a gap by 
investigating the impact of UMP on bank risk-taking focusing exclusively on the US 
investment banks.     
Our focus in the US is motivated by the importance of the investment banking industry 
for the US economy both in terms of size and also in terms of its contribution to the recent 
financial crisis. Furthermore, the US is one of the countries that have used in unparalleled 
levels UMP tools to wither the recent financial crisis. Before the advent of the economic 
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crisis in 2007, the US investment banking industry had experienced strong growth. Over 
a period of continuous economic prosperity, investment banking revenues increased 
considerably and constituted more than the half of total US bank income in the US 
(Burgess, 2011). Since the 2007 crisis, the investment banking industry has been 
transformed significantly as a number of prominent US investment banks have collapsed 
while others were acquired by other banking entities or transformed into bank holding 
companies (BHCs) to wither the severe consequences of the crisis. In some detail, the 
industry’s revenues dropped by 30% between 2009-2012 period. There is  also evidence 
that the profitability, as estimated by return on equity (ROE), of the top US 15 investment 
banks decreased by 35% in 2014 compared to the average profitability in the years before 
the crisis (Oliver Wyman, 2015). This underperformance of the US investment banking 
industry has led to a series of regulatory changes that in turn have transformed 
fundamentally the way investment banks operate. In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010) included a number of restrictions on major specific business areas of US 
investment banks. A key legislative rule is known as ‘Volcker rule’, requires investment 
banks to separate commercial banking from investment banking activities (Dodd-Frank 
Act, 2010). This, in turn, suggests a major transformation of the operational framework 
of the US investment banks since the 2007 crisis. In addition, government intervention in 
the US industry is considerably apparent, as a number of US investment banks have been 
converted into BHCs so as to have access to government funding such as the Federal 
Deposit Insurance (FDIC) support and the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
Although these stringent rules are imposed by the US regulators aiming to enhance the 
stability of investment banks, there is evidence that the ‘implicit government guarantee’, 
which stems from access to capital provided by the government, could result in an 
increase of moral hazard of financial institutions (Gropp et al., 2006, 2013). 
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The Fed in the US, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, has implemented a series of 
unconventional monetary tools aiming to ensure the well-functioning of deposit-taking 
institutions and primary dealers that include, among others, prominent US investment 
banks (Gagnon et al., 2011). A major UMP tool implemented by the Fed, the large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAPs), has resulted in significant expansion of central bank’s assets.36 
Note, that these programmes involve primarily transactions between the Fed and major 
investment banks that have primary dealer status such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley (Gagnon et al., 2011). 37 Therefore, UMPs, as explained by LSAPs, has a direct 
impact on the stability of these financial institutions and hence it is of importance to 
further investigate the relationship between UMPs and investment banks’ risk-taking. In 
addition, primary dealers’ expectations as trading counterparties of the Fed in the 
implementation of UMP is critical. This is so as the Fed compiled the Survey of Primary 
Dealers where primary dealers develop their projections with regards to the impact of the 
Fed’s LSAP program.38 
Given the extensive usage of UMP tools by the Fed, there has been a growing research 
interest that sheds light on the effect of monetary easing, through low-interest rates over 
a prolonged period of time, on the level of bank risk-taking. This is well-documented in 
the literature as the ‘risk-taking transmission channel’ (Altunbas et al., 2010, 2012; 
Fungáčová et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014). The ‘risk-taking transmission’ hypothesis 
suggests that low-interest rates rise the risk-taking of commercial banks through the 
                                                          
36 To illustrate this, in 2008 the Fed announced asset purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
of up to $600 billion, while the federal open market committee (FOMC) expanded significantly its 
purchases of MBS reaching a total value of up to $1.25 trillion. These transactions involve the first phase 
of UMP and include also LSAPs of longer Treasury securities and agency debt of up to $300 and $175 
billion respectively. In a second phase of the LSAP program, Fed expanded its balance sheet assets’ with 
an additional purchase of longer-term Treasury securities of up to $600 billion. 
37The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides a detailed list of the primary dealers in the US:  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html 
38Information on the questions asked in  the Survey of Primary Dealer  is available on the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealer_survey_questions.html 
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decrease in the difference between the lending and the deposit rate, which is known as 
the ‘intermediation spread’. Lower intermediation spreads rise incentives of commercial 
banks to invest in riskier assets, rather than safer assets such as Treasury-bills and 
government bonds, so as to increase their return. In support of this argument, Borio and 
Zhu (2008) show that low-interest rates decrease asset price movement. This, in turn, 
reduces the probability of a bank to default and encourage managers to undertake risk 
positions. Managers are also motivated to follow this search-for-yield mechanism as 
higher returns lead to higher level of executive compensation (Borio and Zhu, 2008).  
Departing from the existing literature, there is a rather limited discussion with regards to 
the effect of UMP on risk-taking of investment banks. However, there has been a growing 
research interest in the relationship between UMP and risk of commercial banks. 
Thereafter, we provide a brief overview of the existing literature on this topic. Table 1 
summarises the empirical studies that are relevant to the focus of our study and in terms 
of the period of examination and the sample employed. Note, that all these studies report 
evidence of positive relationship between UMP and risk of commercial banks (Altunbas 
et al., 2010, 2012; De-Nicolo et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013; 
Buch et al., 2014; Fungacova et al., 2014) consistent with the ‘risk-taking transmission’ 
hypothesis. From Table 1 it is obvious that, among the studies reviewed, there exists a 
clear concentration in terms of the country coverages in the euro area (Altunbas et al., 
2010, 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014) and the US (Altunbas et al., 2010, 2012; De-Nicolo 
et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2011;  Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013; Buch et al., 2014; Fungacova et 
al., 2014), suggesting that UMP has been extensively employed by European central bank 
(ECB) and Fed as a tool to wither the financial crisis in these economies. In terms of the 
measures employed to proxy for UMP, most of the studies use the US federal fund rate 
(De-Nicolo et al., 2010; Buch et al., 2014; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013), while others employ 
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as a measure of UMP the Taylor gap (Altunbas et al., 2010; Fungacova et al., 2014) as 
introduced by Taylor (1993). However, there is a stand of literature (Altunbas et al., 2010; 
De-Nicolo et al., 2010; Buch et al., 2014) that highlights the ineffectiveness of US federal 
fund rate as a proxy of UMP due to its close to zero values over a prolonged period of 
time.  In addition, Table 1 shows the variety of risk measures employed such as the 
expected default frequency (Altunbas et al., 2010,2012), insolvency risk as estimated by 
Z-score (Delis et al., 2011), risk-weighted assets (De-Nicolo et al., 2010) and loan supply 
(Fungacova et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014). Furthermore, studies vary with respect to the 
periods employed as some of them cover a period that ends at 2009 (Altunbas et al., 2010, 
2012; De-Nicolo et al., 2010; Buch et al., 2014), while others include the following years 
of 2010 (Delis et al., 2010; Fungacova et al., 2014)  and 2011 (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013) 
as well. Finally, the vast majority of these studies (Altunbas et al., 2010, 2012; De-Nicolo 
et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2011;  Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013; Buch et al., 2014) use quarterly 
data as high-frequency data are appropriate in the context of these studies that aim to 
examine the short-term effect of UMP on bank risk-taking.  
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Table 1. Summary of relevant studies 
A/A References Title 
Monetary policy  
variable 
Risk Indicators Years in Sample Country sample 
1 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., & 
Marques-Ibanez, D. (2012).  
Do bank characteristics 
influence the effect of 
monetary policy on bank risk? 
The number of 
consecutive quarters that 
the real monetary interest 
rate is below the natural 
rate.  
 Expected default 
frequency (EDF)  
2002q2-2009q4 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,  
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  
the United Kingdom and the United States 
2 
Fungáčová, Z., Solanko, L., & Weill, 
L. (2014).  
Does competition influence 
the bank lending channel in 
the euro area? 
Taylor Gap  Loan supply 2002-2010 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy,  
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
and the United States 
3 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., & 
Marqués-Ibáñez, D. (2010). Does 
monetary policy affect bank risk-
taking?. 
Does monetary policy affect 
bank risk-taking? 
 Use three alternative 
measures of Taylor gap. 
 Expected default 
frequency (EDF)  
1999q1-2008q3 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,  
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  
the United Kingdom and the United States 
4 
Manthos Delis and Iftekhar Hasan 
and Nikolaos Mylonidis (2011) 
The risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy in the USA: 
Evidence from micro-level 
data. 
Quarterly change in the 
real federal fund rate as 
the difference between 
the nominal funds rate 
and the CPI. 
1) Z-score 2)Syndicated 
loans 
1985q1-2010q2 United States 
5 
Claudia M.Buch, Sandra Eickmeier, 
Esteban Prieto (2014) 
In search for yield? Survey-
based evidence on bank risk-
taking 
The US Federal fund rate 
1) Ex-ante loans and 2) 
New loans.  
1997q2-2008q2  United States 
6 
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven, 
and Gustavo Suarez (2013)  
Bank Leverage and Monetary 
Policy's Risk-Taking 
Channel: Evidence from the 
United States 
The US Federal fund rate 
The ex-ante internal risk 
rating assigned by the 
bank to a given new loan 
1997q1-2011q3 United States 
7 
De Nicolò, G., G. Dell’Ariccia, L. 
Laeven, and F. Valencia (2010) 
Policy at the Zero Lower 
Bound: A Cross-Country 
The US Federal fund rate 
Risk-weighted assets 
over total assets 
1997q1–2008q2 United States 
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Based on the above review of the existing literature, while there is growing volume of 
research papers that investigate the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of 
commercial banks, there is no empirical study, to the best of our knowledge, that 
explicitly focuses on the investigation of the effect of UMP on the risk-taking of 
investment banks. However, recently researchers highlight the importance of broker-
dealers, also known as primary dealers, as main financial intermediaries regarding the 
LSAPs programmes (Carpenter et al., 2015). The list of the US primary dealers consists 
of prominent bank holding companies (BHCs), such as Morgan Stanley and J.P. Morgan, 
that before the Dodd-Frank (2010) and their transformation into BHCs used to operate as 
investment banks. Adrian and Shin (2009) claim that broker-dealers, also known as 
investment banks, are a better barometer of the general funding conditions compared to 
commercial banks. This is particularly the case in financial systems, such as the US and 
the UK, where the importance of broker-dealers’ activities has been increased due to the 
securitisation (Stiroh, 2004; Yin and Yang, 2013). Since the importance of investment 
banks has been neglected by researchers for some time now, the existing research on the 
effect of unconventional monetary policy on the risk of these financial institutions is 
rather limited. However, there are some studies to justify the presence of a theoretical link 
on the relationship between unconventional monetary policies and investment banks’ risk.   
Based on the ‘risk-taking transmission’ hypothesis, low-interest rates rise the risk-taking 
of commercial banks through the decrease in the difference between the lending and the 
deposit rate. Thus, it is natural to expect that investment banks are less exposed to 
unconventional monetary shocks compared to commercial banks. However, empirical 
evidence shows that low-interest rates increase significantly securitization and 
underwriting operations of banking institutions (Maddaloni and Peydro, 2010). Therefore, 
as investment banks are involved primarily in non-banking activities such as insurance, 
150 
 
underwriting, and securitization operations it is expected that UMP would affect 
considerably investment banks. Moreover, reality has shown that prominent investment 
banks, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch proved to be 
significantly affected by monetary policy changes. In addition, investment banks are 
financial institutions that differ fundamentally from commercial banks. This is so as 
investment banks’ main source of income comes from non-interest based activities, while 
commercial banks focus mainly in interest-based operations (Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). Furthermore, Stiroh (2004) highlights that there exists a high positive 
correlation between fee-based and interest based income. This is due to increased level 
of reliance on loan substitutes that shows that different business segments are exposed to 
same economic fluctuations and that in turn reduces diversification benefits as product 
lines become considerably blurred (Stiroh, 2004, Yin and Yang, 2013). This suggests that 
unconventional monetary tools, through lower interest rates, would consequently affect 
to a similar extent banks relying on fee-based operations, such as investment banks, and 
these financial institutions that focus on interest-based income activities, such as 
commercial banks. Also, previous studies show that banks that focus primarily on non-
interest operations are more exposed to monetary policy shocks (Fraser et al., 2002; Stiroh, 
2004). 
Moreover, Adrian and Shin (2009) highlight the importance of investment banks for the 
well- functioning of financial markets and their response to monetary policy changes. 
Initially, they report that asset growth of investment banks provide a better prediction of 
general funding conditions compared to the balance sheet growth of commercial bank 
asset growth. Moreover, in an earlier study, Adrian and Shin (2008) find that the leverage 
of investment banks has a procyclical behaviour and thus when the balance sheets of these 
financial institutions become large their leverage increases, while smaller balance sheets 
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have as a result the reduction in leverage. The authors also document that lower short-
term interest rate is associated with higher balance sheet asset growth  of investment 
banks (Adrian and Shin, 2008). In particular, it is documented that monetary easing boosts 
asset prices. Gambacorta et al. (2014) perform a cross-country analysis, including the US, 
the UK, and Japan, and investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policy on 
output and consumer prices. They measure unconventional monetary policy by 
employing central bank assets as a percentage of GDP and they conclude that the latter 
increases output and consumer prices suggesting that unconventional monetary tools are 
effective in boosting asset prices. This increase of asset prices would cause a rise in bank 
equity while leverage would fall. Investment banks would respond to this reduction of the 
leverage by increasing their borrowing and consequently the demand of assets that would, 
in turn, increase further the price of assets resulting in higher balance sheet asset growth 
of these financial institutions (Adrian and Shin, 2008). This finding suggests that 
investment banks are exposed particularly to monetary policy shocks. Therefore, the 
above studies signify that it is important to put emphasis on the effect of UMP on 
investment bank risk.  
In support of the above theoretical prediction, the most relevant empirical study is that by 
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013). The authors investigate the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy, through low-interest rates for a prolonged period of time, on the credit 
risk of the financial sector using daily data over the 2008-2011 period.  They use 5-year 
CDS contracts to construct indexes that incorporate the credit risk of two types of 
financial intermediaries, i.e., commercial banks and broker-dealers. To create these credit 
risk indicators, they use daily data for a sample of 9 US investment banks and 26 US 
commercial banks. They also perform a case study analysis where they measure the 
impact of unconventional monetary policy tools on the credit risk of the five most 
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prominent US investment banks: Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs Group, Bank of 
America, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan. Overall, they find that lower interest rate over the 
crisis period, raises the credit risk of these financial institutions due to the increased cost 
of insurance.  
From a methodological point of view, we employ both fixed effect and dynamic panel 
specifications to further boost the validity of our results. The usage of the dynamic panel 
analysis allow us to encounter two major econometric issues that our study faces: i) the 
well documented in the literature persistence of bank risk-taking (Keeley, 1990; Cordella 
and Yeyati, 2002), ii) and the endogeneity issues with regards to the relationship between 
the monetary policy stance and bank risk-taking (Jimenez et al., 2008; Ioannidou et al., 
2015; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). 
Based on the above discussion, the examination of the impact of UMP on the risk taking 
of the US investment banks is of importance both in terms of academic interest and policy 
implications. Thus, this study contributes to the existing literature in various ways. Firstly, 
it is the only study that investigates the underlying relationship between UMPs and bank 
risk-taking of investment banks. By contrast, the vast majority of the academic research 
has been focused on the effect of UMP on bank risk-taking of commercial and saving 
banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Delis et al., 2011; Buch et al., 2014; 
Fungacova et al., 2014). Secondly, our analysis is based on quarterly based data as high-
frequency information can gauge effectively the short term effect of UMPs on the US 
investment banks’ risk (Altunbas et al., 2010). Thirdly, we use a number of alternative 
measures of UMP including both indicators that are standard in the relevant literature, 
such as central bank’s assets, as well as variables that has been recently in the research 
spotlight as effective proxies of UMP, such as the shadow short rate (Kim and Singleton, 
2012; Bullard, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013; Krippner, 2013; Wu and Xia, 2014). 
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Fourthly, the usage of dynamic panel regressions enables us to deal with banks’ risk 
persistence and endogeneity issues that arise from the effect of UMPs on risk, thus 
increasing the validity of our findings. 
Overall our findings suggest a positive association between UMP and bank risk-taking, 
across a number of specifications where we employ a plethora of measures to capture the 
monetary policy stance. Our findings are broadly in line with the existing literature that 
also confirms the presence of a transmission risk channel on commercial and saving 
banking institutions under prolonged periods of low-interest rates. However, this is the 
first study that finds a strong relationship between UMPs and risk taking of the US 
investment banks, suggesting that these institutions are particularly affected by changes 
in the monetary policy. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the hypothesis 
development. Section 5.3 describes our sample, data, and variables. Section 5.4 explains 
the methodology employed in our study. Section 5.5 discusses our results and Section 5.6 
concludes with a brief summary of our key findings and policy implications. 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
There has been an extensive research that focuses on establishing a theoretical and 
empirical linkage between UMP and the risk of deposit-taking institutions (Delis et al., 
2011; Altunbas et al., 2012; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014). However, there is 
rather limited research that bridges a conceptual framework on the effect of monetary 
expansionary policies on other financial intermediaries, such as investment banks. 
Subsequently, we develop our main hypothesis with regards to the association of UMP 
and the risk-taking of investment banks based on established literature (Adrian and Shin, 
2009,2008; Yin and Yang, 2013). 
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5.2.1   Unconventional monetary easing and risk-taking of investment banks 
There is a large body of literature that investigates the relationship between low-interest 
rates and risk-taking of commercial banks and confirms the presence of risk-taking 
channel (Delis et al., 2011; Altunbas et al., 2012; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Buch et al., 
2014). The risk transmission channel might also be present in the case of investment 
banks since these financial institutions are exposed particularly to monetary policy shocks 
and could be a better barometer of general funding conditions compared to commercial 
banks (Yin and Yang, 2013; Adrian and Shin, 2009,2008; Stiroh, 2004). In the case of 
LSAPs, in which investment banks are largely involved, the “portfolio balance” channel 
as originally developed by Tobin (1963,1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) is a key 
mechanism that could explain how UMP is able to affect financial institutions and the 
wider economy (Steeley and Matyushkin, 2015). They suggest that central banks, by 
shifting the relative supplies of assets with different maturities and liquidity, can have an 
impact on the relative returns on these assets owing to imperfect substitutability. 
Therefore, in the long term, an asset supply increase would result in adjustments of prices 
and returns aiming to restore equilibrium. In some detail, when central bank purchases 
assets from primary dealers such as investment banks, the cash holdings of sellers is 
increased. As money is not a perfect substitute for assets sold by primary dealers, sellers 
might put an emphasis in rebalancing their portfolios by buying other assets that are better 
substitutes (Joyce et al., 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012). These purchases could involve 
riskier assets than cash, such as corporate bonds and equities, that would, in turn, increase 
risk-taking of these financial institutions (Fisher, 2010; Fratzscher et al., 2013). Moreover, 
the bid-ask spread of safe assets is reduced because of lower interest rates imposed by 
UMPs (Steely et al., 2015; Wu, 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2013).39 Given that investment 
                                                          
39 This resembles the intermediation spread explained by the risk-transmission channel for commercial 
banks.   
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banks are engaged in trading operations, they would shift towards riskier assets aiming to 
increase their return. This could consequently increase the risk-taking of investment 
banks. 
In addition, following the literature (Adrian and Shin, 2008), monetary easing results in 
higher balance sheet asset growth of investment banks due to the procyclical behaviour 
of leverage. In particular, monetary easing boost asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014) 
that in turn rises the value of equity while decreases the level of leverage. Investment 
banks would restore the level of leverage by increasing their borrowing and the demand 
of assets (Adrian and Shin, 2008). This rise in the demand of assets would further increase 
the asset prices that would again result in the increase of leverage. High leveraged 
institutions, such as investment banks, entail a higher risk of default especially under high 
financial distressed conditions (Adrian and Shin, 2008). On the other hand, low leveraged 
banks are considered to be safer by investors and less sensitive to interest rate fluctuations 
(Madura and Schnusenberg, 2000).  
Finally, in support of the risk transmission channel, Bekaert et al. (2010) find that 
investors are less risk-averse over monetary expansionary periods because UMP reduces 
market uncertainty and thus they are more confident in undertaking riskier positions. 
Similarly, Roache and Rousset (2014) observe that UMP, over the crisis and post-crisis 
period, reduces the probability of extreme movements of asset prices that in turn rises the 
risk-taking of financial institutions. Given that investment banks’ operational framework 
involves, among others, trading activities this moderation effect of UMP on extreme asset 
price movements could reduce the level of risk-aversion that would lead to an increase of 
risk-taking of these financial institutions. Also, there is empirical evidence that confirms 
the positive relationship between monetary easing and the risk-taking of investment banks. 
In particular, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2013) suggest that low-interest rates increase credit 
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risk of the US BHCs (previously known as investment banks). Based on the above 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, we conclude that UMP would increase the 
risk-taking of investment banks and thus our first hypothesis is defined as: 
H1. : The effect of unconventional monetary easing on the investment bank risk-taking is  
positive.  
5.3 Data and Variables 
5.3.1 Sample 
We hand-collect quarterly financial data from 10-Q fillings form SEC Edgar platform 
over a period that includes the financial crisis (2007Q1-2014Q4). The usage of quarterly 
data is particularly appropriate for examining the short-term effect of monetary policy 
stance on bank risk-taking (Altunbas et al., 2010). In addition, our analysis covers a period 
that includes not only the financial crisis of 2007 but also major UMPs. Our final sample 
consists of 20 investment banks with standard industry classification (SIC) of 6211 and 
6282 and a total of 540 observations, after removing discrepancies and errors. Table 2 
defines all variables, explanatory and dependent, employed to identify the underlying 
relationship between unconventional monetary policy and investment bank risk-taking. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
A. Dependent variables   
Z-SCORE 
(1+ROE)/SDROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the standard 
deviation of return on equity 
Authors' estimation 
SDROE 
Standard deviation of ROE 
Authors' estimation 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest   
CBA/GDP Central bank assets over GDP ratio International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
M1 
Money supply that is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and 
transaction deposits at depository institutions  
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
M2 
Money supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination 
time deposits, and retail money market mutual fund shares. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
TAYL.GAP-NCORE 
The difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by 
the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), using the non-core inflation rate. 
Authors' estimation 
TAYL.GAP-CORE 
The difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by 
the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), using the core inflation rate. 
Authors' estimation 
SHADOW-RATE 
Shadow short rate is the monetary policy rate estimated at the Zero Lower 
Bound 
Monthly Shadow short rate data as estimated by Wu and Xia (2014) are 
available at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
FED-RATE Federal Fund rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
C. Other bank-specific and state-level explanatory variables   
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets   Authors' estimation-financial data resourced from 10-Q 
E/TA Equity/total assets Authors' estimation-financial data resourced from 10-Q 
ROAE Net income/average total assets Authors' estimation-financial data resourced from 10-Q 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA Liquid assets/total assets Authors' estimation-financial data resourced from 10-Q 
FEES/TA Investment banking fees/total assets Authors' estimation-financial data resourced from 10-Q 
VIX Volatility Implied Index Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
SP&500 Stock Price Index Bloomberg database 
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5.3.2 Bank risk indicators 
 
We proxy risk-taking of banks by two alternative measures that are standard in the 
banking literature; i)  Z-score index and ii) SDROE. Z-score is calculated as follows: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
 
1+𝑅𝑂𝐸
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐸)
                                                                                                                             (1),                                                                                                             
where ROE is return on equity, and 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐸) is the standard deviation of ROE (Boyd and 
Graham, 1986). Z-score has been widely used in commercial and investment banking 
studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry, et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012) as it an intuitive and 
easily implementable measure. Following this equation (1), Z-score reduces when 
earnings’ volatility increases. Thus, there is a negative relationship between Z-score and 
bank’s default risk, and hence Z-score can be considered as an inverse proxy of bank’s 
default risk. Therefore, higher values of Z-score denote lower default risk, while lower 
Z-score values suggest increased default risk. Table 3 shows that the mean value of Z-
score is 0.587, while it ranges from -4.913 to 6.650. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis with 
respect to bank performance. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dv. Min. Max. 
A. Dependent 
Variables 
          
Z-SCORE 540 0.587 1.315 -4.913 6.482 
SDROE 540 1.423 1.446 0.000 6.650 
B. Independent Variables of our main 
interest 
      
CBA/GDP 540 56.27 21.68 20.890 90.766 
M1 540 7.56 0.250 7.221 7.966 
M2 540 9.11 0.147 8.868 9.356 
TAYL.GAP-NCORE 540 -4.15 1.923 -8.822 0.095 
TAYL.GAP-CORE 540 -3.81 0.801 -4.946 -1.903 
SHADOW-RATE 540 0.58 1.886 -0.996 5.340 
FED-RATE 540 0.94 1.658 0.060 5.340 
C. Other bank-specific and country-level 
explanatory variables 
    
SIZE 540 16.112 2.878 10.233 21.668 
E/TA 540 26.708 25.755 -8.810 92.856 
ROAE 540 2.030 34.394 -362.129 546.191 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA 540 39.789 22.411 0.005 106.295 
FEES/TA 540 15.487 38.226 -10.104 409.227 
VIX 540 21.859 8.851 11.570 44.140 
S&P500 540 7.210 0.223 6.667 7.625 
 Notes: the Table shows the basic descriptive statistics (mean, std.dv., min., max.) of all 
our dependent and independent variables. Our dependent variables are: Z-
score=(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the standard 
deviation of return on assets; and  SDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity as 
estimated  based on twelve quarters. Our independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central 
bank’s assets to gross domestic product ratio; M1= Money supply that is defined as the 
sum of currency held by the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions; M2= 
Money supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination time 
deposits, and retail money market mutual fund shares. TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference 
between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 
1993) and the non-core CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= Difference between the federal fund 
rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core CPI; 
SHADOW-RATE= shadow short rate; FED-RATE= federal fund rate; SIZE= natural 
logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; Return on average equity 
ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets 
ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied 
index; S&P500= stock price index. Taylor gap=Difference between the federal fund rate 
and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993); Shadow short rate;  
Figure 1 demonstrates the trend of Z-score index over the 2007Q1-2014Q4 and reveals 
that investment banks face particularly high-risk exposure over the last quarter of 2008 
reaching the lowest mean Z-score value of -0.2859. In particular, a number of investment 
banks underwent through an unprecedented financial crisis that had led to severe and 
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adverse consequences to the survival of these financial institutions. Note that investment 
banks appear to have lower default risk between 2009 and 2010, reaching a lower bank 
exposure in the last quarter of 2010 (1.1262). Lastly, from 2011Q1 and onwards we 
observe a mean Z-score around 0.5539, suggesting a comparable stable risk-taking 
behavior of investment banks. 
  Figure 1. Mean values Z-score index across the 2007Q1-2014Q4 period. 
 
Notes: the Figure 1 shows the trend of mean Z-score index over the 2007Q1-2014Q4. 
 
As a secondary variable we use SDROE that is the standard deviation of ROE calculated 
on values of ROE over the last twelve quarters. SDROE denotes income volatility and 
has been used by previous banking studies as a measure of bank risk (Jensen and Mester, 
2003; Stiroh, 2004; Lepetit et al., 2008). Thus, higher values of SDROE increase earnings’ 
variability and investment bank’s risk, while lower values reduce banks’ risk-taking. The 
mean value of SDROE is 1.423, while SDROE ranges between -2.279 and 6.650.  
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5.3.3 Unconventional monetary policy indicators 
 
Unconventional monetary policy is proxied by a number of alternative variables that used 
in previous studies. As the first proxy of unconventional monetary policy, we use central 
bank assets over gross domestic product (CBA/GDP) that has been used in previous 
studies (Lambert and Ueda, 2014; Meaning and Zhu, 2012). This ratio shows the growth 
of central bank’s balance sheets by buying government bonds and less safe assets by 
initiated unconventional monetary schemes that can increase bank lending. In addition, 
early academic literature (Friedman and Schwartz, 1986; Cagan, 1972) stresses the 
usefulness of monetary aggregates, i.e., M1 and M2, to gauge the monetary stance. We 
also use the Taylor gap to estimate the impact of unconventional monetary policy on 
investment bank risk that is used in previous studies (Altunbas et al., 2010; Lambert and 
Ueda, 2014). The Taylor gap is expressed as the difference between the federal fund rate 
and the interest rate as estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). Taylor rule interest 
rate is estimated as: Real Interest Rate +Inflation Target+0.5*Inflation 
Deviation+0.5*Output Gap. Inflation deviation is the difference between the current 
inflation and the target inflation rate as aimed by the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). The Output gap is estimated as the percentage change between the real and 
potential gross domestic product. We estimated the output gap based on the official data 
released by the FED. We employ two different measures of Taylor rule rate, based on 1) 
the non-core consumer price index CPI (TAYL.GAP-NCORE) and 2) the core CPI 
(TAYL.GAP-CORE) that excludes energy and food prices. For consistency reasons, we 
also use different sets of weights on the estimation of the Taylor rule rate i) 0.5 and 1.0 
and ii) 0.5 and 1.5. Table 3 demonstrates that the mean values of TAYL.GAP-NCORE 
and TAYL.GAP-CORE are -4.149 and -3.808 respectively, suggesting that core inflation 
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rate provides lower (negative) values. Moreover, negative Taylor gap values suggest that 
interest rates are below the benchmark rate (Taylor rule rate) and that in turn show 
increased monetary easing over the examination period (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Figure 2 shows that both TAYL.GAP-NCORE and TAYL.GAP-CORE fall below zero 
over the 2007Q1-2014Q4 period. This reveals that mean interest rates are lower compared 
to interest rates as estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). This, in turn, suggests a 
prolonged period of low-interest rates due to the implementation of UMP. Interestingly, 
we observe that both these two indicators reach their lowest value in the late 2008, when 
investment banks experience particularly high-risk exposure. Moreover, we can observe 
that TAYL.GAP-NCORE takes consistently lower values compared to the TAYL.GAP-
CORE, as the latter is estimated based on the core CPI from which volatile prices, such 
as food and gas prices, are removed and thus the TAYL.GAP-CORE appear to be steadier 
than the TAYL.GAP-NCORE.  
 
Figure 2. Mean values of TAYL.GAP-CORE and TAYL.GAP-NCORE variables the 2007Q1-
2014Q4 period. 
 
Notes: the Figure 2 shows the trend of mean TAYL.GAP-CORE and TAYL.GAP-NCORE variables over the 
2007Q1-2014Q4. 
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We also employ federal fund rate (FED-RATE) as it is considered very informative in 
explaining movements of macroeconomic and microeconomic variables (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992) and has been broadly used in previous studies to examine the relationship 
between bank risk-taking and monetary stance  (Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013; De Nicolò et al., 2010). Table 3 displays that FED-RATE ranges 
between 0.060-5.340, while the mean value is equal to 0.937. In addition, there has been 
an increased research interest in the estimation of the shadow short rate (Kim and 
Singleton, 2012; Bullard, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013; Krippner, 2013), while there 
are studies that examine the suitability of these rates on investigating the impact of 
unconventional monetary policies on asset prices (Francis et al., 2014; Claus et al., 2014). 
Therefore, we also use shadow short rate (SHADOW-RATE) measured by Wu and Xia 
(2014) as an additional proxy of UMP. The shadow short rate is constructed to replace 
the federal fund rate as a more effective measure to identify the impact of unconventional 
monetary policies on general economic and business conditions. The reason being that 
federal fund rate has been targeted at zero lower bounds after the initiation of 
unconventional monetary policies (2008Q1) and, in turn, is considered to be a less 
effective proxy of monetary policy between the 2008Q1-2014Q4 (Bruno and Shin, 2015). 
The Shadow short rate could be a better proxy compared to federal fund rate as it takes 
negative values and thus could capture the effects of monetary shocks on both the macro 
and micro-economic economic environment. The mean value of SHADOW-RATE is 
0.575 and is almost half the mean value of FED-RATE (0.937). This is so as SHADOW-
RATE takes both positive and negative values with a minimum value of -0.996. 
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5.3.4 Control Variables 
We use numerous bank-specific and country-level control variables in our specifications 
following previous research papers. We control for the size (SIZE) of banks as estimated 
by using the natural logarithm of total assets. The impact of size on bank risk is mixed 
(Altunbas et al., 2001; DeGuevara and Maudos, 2007), as there are studies to find that 
size exerts a positive impact on bank risk-taking (Berger et al., 1987; Black and 
Hazelwood, 2013), while others observe a negative relationship between size and 
investment bank’s risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Black and Hazelwood, 2013). 
Increases of bank size might result in decreases in bank risk as increased size denotes 
higher level and mix of operations and thus, might result in higher risk diversification 
benefits (Mester, 1993). By contrast, the negative impact of bank size on bank risk-taking 
suggests that economies of scope and scale are not realized (Berger et al., 1987). In 
addition, we control for the equity to total assets ratio (E/TA) to proxy for bank risk-
taking preferences (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). Similarly to SIZE, the 
impact of E/TA on bank risk could be either negative or positive. In particular, increases 
of E/TA suggest a higher level of capital at risk and therefore bank managers undertake 
less risky positions (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 
2008). However, increases of E/TA (decreases of leverage) could result in a higher risk, 
as lower leverage reduces the priority of managers to secure funding to pay back the debt 
and thus are eager to undertake riskier projects (Myers, 1977). Furthermore, we 
investigate the effect of liquidity, as estimated by the liquid asset over total assets 
(LIQUID_ASSETS/TA), on investment bank risk-taking. Empirical studies suggest that 
the impact of LIQUID_ASSETS/TA on bank risk-taking could be negative as liquidity 
risk is decreased (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008), while 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA could also affect bank risk-taking positively as they are associated 
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with lower returns and thus manager might try to undertake more risky positions in their 
effort to increase their revenues (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). In addition, we control 
for the ROAE aiming to test whether banks that have higher levels of profits accumulate 
increased risks (Altunbas et al., 2011; Black and Hazelwood, 2013). 
In addition, the main source of income for investment banks is related to non-interest 
based activities, such as trading securities, underwriting, and M&A advisory services. 
Therefore, it is essential in the context of this study to include investment banking fees, 
proxied by the ratio of net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets 
(FEES/TA), as an additional bank-specific control variable. Based on previous empirical 
evidence (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), we expect the impact of FEES/TA on 
bank risk to be positive, as non-interest income is found to be more volatile compared to 
interest income, such as deposits (Stiroh, 2004). The mean value of FEES/TA is 15.487 
and the standard deviation is equal to 38.226 (see Table 2).  
With regards to the impact of asset prices on bank risk taking, we include the stock price 
index, as estimated by S&P500, following a study by Adrian and Song Shin (2010) that 
investment banks’ balance sheet expansion is positively influenced by the rise of asset 
and stock prices. We observe that the mean value of S&P500 is 7.210 while the standard 
deviation is relatively low (see Table 2). Finally, we control for the market risk by using 
the Volatility Implied Index (VIX) consistent with numerous previous studies aiming to 
examine the impact of monetary stance on macroeconomic and microeconomic variables 
(Adrian and Shin, 2009; Bekaert et al., 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Gambacorta et al., 
2014).  Higher values of VIX indicator reflect higher degrees of financial distress in the 
US economy (Whaley, 2000). Therefore, we expect that the effect of VIX index on 
investment bank risk to be positive. The mean value of VIX indicator is 21.859 while the 
variable ranges from 11.570 to 44.140. 
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5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Fixed effect estimator 
We provide results from both fixed and dynamic panel specifications. The fixed effect 
estimator takes the following general model: 
(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝛽1∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑒𝑖,𝑡]          (2)                                                                      
where 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡  is the vector of bank-specific measure of US investment bank risk as 
estimated by two different proxies; i) insolvency risk as estimated by the Z-SCORE= 
(1+ROE)/σROE, where σROE is the estimate of standard deviation of ROE.  Z-SCORE 
is an indicator of bank stability and has been used in the banking literature (Lepetit et al., 
2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Higher values of Z-SCORE suggest higher 
distance of bank default. ii) SROE standard deviation of ROE (3 years window) , that also 
captures risk as it estimates income volatility (Jensen and Mester, 2003). 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 stands 
for the vector of UMP measures i) central bank assets over GDP ratio (CBA/GDP) ii) 
money supply (M1 & M2) iii) Taylor gap (non-core and core inflation) iv) Shadow short 
rate v) Federal fund rate.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 includes a number of bank-specific (SIZE, E/TA, 
ROAE, FEES/TA, LIQUID_ASSETS/TA) and country-level (VIX, S&P500) control 
variables, while 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term. 
 
5.4.2 System GMM estimator 
We further opt for a dynamic panel analysis as it is essential in the context of our study 
for two main reasons. Firstly, our study encounters an identification problem in the 
relationship between the monetary policy stance and bank risk-taking, as there is a 
perception in the existing literature that bank risk could influence monetary policy stance 
(Jimenez et al., 2008; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). Therefore, 
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by employing dynamic analysis and setting UMP variables as endogenous in our panel 
regression we are able to adequately control for this endogeneity issue. Secondly, the 
well-documented in the literature persistence of bank risk necessitates the usage of the 
dynamic panel (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). This behaviour of bank risk-taking could be 
explained by the increased competition among financial institutions that further ease the 
risk-taking of banks (Keeley, 1990; Cordella and Yeyati, 2002). Moreover, the regulation 
framework, such as deposit insurance coverages might enhance moral hazard and this, in 
turn, may lead to risky positions over a prolonged period of time (Delis and Kouretas, 
2011).40 Therefore, in our dynamic panel analysis, risk persistence is treated with the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.  
For the dynamic panels, we use the two-step system generalised method of moments 
estimator (GMM) as advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), using the corrected robust standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005). The model 
includes among others explanatory variables, one lag of the bank risk indicator, and, 
therefore, equation (2) takes the following form: 
(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑒𝑖,𝑡]      (3) 
In particular, besides the UMP measures, we treat as endogenous variables the bank-
specific control variables (SIZE, ETA, ROAE, FEES/TA, LIQUID_ASSETS/TA) 
following the literature (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Delis, 2012). Our results of the 
two-step GMM estimator are also verified by Hansen’s J test for instrument validity and 
the second-order autocorrelation of the error terms test, AR2, as introduced by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). 
                                                          
40 Following the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), investment banks have been obliged to be transformed into bank 
holding companies (BHCs) in order to have access to the governmental deposit insurance coverage.  
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5.5 Discussion of the Results 
5.5.1 Fixed effect panel results 
Our fixed effect estimations suggest that unconventional monetary policy exerts a 
positive impact on bank risk, i.e. a negative effect on Z-score. In particular, 
unconventional monetary policy, as estimated by the CBA/GDP ratio, reduces Z-score 
and thus increases investment banks risk. This effect is significant at the 1% level (see 
Table 3, Model 2). Our finding is in line with previous studies (Lambert and Ueda, 2014; 
Meaning and Zhu, 2012) that focus on the impact of central bank’s assets on bank risk-
taking of commercial banks. We also observe the impact of the combined money supply 
indicator, M1, and M2, on Z-score and conclude that there exists also a negative and 
significant relationship at the 1% level (see Table 4, Model 5). We further decomposed 
the combined indicators into M1 and M2 to test for the individual impact of each of these 
variable on bank risk-taking. Similarly, we find that both indicators, M1, and M2, have a 
negative effect on the Z-score at the 1% level of significance (see Table 4, Model 3 and 
4 respectively). However, we observe that the impact of M2 indicator on risk is somewhat 
stronger than the impact of M1. In some detail, the coefficient of M1 (0.122) is almost 
the half of the coefficient of M2 (0.205). The reason could be that M2 indicator includes 
among others, overnight repos and money market funds, that involve major sources of 
lending to broker-dealers (Duygan-Bump et al. 2010; Rosengren, 2014).  Overall, our 
findings lend support to our hypothesis (H1) that there exists a positive association 
between the UMP and investment bank’s risk-taking.  
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Table 4. Fixed effect results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (Z-
score) determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  
Our dependent variable is: Z-score=(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Our independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central bank’s assets to gross 
domestic product ratio; M1= Money supply that is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and 
transaction deposits at depository institutions; M2= Money supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, 
small-denomination time deposits, and retail money market mutual fund shares; SIZE= natural logarithm of 
total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total 
assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is not a high level 
of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
SIZE 0.036 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.057 
 (0.089) (0.052) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) 
ROAE 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
E/TA 0.005* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FEES/TA -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQUID_AS
SETS/TA 0.065** 0.074*** 0.075** 0.075** 0.076** 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
VIX -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.0009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
S&P500 -0.0405 -0.0312 0.064** 0.063** 0.053** 
 (0.210) (0.0253) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) 
CBA/GDP - -0.120*** - - - 
  (0.030)    
M1 - - -0.122***   
   (0.034) - - 
M2 - - - -0.205***  
    (0.055) - 
M1&M2 - -   -0.195*** 
   - - (0.050) 
Constant 1.307*** 1.317*** 1.762*** 2.715*** 3.042*** 
 (0.303) (0.274) (0.341) (0.416) (0.489) 
F-test 13.96*** 37.05*** 15.97*** 16.59*** 16.74*** 
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 
R-squared 0.265 0.204 0.189 0.226 0.198 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
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Turning to the impact of UMP on SDROE, our findings are similar to those specifications 
where we employed Z-score as the bank risk indicator. In some detail, CBA/GDP exerts 
a positive impact on SDROE suggesting that increases of central bank’s assets increases 
the instability of bank’s net earnings and thus rises investment bank’s risk-taking. The 
effect of CBA/GDP on SDROE is significant at the 1% level (see Table 5, Model 2), 
signaling a strong positive association between UMP and risk-taking. Moreover, M1&M2 
combined money supply indicator exerts a positive and significant impact on SDROE at 
the 1% level of significance (see Table 5, Model 5). We also test for any differences in 
the impact of M1 and M2 on risk-taking and conclude that both have a significant at the 
1 % (see Table 5, Model 3 and 4) and positive relationship with SDROE. In line with the 
Z-score’s specifications, the effect of M2 on bank risk is stronger than that of M1 as the 
coefficient of the former (0.236) is larger than that of the latter (0.139). These results 
show that M2 is a more effective indicator compared to M1 to gauge the effect of UMP 
on risk-taking of investment banks. 
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Table 5. Fixed effect results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (SDROE) 
determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
SIZE 0.268 -1.422* -1.518* -1.504* -1.510* 
 (0.341) (0.798) (0.815) (0.811) (0.812) 
E/TA 0.000 -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
FEES/TA 0.003** -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA -0.306*** 0.208 0.240 0.235 0.237 
 (0.101) (0.211) (0.220) (0.218) (0.218) 
VIX 0.004 0.013** 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
S&P500 0.001*** 0.000* 0.331 0.354 0.342 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.326) (0.325) (0.326) 
Central bank 
assets/GDP 
- 
0.148*** 
   
  (0.046) - - - 
M1 - - 0.139**   
   (0.051) -  
M2 - - - 0.236** - 
    (0.084)  
M1&M2 -    0.211** 
  - - - (0.076) 
Constant 5.93** 9.244** 21.024*** 32.143*** 30.186*** 
 (2.926) (3.628) (4.283) (7.158) (6.608) 
F-test 46.79*** 9.06*** 10.91*** 11.09*** 11.07*** 
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 
R-squared 0.122 0.186 0.1796 0.1814 0.181 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is: SDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity as estimated based on twelve quarters. Our 
independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central bank’s assets to gross domestic product ratio; M1= Money supply that 
is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions; M2= Money 
supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits, and retail money market mutual 
fund shares; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; Return on average equity 
ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment 
banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is 
not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. 
 
In addition, we find that the TAYL.GAP-NCORE,  as estimated by the non-core CPI, 
exerts a positive impact at the 10% significance level on Z-score (see Table 6,  Model 2), 
suggesting that higher negative values that stand for increased monetary easing, enhances 
investment banks’ default risk. In other words, if interest rates are below the benchmark 
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rate, investment banks undertake more risks (lower Z-score). We also find a significant 
at the 1% level and positive relationship between TAYL.GAP-CORE, as measured by the 
core CPI (see Table 6, Model 3). Overall, our findings are consistent with previous studies 
that find a negative relationship between Taylor gap and bank risk (Altunbas et al., 2010; 
Lambert and Ueda, 2014). Furthermore, we find a negative and significant at the 1% level 
(see Table 6, Model 3) relationship between SHADOW-RATE and Z-score, suggesting 
that lower values of the shadow short rate increase investment banks’ risk taking. 
Similarly, we observe that the FED-RATE exerts a positive and significant effect at the 
1% level (see Table 6, Model 4) on Z-score, signifying that values of FED-RATE that are 
close to zero-bounds increase investment banks’ risk-taking. Our finding is further 
confirmed by previous relevant studies that observe the impact of FED-RATE on the risk-
taking of commercial banks (Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2013; De Nicolò et al., 2010). Overall, our evidence lends support to our hypothesis and 
the presence of a risk-taking channel for investment banks following the US 
implementation of unconventional monetary policies.  
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Table 6. Fixed effect results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (Z-score) 
determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
SIZE 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.055 0.054 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
ROAE 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
E/TA 0.005* 0.000 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FEES/TA -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA 0.065** 0.067** 0.068** 0.068** 0.076** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) 
VIX -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
S&P500 -0.0405 0.016 -0.023 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.210) (0.029) (0.310) (0.031) (0.022) 
TAYL.GAP-
NCORE - 0.005* - - - 
  (0.002)    
TAYL.GAP-
CORE - - 0.028***   
   (0.009) - - 
SHADOW-
RATE - - - 0.013*** - 
    (0.003)  
FED-RATE     0.016*** 
 - - - - (0.003) 
Constant 1.307*** 1.170*** 1.542*** 1.261*** 1.268*** 
 (0.303) (0.324) (0.315) (0.324) (0.323) 
F-test 13.96*** 14.59*** 13.58*** 16.04*** 16.12*** 
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 
R-squared 0.265 0.212 0.251 0.158 0.178 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is Z-score=(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the standard deviation 
of return on assets. Our independent variables are: TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference between the federal fund rate and 
the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the non-core CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= Difference 
between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core CPI; 
SHADOW-RATE= shadow short rate; FED-RATE= federal fund rate; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= 
equity over total assets ratio ; Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= 
liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied 
index; S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in 
the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Turning to the effect of Taylor gap on SDROE, TAYL.GAP-NCORE enters the 
regression negative, suggesting that lower (negative) values increase bank risk-taking of 
investment banks (see Table 7, Model 2). Regarding the impact of TAYL.GAP-CORE 
on SDROE, we also observe that the Taylor gap, as estimated by the core CPI, exerts a 
positive effect on risk-taking (see Table 7, Model 3). However, in both the above 
specifications the relationship between Taylor gap, as proxied by TAYL.GAP-NCORE 
and TAYL.GAP-CORE, and bank risk-taking is not statistically significant. To gauge the 
impact of interest rates on SDROE, we also examine the effect of shadow short rate and 
the federal fund rate on bank risk-taking. In particular, SHADOW-RATE has a negative 
and significant at the 1% level on SDROE (see Table 7, Model 4), signalling that lower 
rates increases earning’s volatility and hence rise bank risk. Similarly with the 
SHADOW-RATE, the FED-RATE exerts a negative and significant effect at the 1% level 
on SDROE (see Table 7, Model 5) and conclude that UMP, as captured by FED-RATE 
values close to zero-bounds, enhances investment bank’s risk-taking. 
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Table 7. Fixed effect results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (SDROE) 
determinants of the US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
SIZE -0.268 -1.304 -1.324 -1.508* -1.491* 
 (0.341) (0.913) (0.890) (0.789) (0.794) 
E/TA 0.000 -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FEES/TA 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
LIQUID_
ASSETS/
TA -0.306*** 0.601 0.091 0.255 0.241 
 (0.101) (0.253) (0.242) (0.195) (0.199) 
VIX 0.004 0.151** 0.023*** 0.018** 0.0196** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
S&P500 0.001*** 1.113*** 1.041*** 0.966*** 1.210*** 
 (0.001) (0.336) (0.345) (0.330) (0.364) 
TAYL.GA
P-NCORE 
- 
-0.038 
- - - 
  (0.042)    
TAYL.GA
P-CORE 
- - 
-0.125 
- - 
   (0.380)   
SHADOW
-RATE 
- - - 
-0.160*** 
- 
    (0.050)  
FED-
RATE 
- - -  
-0.180*** 
     (0.057) 
Constant 5.93** 17.062*** 16.65*** 14.498*** 16.216*** 
 (2.926) (4.228) (3.695) (3.609) (3.572) 
F-test 46.79*** 15.68*** 17.35*** 8.85*** 9.18*** 
Observatio
ns 540 540 540 540 540 
Rsquared 0.122 0.1235 0.1281 0.1837 0.1812 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 2007Q1 to 
2014Q4.  Our dependent variable is: SDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity as estimated 
based on twelve quarters. Our independent variables are: TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference between 
the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the non-core 
CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= Difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by 
the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core CPI; SHADOW-RATE= shadow short rate; FED-RATE= 
federal fund rate; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; Return 
on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total 
assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; 
S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables 
used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Given the above findings, there is clear evidence that UMP, as proxied by a plethora 
measures, increase bank risk-taking of investment banks. One channel through which 
UMP could rise the risk of investment banks is via the “portfolio balance” effect.  The 
“portfolio balance” theory in the investment banking context would suggest that 
investment banks could be motivated to gear their trading efforts toward riskier assets due 
to the reduction of bid-ask spread of safer assets (Steely et al., 2015; Wu, 2014; Fratzscher 
et al., 2013). Moreover, primary dealers such as investment banks could shift towards 
riskier assets due to low returns of increased cash holdings stemming from the sale of safe 
assets to central banks’ (Joyce et al., 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012). In this way, the 
“portfolio balance” channel resembles the “risk taking” channel of monetary policy in  
commercial banking which posits that lower intermediation spreads rise incentives of 
commercial banks to invest in riskier assets. Previous, empirical evidence also confirms 
our results as Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2013) find that low-interest rates increase credit 
risk of the US BHCs (previously known as investment banks). Another channel through 
which UMP could increase the risk-taking of investment banks is through limiting 
extreme movements in asset prices. Based on previous empirical evidence (Bekaert et al., 
2010; Roache and Rousset, 2014), monetary expansionary policies reduce volatility in 
asset prices and consequently reduce market uncertainty. In some detail, Roache and 
Rousset (2014) find that UMP during the crisis and post-crisis period declines extreme 
changes in asset prices that in turn increase increases confidence and risk-taking of 
financial institutions. There is evidence to support that low asset price volatility decreases 
investors’ risk aversion (Lansing and LeRoy, 2014; Lansing, 2015). This is important in 
the case of investment banks as these financial institutions rely heavily on trading 
operations.  
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With regards to the impact of the bank-specific control variables, we find a positive 
association between SIZE and Z-score (Table 4 and 5, all Models), indicating that larger 
banks undertake lower risks compared to smaller banks. The reason is that larger banks 
could benefit from increased risk diversification due to the mixture of banking operations, 
i.e., interest and non-interest activities (Mester, 1993). Similarly, we find a negative 
relationship between SIZE and risk as proxied by SROE. Our results are statistically 
significant in most of our specifications (see Table 5, Model 2,3 and 5; see Table 7, Model 
4 and 6), confirming the presence of risk diversification benefits. Turning to the impact 
of capital on investment banks’ risk-taking, we observe a positive and significant effect 
of E/TA on Z-score at the 10 % (see Table 4, Model 1; see Table 5, Model 1, 4 and 5) 
and 5% level of significance (see Table 5, Model 3), suggesting that managers undertake 
less risky positions under higher levels of capital at risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). We also observe that E/TA exerts a 
negative and significant effect at the 5% (see Table 5 and 7, Model 2,3 and 4) and 1% 
level on SDROE (see Table 5, Model 5) in the relevant fixed effect regressions. 
Concerning the impact of ROAE on Z-score, we observe that increases of ROAE decrease 
the bank risk-taking (see Table 4 and 5, all Models), suggesting that the net income of 
investment banks, that include both net interest and non-interest income, is not associated 
with higher default risk.41 Our finding is consistent with previous studies (Altunbas et al., 
2011; Lamont and Hazelwood, 2013).  
We also observe that FEES/TA exerts a negative and significant effect at the 1% level  
(Table 4 and 5, all Models) on Z-score, suggesting that fee-income is a more volatile 
source of income compared to interest based and that in turn can increase bank risk-taking 
                                                          
41With regards to the impact of ROAE on the SDROE, we omit the former from these regression 
specifications due to multicollinearity reasons. 
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(Stiroh, 2004; Dermiguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). In the case of investment banks, the 
effect of FEE/TA on bank risk-taking is of utmost importance, as the main source of 
income of these financial institutions is derived from non-interest based activities. In the 
same way, we observe a positive association between FEES/TA and SDROE. Our 
findings are significant at the 5% (see Table 5 and 7, Model 1) and 10% (see Table 7, 
Model 2 and 3) significance level and thus confirms that FEE/TA increases bank risk-
taking due to the highly risky and complex operations that investment banks’ operations 
involve. 
With regards to the impact of LIQUID_ASSETS/TA on bank risk, we observe a positive 
and significant effect at the 5% (see Table 4, Model 1,3,4 and 5; see Table 5, all Models) 
and 1% significance level on Z-score (see Table 4, Model 2). This result indicates that 
increases in investment banks’ liquidity reduce liquidity risk (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also test the effect of 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA on SDROE and our findings suggest that there is a negative and 
significant at the 1% impact (see Table 5 and 7, Model 1) of liquidity on risk-taking in 
line with the previous empirical evidence.   
Turning to the VIX indicator, we find that there is a positive association between VIX 
and bank default risk. Our finding is significant at the 5% (see Table 4, Model 1; see 
Table 5, Model 2,4 and 5) and 1% significance level (Table 5, Model 3). This relationship 
could be attributed to the fact that market uncertainty is related positively with bank risk-
taking (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). Likewise, we observe that there is a 
positive association between the VIX indicator and SDROE that in turn confirms our 
previous findings. Our results are robust in most of our specifications at the 5% (see Table 
5, Model 2; see Table 7, Model 2,4 and 5) and 1% (see Table 7, Model 3) level of 
significance. Also, S&P500 has a negative association with default risk, suggesting that 
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stock prices are associated positively with investment banks’ balance sheet assets growth 
and consequently rise of leverage (Adrian and Song Shin, 2010). High level of leverage 
is related positively with bank risk-taking due to a higher risk of default and liquidation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Finally, we observe that S&P500 has a positive relationship 
with SDROE at the 1% significance level (see Table 5, Model 1; see Table 7, all Models), 
confirming in that way our previous results. 
5.5.2 Dynamic panel results 
 
Tables (8, 9, 10 and 11) show the regression results of the dynamic panel analysis with 
the alternative measures of UMP and the two proxies of bank risk-taking, Z-score, and 
SDROE. We choose to perform dynamic panel analysis to account for endogeneity issues 
that are very relevant in the context of our study (Jimenez et al., 2008; Ioannidou et al., 
2015; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011) and further confirm the validity of the fixed effect 
panel results. Based on the dynamic panel results, we identify that the usage of the of the 
two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is appropriate as the coefficients in all the 
corresponding models on the lagged dependent variables, i.e., Z-score and SDROE, 
shows that bank risk-taking is highly persistent (see Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11). Moreover, 
all the observed statistical diagnostics suggest there is no second-order autocorrelation in 
second differences as Hansen test for overidentification remains insignificant in all our 
specifications (see Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11). 
Our dynamic panel estimations show that UMP increases bank risk-taking as proxied by 
Z-score. In some detail, central bank’s assets to GDP (CBA/GDP) ratio enters the 
regression negative and significant at the 5% level (see Table 8, Model 2), supporting our 
main hypothesis (H1). In some detail, one of the reasons could be that UMP encourages 
investment banks to undertake riskier positions through the rise of leverage under periods 
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of high financial distress (Adrian and Shin, 2008). Our results are also in line with those 
of previous studies (Delis et al., 2011; Altunbas et al., 2012; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Buch 
et al., 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014; Meaning and Zhu, 2012) that focus exclusively on 
commercial banks. In similar lines with the fixed effect specification, we also observe 
that the combined money supply indicator, M1&M2, exerts a negative and significant 
impact at the 5% level on Z-score (see Table 8, Model 5). This, in turn, denotes that UMP 
increases bank risk-taking consistent with our findings in the fixed effect regressions. 
Similarly, we decompose M1&M2 combined indicator into M1 and M2, and we further 
find that the individual impact of each of the two proxies of UMP remains negative and 
significant at the 5% level (see Table 8, Model 3 and 4). 
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Table 8. Dynamic results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (Z-score) 
determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
Lagged Z-
SCORE 0.457*** 0.428** 0.411** 0.406** 0.407** 
 (0.164) (0.180) (0.178) (0.171) (0.172) 
SIZE 0.194* 0.212** 0.233 0.234* 0.234* 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) 
ROAE 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
E/TA 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
FEES/TA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA 0.004* 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
VIX -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
S&P500 -0.161*** -0.160 -0.192** -0.187** 0.187** 
 (0.051) (0.100) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) 
CBA/GDP  -0.060** - - - 
 - (0.028)    
M1   -0.061**   
   (0.028) - - 
M2 - -  -0.022** - 
    (0.009)  
M1&M2 - - - - -0.017** 
     (0.007) 
Constant -1.62*** -1.35*** -1.954** -1.830** -1.86** 
 (0.452) (0.225) (0.612) (0.521) (0.598) 
Wald test 136.19*** 89.82*** 162.73*** 164.15*** 164.08*** 
Hansen (p-
value) 0.065 0.074 0.064 0.063 0.063 
AR(1) -3.43*** -4.187** -2.517** -2.425** -3.218*** 
AR(2) 0.954 0.998 0.925 0.815 0.889 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a dynamic panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is: Z-score=(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the standard 
deviation of return on assets. Our independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central bank’s assets to gross domestic 
product ratio; M1= Money supply that is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and transaction deposits at 
depository institutions; M2= Money supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination time 
deposits, and retail money market mutual fund shares; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total 
assets ratio ; Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over 
total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= 
stock price index. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, 
** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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With regards to the effect of UMP on bank risk-taking, as proxied by SDROE, our 
conclusions are similar to the Z-score’s specifications. In particular, we observe that 
CBA/GDP ratio enters the regression positive and significant at the 5% level (see Table 
9, Model 2) and hence we conclude that increases in central bank’s assets rise investment 
bank’s risk-taking. In addition, we find that there exists a positive and significant 
relationship at the 5% (see Table 9, Model 5) level between the combined money supply 
indicator, M1&M2, and bank risk-taking as estimated by SDROE that in turn further 
confirms the fixed effect specifications. As above, we also examine the individual impact 
of the M1 and M2 money supply proxies on SDROE and we conclude that they both have 
a positive and significant (see Table 9, Model 3 and 4 respectively) impact on risk taking, 
also confirming our previous findings. Furthermore, we observe that M2 indicator has a 
stronger effect on bank risk compared to M1 variable, suggesting that the former is a 
better barometer of UMP for investment banks in order to gauge the impact of monetary 
expansionary policies on risk-taking.  
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Table 9. Dynamic results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (SDROE) 
determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
Lagged 
SDROE 0.371** 0.366** 0.473*** 0.608*** 0.600*** 
 (0.174) (0.170) (0.094) (0.192) (0.200) 
SIZE -0.451 -1.452 -1.713 -0.372 -0.325 
 (0.358) (1.693) (2.091) (0.900) (0.879) 
E/TA -0.012 0.020 -0.025* 0.009 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
FEES/TA 0.008* 0.009* 0.013** 0.013** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA -0.006 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
VIX 0.008 0.016 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
S&P500 0.267 0.202 1.060 1.044* 1.024 
 (0.643) (0.752) (0.669) (0.601) (0.627) 
CBA/GDP 0.427** - - - 
  (0.117)    
M1 - - 0.100* - - 
   (0.056)   
M2 - - - 0.497** - 
    (0.227)  
M1&M2 - - - - 0.441** 
     (0.220) 
Constant 5.976 13.921 13.30*** 56.25*** 51.548** 
 5.182 13.03 2.700 24.67 25.03 
Wald test 76.75*** 22.01*** 162.24*** 67.90*** 54.22*** 
Hansen (p-
value) 0.124 0.185 0.145 0.137 0.128 
AR(1) -2.28** -2.48** -2.60*** -2.47** -2.44** 
AR(2) 0.975 0.885 0.995 0.834 0.956 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a dynamic panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 
2014Q4.  Our dependent variable is: SDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity as estimated 
based on twelve quarters. Our independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central bank’s assets to gross 
domestic product ratio; M1= Money supply that is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and 
transaction deposits at depository institutions; M2= Money supply that is defined as M1 plus savings 
deposits, small-denomination time deposits, and retail money market mutual fund shares; SIZE= natural 
logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio; Return on average equity ROAE= Net 
income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment 
banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index. We check 
that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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In addition, we observe the effect of Taylor gap, as another measure of UMP, on Z-score 
using a dynamic panel model. In particular, TAYL.GAP-NCORE, as estimated by the 
non-core CPI, enters the regression positive and significant at the 5% level (see Table 10, 
Model 2). This result further boosts our findings that when interest rates fall below the 
benchmark rate banks raise their risk taking. Moreover, we estimate Taylor gap using 
non-core CPI in order to examine in more detail the effect of Taylor gap under different 
inflation rates. Similarly, to our fixed effect estimations, we observe that TAYL.GAP-
CORE exerts a positive and significant at the 5% level effect on Z-score (see Table 10, 
Model 3), confirming in that way our previous findings. These results further confirm that 
Taylor gap increases bank risk-taking consistent with existing empirical evidence that 
concentrates on the effect of Taylor gap on risk-taking of commercial banks (Altunbas et 
al., 2010; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). Turning to the impact of interest rates on Z-score 
using dynamic panel estimations, we also observe a positive association between 
SHADOW-RATE and FED-RATE and Z-score but these findings are not statistically 
significant (see Table 10, Model 4 and 5). The positive relationship of federal fund rate 
and bank risk-taking is consistent with previous empirical research (Buch et al., 2014; 
Ioannidou et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013; De Nicolò et al., 2010). 
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Table 10. Dynamic results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (Z-
score) determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
Lagged Z-
SCORE 0.457*** 0.352** 0.329** 0.409** 0.445** 
 (0.164) (0.149) (0.152) (0.195) (0.202) 
SIZE 0.194* 0.262 0.260 0.219* 0.052 
 (0.104) (0.180) (0.181) (0.117) (0.057) 
ROAE 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
E/TA 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.023) 
FEES/TA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.000) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA 0.004* 0.002* 0.004 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) 
VIX -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
S&P500 -0.161*** -0.152*** -0.159*** -0.210* -0.077 
 (0.051) (0.064) (0.066) (0.125) (0.140) 
TAYL.GAP-
NCORE 
- 
0.019** 
   
  (0.008) - - - 
TAYL.GAP-
CORE 
- - 
0.026** 
  
   (0.012) - - 
SHADOW-
RATE 
- -  
0.003 
 
   - (0.004) - 
FED-RATE - -   0.006 
   - - (0.005) 
Constant -1.62*** -1.75*** -1.77*** -2.13*** -1.87*** 
 (0.452) (0.487) (0.554) (0.548) (0.513) 
Wald test 136.19*** 55.39*** 284.34*** 76.01*** 238.37*** 
Hansen (p-
value) 0.065 0.125 0.137 0.158 0.125 
AR(1) -3.43*** -2.78*** -2.565** -2.470** -2.857*** 
AR(2) 0.954 0.754 0.885 0.998 0.991 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a dynamic panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is: Z-score=(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity and sdROE is the standard 
deviation of return on assets. Our independent variables are: TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference between the federal 
fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the non-core CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= 
Difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core 
CPI; SHADOW-RATE= shadow short rate; FED-RATE= federal fund rate; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; 
E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; 
VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Our findings concerning the effect of Taylor gap on SDROE are similar to the fixed-effect 
specifications. With regards to the impact of TAYL.GAP-NCORE on SDROE, 
TAYL.GAP-NCORE enters the regression negative and significant at the 1% level (see 
Table 11, Model 2), suggesting that lower (negative) values increase bank risk-taking of 
investment banks. Turning now to the impact of Taylor gap, as estimated by core CPI, on 
SDROE, we observe that TAYL.GAP-CORE also exerts a negative effect on bank risk-
taking confirming in that way our previous findings (see Table 11, Model 3). Regarding 
the impact of interest rates on SDROE using a dynamic panel analysis, we observe that 
increases of SHADOW-RATE and FED-RATE decrease bank risk-taking. In some detail, 
both SHADOW-RATE and FED-RATE have a negative and significant at the 5% level 
on SDROE (see Table 11, Model 4 and 5). This, in turn, suggests that lower values of 
interest rates particularly close to zero increase bank risk-taking in line with existing 
empirical evidence (Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2013).  
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Table 11. Dynamic results for unconventional monetary policies measures as bank risk (SDROE) 
determinants of US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
Lagged 
SDROE 0.371** 0.401*** 0.423*** 0.369** 0.335** 
 (0.174) (0.136) (0.132) (0.160) (0.144) 
SIZE -0.451 -0.271 -0.514** -0.243 -0.166 
 (0.358) (0.912) (0.254) (1.749) (0.263) 
E/TA -0.012 -0.029 -0.021 -0.017 -0.029** 
 (0.015) (0.071) (0.078) (0.018) (0.013) 
FEES/TA 0.008* 0.015 0.007** 0.009* 0.112** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
LIQUID_ASS
ETS/TA -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.023* 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) 
VIX 0.008 0.023** 0.019** 0.011 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
S&P500 0.267 2.370*** 1.911* 0.001 1.522** 
 (0.643) (0.899) (1.129) (0.001) (0.610) 
TAYL.GAP-NCORE- -0.101***    
  (0.036)    
TAYL.GAP-CORE - -0.166   
   (0.153)   
SHADOW-RATE - - -0.111**  
    (0.047)  
FED-RATE - - - - -0.131** 
     (0.051) 
Constant 5.976 15.34*** 16.70 16.69 17.45*** 
 (5.182) (5.181) (11.136) (11.135) (5.243) 
Wald test 76.75*** 179.18*** 24.35*** 24.35*** 32.14*** 
Hansen (p-
value) 0.124 0.053 0.078 0.178 0.248 
AR(1) -2.28** -1.93** -2.67*** -2.67*** -2.28** 
AR(2) 0.975 0.810 0.924 0.971 0.962 
Number of 
banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a dynamic panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is: SDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity as estimated based on twelve quarters. Our 
independent variables are: TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate 
estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the non-core CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= Difference between the federal 
fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core CPI; SHADOW-RATE= shadow 
short rate; FED-RATE= federal fund rate; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; 
Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; 
FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index 
We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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In support of our findings in the fixed effect specifications, we also observe that 
expansionary monetary policy asserts a positive effect on risk-taking of investment banks. 
Another channel through which UMP could rise the risk-taking of investment banks is 
through the procyclical behaviour of leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2008). The procyclicality 
of investment banks’ leverage suggests that during periods of monetary expansionary 
policies the level of leverage of these financial institutions rises. The reason is that UMP 
boosts asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014) and this, in turn, could raise the level of 
equity of investment banks and reduce their debt.  As a response to this capital structure 
change, investment banks increase their borrowing that consequently raises the demand 
of assets (Adrian and Shin, 2008). This rise in asset demand could further increase asset 
prices and result in an increase of investment banks’ leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2008). 
High leveraged institutions are considered as riskier compared to low leveraged 
particularly under periods of high financial distress when high leveraged banks face 
increased default risk.   
Regarding the effect of the bank-specific control variables, our findings are consistent 
with those of fixed effect specifications. In particular, SIZE exerts a positive and 
significant at the 5% (see Table 8, Model 2) and 10% level impact (see Table 8, Model 
1,4 and 5; see Table 10, Model 1 and 4), suggesting that large banks could take advantage 
of risk diversification benefits. Similarly, we find that increases in SIZE decrease SDROE 
that in turn displays that larger investment banks income’s volatility reduces compared to 
smaller banks due to increased diversification benefits. The negative impact of SIZE on 
SDROE is apparent in all our specifications, although the effect is not statistically 
significant across all the regression models (see Table 9 and 11, all Models). We also 
observe, a positive association between E/TA and Z-score, signaling that increases in 
capital reduce investment banks’ default risk as managers would be more risk-averse due 
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to increased capital at risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). This 
association is also apparent in the specifications where we use SDROE as a risk indicator. 
In particular, we find that E/TA exerts a negative impact at the 10% (see Table 9, Model 
3) and 5% (see Table 11, Model 5) significance level on SDROE, signifying that increases 
of equity reduce risk-taking of investment banks. With regards to the impact of ROAE on 
Z-score, we find similar results to those of fixed effect models. In particular, ROAE exerts 
a positive and significant at the 1% level on Z-score (see Table 8 and 10, all Models) that 
in turn shows that the net income of investment banks is associated with income 
diversification benefits as these financial institutions include both non-interest and 
interest-based income (Altunbas et al., 2011; Lamont and Hazelwood, 2013). 
In addition, we find that FEES/TA exerts a positive and significant impact at the 10% 
(see Table 9, Model 1 and 2; Table 11, Model 1 and 4) and 5% significance level on 
SDROE (see Table 9, Model 3,4 and 5; Table 11, Model 3 and 5), confirming in that way 
that non-interest based income rises bank-risk (Stiroh, 2004; Dermiguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). As in the fixed effect specifications, we also find that of 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA have a positive impact on Z-score (see Table 8 and 10), while 
exerts a negative effect on SDROE (see Table 9 and 11). These findings show that 
liquidity reduces bank risk-taking and are consistent with the previous empirical evidence 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Finally, we also observe 
a negative and significant impact of VIX and S&P500 indexes on Z-SCORE, whereas 
both these indicators have a positive and significant effect on SDROE. Our findings are 
also consistent with existing empirical evidence (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997; 
Adrian and Shin, 2010). 
Turning to the impact of the VIX indicator on bank risk, we find that higher values of 
VIX increase bank default risk. Our finding is significant at the 5% (see Table 4, Model 
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1; see Table 5, Model 2,4 and 5) and 1% (Table 5, Model 3) level and is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997), suggesting that 
higher market uncertainty increases bank’s risk default. Likewise, we observe that higher 
values of VIX increase SDROE that in turn confirms our findings. Our results are robust 
in most of our specifications at the 5% (see Table 5, Model 2; see Table 7, Model 2,4 and 
5) and 1% (see Table 7, Model 3) level of significance. Also, S&P500 exerts a negative 
effect on default risk, suggesting an increase of stock prices result in expansion of 
investment banks’ assets growth and consequently rise of leverage (Adrian and Song Shin, 
2010). This, in turn, could increase bank risk-taking due to a higher risk of default and 
liquidation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Finally, we observe that S&P500 exerts a 
positive and significant effect on SDROE at the 1% level (see Table 5, Model 1; see Table 
7, all Models), confirming in that way the positive association between stock price index 
and bank risk-taking. 
5.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we present additional estimates to examine the robustness of our findings.  
These include fixed effect and dynamic panel specifications using as an alternative 
indicator of bank risk that encompasses earnings’ volatility is the standard deviation of 
return on assets (SDROA) (Kwan, 2004; Lepetit et al.,2008; Barry et al.,2011).  
We re-estimate the impact of UMP on bank risk as estimated by SDROA. Our fixed effect 
results show that expansionary monetary policies increase bank risk. In some detail, we 
observe that CBA/GDP ratio increases SDROA, suggesting that central bank’s asset 
growth through LSAPs rises risk-taking of investment banks. Thus, the effect of 
CBA/GDP on SDROA is positive and significant at the 1% level (see Table 12, Model 
2). Moreover, we also find that both M1 and M2 indicators enter the regressions positive 
and significant at the 5% level (see Table 12, Model 3 and 4 respectively). Similarly to 
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our previous findings, we observe that the effect of M2 indicator (0.634) on SDROA is 
fairly stronger than the impact of M1 indicator (0.388). As mentioned before, this is due 
to the fact that the M2 indicator comprises among others, overnight repos and money 
market funds, which encompasses main sources of lending to investment banks (Duygan-
Bump et al. 2010; Rosengren, 2014).       
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Table 12. Robustness check- Fixed effect results for unconventional monetary policies measures 
as bank risk (SDROA) determinants of the US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
SIZE -1.685*** -0.829*** -0.813*** -0.821*** -0.819*** 
 (0.332) (0.244) (0.242) (0.244) (0.243) 
E/TA 0.002 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
FEES/TA 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA 0.119** 0.075** 0.075** 0.076** 0.075** 
 (0.061) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
VIX 0.059 0.020** 0.049 0.064** 0.061** 
 (0.050) (0.010) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
S&P500 0.117 0.100 0.156* 0.147 0.150 
 (0.093) (0.078) (0.083) (0.081) (0.081) 
Central bank assets/GDP - 0.423***    
  (0.137) - - - 
M1 - - 0.388**   
   (0.147) -  
M2 - - - 0.634** - 
    (0.225)  
M1&M2 -    0.571** 
  - - - (0.207) 
Constant 12.377*** 6.882*** 5.189*** 2.371 2.837 
 (2.233) (1.477) (1.469) (1.889) (1.812) 
F-test 9.75*** 22.16*** 21.51*** 22.17*** 22.01*** 
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 
R-squared 0.230 0.134 0.179 0.191 0.149 
Number of banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a fixed effect panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  
Our dependent variable is: SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets as estimated based on twelve quarters. 
Our independent variables are: CBA/GDP= central bank’s assets to gross domestic product ratio; M1= Money supply 
that is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions; M2= Money 
supply that is defined as M1 plus savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits, and retail money market mutual 
fund shares; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= 
liquid assets over total assets ratio; FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied 
index; S&P500= stock price index. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in 
the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Table 13 shows results of dynamic specifications with regards to the impact of Taylor 
gap on SDROA. It is worth mentioning that the impact of TAYL.GAP-CORE on bank 
risk-taking is more robust compared to that of TAYL.GAP-NCORE on SDROA. In 
particular, TAYL.GAP-CORE exerts a negative and significant effect on SDROA at the 
10%, signifying that monetary easing increases bank risk-taking of investment banks (see 
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Table 13, Model 3). Concerning the effect of TAYL.GAP-NCORE on SDROA, we 
observe that remains negative but not statistically significant (see Table 13, Model 2). 
Furthermore, we find that both FED-RATE and SHADOW-RATE have a negative and 
significant effect at the 10% level on bank risk-taking (see Table 13, Model 4 and 5). 
These results suggest that UMP increases SDROA. Overall, our findings lend support to 
our main hypothesis H1 that UMP increases bank risk-taking of investment banks. 
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Table 13. Robustness check- Dynamic results for unconventional monetary policies measures as 
bank risk (SDROA) determinants of the US investment banks (2007Q1-2014Q4). 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) Model(5) 
Lagged SDROA 0.682*** 0.502*** 0.370** 0.421*** 0.420*** 
 (0.064) (0.136) (0.158) (0.137) (0.139) 
SIZE -0.055 -0.150 -0.188 -0.064 -0.061 
 (0.060) (0.153) (0.156) (0.045) (0.041) 
E/TA -0.012*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
FEES/TA 0.019 0.041 -0.067** -0.070** -0.069** 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
LIQUID_ASSETS/TA  0.005***  0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
VIX 0.002 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
S&P500 0.086 0.027* 0.029* 0.019 0.020* 
 (0.072) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.0011) 
TAYL.GAP-NCORE- -0.010    
  (0.010)    
TAYL.GAP-CORE - -0.160*   
   (0.083)   
SHADOW-RATE - - -0.071*  
    (0.036)  
FED-RATE - - - - -0.079* 
     (0.045) 
Constant 1.628** 3.35** 2.378* 3.598*** 2.941** 
 (0.684) (1.410) (1.378) (1.325) (1.286) 
Wald test 36.75*** 50.66*** 52.85*** 61.73*** 59.85*** 
Hansen (p-value) 0.078 0.096 0.117 0.120 0.117 
AR(1) -3.90*** -5.94*** -4.67*** -3.67*** -3.28*** 
AR(2) 0.678 0.814 0.874 0.751 0.956 
Number of banks 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: the Table shows the regression results based on a dynamic panel model over the period 2007Q1 to 2014Q4.  Our 
dependent variable is: SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets as estimated based on twelve quarters. Our 
independent variables are: TAYL.GAP-NCORE= Difference between the federal fund rate and the Taylor rate 
estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the non-core CPI; TAYL.GAP-CORE= Difference between the federal 
fund rate and the Taylor rate estimated by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the core CPI; SHADOW-RATE= shadow 
short rate; FED-RATE= federal fund rate; SIZE= natural logarithm of total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets ratio ; 
Return on average equity ROAE= Net income/ total assets; LIQUID_ASSETS/TA= liquid assets over total assets ratio; 
FEES/TA= investment banking fees over total assets ratio; VIX= volatility implied index; S&P500= stock price index 
We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Regarding the other risk indicator correlates, we find SIZE to have a strong negative effect 
on bank risk. As in with our previous findings, E/TA, and LIQUID_ASSETS/TA ratios 
have a negative effect on risk-taking while FEES/TA increases bank risk. Lastly, the 
relationship between VIX and S&P500 and SDROA remains positive and significant, in 
line with our previous results. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the risk-
taking of the US investment banks for the 2007Q1-2014Q4. We find that there is a strong 
positive association between UMP and bank risk-taking of investment banks. In some 
detail, we find that central banks’ assets to gross domestic product ratio exerts a positive 
effect on investment bank risk-taking as estimated by both Z-score and SDROE. 
Furthermore, we observe that the effect of the M2 indicator on the risk-taking of 
investment banks is positive and larger in magnitude than that of M1. This is so as M2 
indicator covers among others, overnight repos and money market funds, which involve 
primary sources of lending to investment banks (Duygan-Bump et al. 2010; Rosengren, 
2014). Moreover, we observe that the shadow short rate introduced by (Wu and Hia, 2014) 
increases the risk-taking of investment banks, confirming in that way both our results and 
the appropriateness of this measure in gauging the impact of UMP on bank risk-taking. 
Overall, our results lend support to a risk transmission channel of monetary expansionary 
policies.  
Our results, also in consideration of the financial crisis, are of importance in terms of both 
policy and managerial implications. In response to the latest crisis, the central bank of the 
US, Fed, has initiated a number of monetary expansion policies to boost the economy and 
increase investment spending. The transformation of investment banks into BHCs and 
their access into the Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage (FDIC) (Volcker, 2010) 
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suggests that they could represent potentially cost for the taxpayer. This, in turn, denotes 
that regulators should put emphasis on ensuring the stability of investment banks as part 
of BHCs. Moreover, investment banks being part of BHCs can have access to deposit 
insurance coverage and hence they can rely on governmental support that might rise the 
undertaken risk of these financial institutions due to increased moral hazard. Therefore, 
managers and policy makers should ensure that investment banks are geared toward 
strategies that could reduce the disproportionate risk of their portfolio. Moreover, as 
investment banking operations still occur within BHCs, regulation of higher minimum 
capital requirements and lower leverage is important particularly for these type of 
financial institutions.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of bank-specific variables on 
the bank performance of the investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland 
countries including the period of the financial crisis.42 Moreover, we look at the impact 
of UMPs on the risk-taking of investment banks. This topic is a novel contribution to the 
banking literature that investigates the determinants of bank performance and risk and has 
substantial policy implications. The contribution initiated by examining the effect of risk, 
liquidity and non-interest income on the performance, as estimated by cost efficiency 
scores, of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland countries (Chapter 2). During the 
last decade the investment banking industry in the industrialized countries, which 
considered being the G7 and Switzerland, has changed dramatically due to the latest 
financial crisis that was initiated by investment banks making the investigation of the 
effect of risk related factors on investment bank performance a timely topic. In more detail, 
we have measured cost efficiency scores using a parametric methodology (SFA) for 
investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland over the 1997-2010 period. As a second stage, 
we have regressed these efficiency scores by employing fixed effects, dynamic panel and 
dynamic threshold analysis for the main three variables, i.e., risk, liquidity and fee-based 
income, of our main interest. An important result that threshold analysis reveals is that 
the positive effect of Z-Score, as a measure of bank stability, on investment bank 
performance is more pronounced for banks of lower risk. This finding is important in the 
context of investment banks whose activities are fundamentally different and inherently 
riskier than those of more conventional type of banks such as commercial or savings. We 
also find that higher liquidity exerts a negative impact on cost efficiency banks for banks 
                                                          
42  Two empirical chapters, the effect of UMPs on risk-taking and the impact of corporate governance on 
bank performance, focuses exclusively on the US investment banks’ due to data availability issues.   
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that fall below a threshold liquidity value. A further analysis shows that this effect is 
driven particularly by investment banks that neither can draw funding from a larger 
banking entity nor depend on bank deposits as conventional banks, in case of credit 
constraints. We also find that the fee income ratio has a positive effect on cost efficiency 
for investment banks that belong to the low fee-income regime. This shows that a rise in 
fee income causes increased risk for investment banks that belong to the high fee-income 
regime. This finding is particularly important and highlights the special nature of 
investment banks compared to conventional banks, as the latter can benefit from an 
increase of the fee-based in terms of risk diversification. The public policy implications 
that arise from this chapter are clear and point out more stringent legislation linked with 
capital requirements. Moreover, with regards to liquidity, the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) as suggested in Basel III in the US and the Capital Requirements Directive  4 
(CRD 4) in Europe could act as defence mechanism in terms of liquidity sufficiency and 
therefore decrease the need for investment banks to seek for external financial aid under 
turbulent economically periods.   
In Chapter 3, we have investigated the effect of the plethora of corporate governance 
measures on bank performance, as estimated by both a structural (profit efficiency) and 
non-structural measures (financial indicators), in the US investment banks over the 2000-
2012 period. Specifically, we examine the effect of five different categories of corporate 
governance on investment bank performance: i) board structure ii) CEO power iii) 
executive compensation iv) ownership of CEO and board members and v) operational 
complexity. We put particular emphasis on these five different categories of corporate 
governance since there is no clear evidence or conclusion of whether and to such extent 
the governance has contributed to the underperformance of the investment banking sector. 
To this end, we regress profit efficiency scores and financial indicators, for a sample of 
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US investment banks over the 2000-2012 period, in dynamic panel models over a number 
of corporate governance variables hand-collected from DEF 14A proxy statements of 
annual meetings found in the SECs EDGAR filings. The findings of this research are 
important since for the first time in the literature is examined the impact of corporate 
governance, as proxied by a number of different measures, on the performance of 
investment banks solely. The motivation for a separate examination of the corporate 
governance in banking is driven mainly by two factors. Firstly, based on the banking 
theory the nature of financial intermediaries makes those institutions less transparent 
compared to another type of organizations owing to the difficulty of regulators and 
shareholders to screen bank assets (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Levine, 2004). In addition, 
the special nature of banks is mirrored in the complexity of these financial institutions’ 
business model (Furfine, 2001). This is particularly apparent in investment banks as their 
operational framework distinguishes them from other types of financial and non-financial 
institutions (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Hence, 
the low level of bank opacity in combination with the high level of business complexity 
of investment banks cause difficulty to outsiders in monitoring bank operations increasing 
in that way information asymmetries (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Secondly, regulation 
plays an important part for financial institutions due to the significant role of banks in the 
well-functioning of the entire economy (Hagendorff, 2014). This monitoring of regulators 
towards banks is a form of additional governance. For example, the Dodd-Frank 
restrictions imposed by US regulators on the remuneration of executives.  Therefore, the 
special operational framework and nature of investment banks raise the need for a 
separate investigation of the relationship between corporate governance on investment 
bank performance. As far as concerns the board structure, we find that there is a negative 
effect of the board size on performance. A further analysis shows that this negative impact 
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is pronounced if board size raises above the threshold value of approximately ten 
members. This suggests that above this critical value screening and monitoring costs 
reduce the performance of investment banks. In addition, we find evidence that the CEO 
power has a positive effect on bank performance, suggesting that investment banks 
increase their performance when the CEO is the chairman of the board or has a long-term 
association with the bank. Moreover, we observe that the board ownership exerts a 
negative impact on performance. In a further analysis, we show that this impact occurs 
solely for banks of board ownership below a critical value. On the contrary, the effect of 
board ownership is positive on investment bank performance above this threshold value. 
These findings are of utmost importance for both regulators and market participants. After 
the burst of the latest financial crisis, investment bank operations, and governance have 
been put into the spotlight of US regulators (Dodd-Frank Act (2010)). Also, the 
compulsory transformation of investment banks into BHCs and their following access 
into the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) support (Volcker, 2010) might increase moral 
hazard for these financial institutions. Hence, regulators should examine ways of ensuring 
that the governance of these financial institutions is linked towards structures that would 
prove to have a positive impact on the performance of investment banks.  
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between M&A advisory fees and bank 
performance, as estimated by technical inefficiency for G7 and Switzerland over the 
1997-2012. M&A revenues comprise the main source of income for investment banks 
and, therefore, it is essential to examine the underlying association between this type of 
fee-based income and bank performance. In addition, a number of deregulation processes 
in G7 and Switzerland countries resulted in the rise of M&A activities both domestically 
and internationally which in turn raised the importance of the role that investment banks 
play as advisors to investors that seek to successfully complete M&A deals. In this chapter, 
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Chapter 4, we estimate technical inefficiency scores by using SFA methodology that can 
take into account undesirable outputs. By doing so, we are able to include bank-specific 
risk in the production function, as the undesirable output of investment banks. The reason 
that this methodology is appropriate in this analysis is because investment banks are 
financial institutions that differ principally from other types of banks, as the former 
engage primarily in activities, such as M&A, riskier and highly complex compared to 
those of saving and commercial banks. Indeed, our results show that bank-specific risk 
increases significantly technical inefficiency of investment banks. We also find that M&A 
fees exert a positive impact on bank performance, as a rise in M&A fees reduce technical 
inefficiency. We further employ panel VAR methodology to further examine the 
robustness of our results and to account for endogeneity issues. In this research, we also 
test for the level of convergence, in terms of technical inefficiency and M&A advisory 
fees,  of investment banks before (2004-2007), during (2007-2010) and after (2007-2010) 
the financial crisis. The reason being that the strong performance of investment banks and 
M&A activity has been decelerated significantly by the latest crisis, causing a negative 
impact on the banking integration process. Based on the above, we investigate the level 
of convergence in inefficiency and M&A advisory fees of investment banks in the G7 
and Switzerland in terms of both their technical inefficiency scores and their income as 
estimated by M&A fees. We find that there is convergence in technical inefficiency and 
M&A fees of investment banks before the crisis (2004-2007), while there is no 
convergence in technical inefficiency during the crisis (2007-2010). By contrast, we find 
evidence of convergence in M&A fees of investment banks over the financial crisis period 
(2007-2010). Therefore, the documented convergence of investment banks in G7 and 
Switzerland countries would encourage regulators to impose harmonization policies, for 
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example, similar capital and liquidity requirements, aiming to enhance the stability of the 
investment banking industry in these countries.  
Chapter 5 explores the impact of UMPs on risk-taking of investment banks, as measured 
by z-score and income volatility (standard deviation of ROE) for the US over the 2007-
2014 period. Expansionary monetary policies, such as LSAPs, have been widely used in 
the US aiming to ensure the stability of financial institutions and boost the economy as a 
whole. Moreover, researchers highlight the key role of investment banks in explaining 
the effects of UMPs on the general funding conditions in a country (Adrian and Shin, 
2008). Also, empirical evidence suggests that UMPs could affect directly the level of 
operations of investment banks, as low-interest rates over an extended period could result 
in the increase of securitisation and underwriting activities. Since these operations consist 
major sources of revenues for investment banks, risky strategies promoted by low-interest 
rates could lead to important destabization effects for these institutions. Hence, the 
investigation of UMPs on the risk-taking of investment banks becomes predominantly 
relevant in the context of this thesis. In Chapter 5, we have regressed the individual level 
of risk of each investment bank with a plethora of variables that capture UMPs both in a 
direct, i.e., central banks’ assets over GDP, monetary aggregates (M1 and M2), taylor gap, 
and an indirect way, i.e., federal fund rate and shadow short rate. We also perform 
sensitivity analysis, where we employ as an alternative measure of risk the standard 
deviation of ROA and examine the impact of UMPs on bank risk-taking through fixed 
and dynamic panel specifications. Overall, we find that UMPs exert a positive and 
significant impact on risk-taking of investment banks across a number of alternative 
regression models, dependent and independent variables employed. An interesting 
finding, that both our main and sensitivity analysis reveals, is that M2 indicator proves to 
be a more appropriate measure compared to M1, as the former includes among others, 
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overnight repos and money market funds, which are main sources of lending to 
investment banks (Duygan-Bump et al. 2010; Rosengren, 2014). Also, our findings 
suggest that the shadow short rate as recently developed by Wu and Hia (2014) confirms 
the presence of a risk-taking channel in line with our previous findings and verifies the 
suitability of this measure in examining the effect of UMP on bank risk-taking. These 
results have important policy implications for regulators and policy makers alike. If 
UMPs play an important role in boosting economic growth and increasing spending, then 
it seems imperative that regulators should put emphasis on strategies that would reduce 
the undertaken risk of investment banks particularly after their transformation into BHCs. 
The reason is that as BHCs investment banks could have access in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Coverage (FDIC) (Volcker, 2010) and that might in turn rises the associated 
risk due to increased moral hazard. Moreover, their access to governmental support could 
represent potentially cost for the taxpayer and thus effective monitoring and screening 
operations are warranted. 
This thesis has provided a comprehensive research on the bank-specific determinants of 
the performance of investment banks prior to and during the crisis, but there remain some 
limitations and challenges for future research. There is a long discussion in the banking 
literature on determining which methodology is most appropriate for estimating bank 
performance. In this thesis, we opt for a number of different bank performance measures 
including cost, profit and technical efficiency estimates using a structural method (SFA). 
We also use numerous non-structural measures, such as ROA and ROE, as financial 
indicators reveal different type of information compared to structural measures of bank 
efficiency estimation. However, in this research we do not employ a non-parametric 
method, such as DEA, to estimate bank performance and further test the impact of bank-
specific variables on investment bank performance. On the one hand, DEA’s main 
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advantage compared to SFA is that its implementation does not require a priori 
information on functional forms (cost, profit or technical production functions) and hence 
there is a low likelihood of estimation bias on efficiency scores. One the other hand, the 
main drawback of DEA is that assumes no noise in the efficiency estimation and hence 
denotes the whole distance of the frontier as inefficiency. However, in future research, it 
would be an interesting endeavour to estimate efficiency scores using DEA and in turn 
further test for the robustness of our results.    
Moreover, due to data and language limitations, we only have looked in this thesis on the 
impact of corporate governance on the US investment bank performance. Therefore, a 
further analysis would enable for the examination of the impact of corporate governance 
on the performance of investment banks in European countries. This is of particular 
research interest since regulators in Europe, after the burst of the latest crisis, have also 
put emphasis on mandates and restrictions with regards to executive compensation, 
ownership and governance control of banks. In particular, regarding the governance of 
UK banks, the Walker (2009) report, appointed by the government after the financial 
crisis, critically discusses and make suggestions for a number of governance-related 
issues, such as the board structure and expertise, managers’ engagement and executive 
remuneration. 
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